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Abstract
This dissertation consists three essays on the economics of housing affordability,
child development, and economic mobility. In these essays, I explore the unintended
policy consequences of rent regulation on tenant labor market outcomes, the inter-
generational effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit on child development, and how
paternal migration affects left-behind children’s non-cognitive development in rural
China.
Chapter One focuses on the rent regulation, which is central to the affordable
housing policies of local municipalities and is on the rise in the United States and
worldwide. In this essay I explore the unintended consequences of rent regulation
on tenant labor market outcomes, along with the impact that policy awareness has
on those outcomes, using a novel data set on rent stabilization in New York City.
Recognizing the potential endogeneity of living in a rent-stabilized unit, I construct
an instrumental variable that leverages variation in the availability of rent-stabilized
units across New York boroughs over three decades of data. I find that rent-stabilized
tenants are more likely to be unemployed compared with tenants in private market-
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rate units, particularly among white and high-skilled tenants. Furthermore, I identify
policy awareness using a unique feature of the data, and show that a large share of
rent-stabilized tenants are either misinformed or unaware of their rent regulation
status. The impact of rent stabilization on unemployment only exists among tenants
who are aware of their regulation status.
Chapter Two aims to investigate the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Given that the theoreti-
cal impact of the EITC on child development is ambiguous, this essay particularly
emphasizes the underlying mechanisms. Using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Development Supplement (CDS) in combination with
an augmented sample of all non-parental child care histories, increased EITC generos-
ity is found to negatively affect cognitive skills of children from single-mother fami-
lies. No significant effect on children from married-mother families is found. Positive
effects are found regarding children’s non-cognitive skills, irrespective of family struc-
ture. Furthermore, several mechanisms are shown to be important. First, there is
strong evidence that both single-mother and married-mother families increase their
non-parental child care usage when facing higher EITC generosity, but this is enacted
in different forms. Single mothers mainly utilize relatives for child care, while married
mothers tend to utilize formal child care programs. Second, single mothers tend to
shift from actively engaged time with children to passively accessible time. Third,
single mothers are found to have increased psychological distress. Both the time input
iii
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and psychological distress channels are not salient among married-mothers. Finally,
the analysis shows that increased goods inputs, measured by income, may not directly
correspond with increased child-specific expenditures.
In Chapter Three we look at how paternal migration affects left-behind children’s
non-cognitive development in developing countries. We use longitudinal data of chil-
dren in rural China and adopt labor market conditions in destination provinces as
instrumental variables for paternal endogenous migration choice. We find that father’s
migration has a significant negative effect on children’s non-cognitive development,
particularly for boys. We test and discuss several mechanisms including parental fi-
nancial inputs, parental time inputs, children’s own time input, household bargaining,
and parenting style.
Advisors
Professor Robert A. Moffitt (Primary Reader and Adviser)
Professor Yingyao Hu (Secondary Reader)
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CHAPTER 1. RENT REGULATION, POLICY AWARENESS, AND LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY
1.1 Abstract
Rent regulation is central to the affordable housing policies of local municipalities
and is on the rise in the United States and worldwide. In this paper I explore the
unintended consequences of rent regulation on tenant labor market outcomes, along
with the impact that policy awareness has on those outcomes, using a novel data
set on rent stabilization in New York City. Recognizing the potential endogeneity
of living in a rent-stabilized unit, I construct an instrumental variable that leverages
variation in the availability of rent-stabilized units across New York boroughs over
three decades of data. I find that rent-stabilized tenants are more likely to be unem-
ployed compared with tenants in private market-rate units, particularly among white
and high-skilled tenants. Furthermore, I identify policy awareness using a unique
feature of the data, and show that a large share of rent-stabilized tenants are either
misinformed or unaware of their rent regulation status. The impact of rent stabiliza-
tion on unemployment only exists among tenants who are aware of their regulation
status.
Housing at Fisher School of Business at Ohio State University, 2019 Workshop on Urban and Re-
gional Economics at Bogotá, Colombia, 2019 National Association for Business Economics (NABE)
Tech Econ Conference, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, and Vanderbilt University. Research
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1.2 Introduction
Rent regulation is central to the affordable housing policies of local municipali-
ties. Its modern version, which limits rent increases, has recently regained legislative
momentum as a result of the rental housing affordability crisis. For example, Oregon,
New York, and California all passed rent regulation bills in 2019. Many more states
in the United States are also considering bringing back rent regulation, with some
presidential candidates even calling for national rent control.2 In this paper I explore
the hitherto understudied effect of rent regulation on labor market outcomes.
In particular I answer two questions: what are the impacts of rent regulation
on tenant labor market outcomes, and would the impacts be different depending on
policy awareness - whether rent-regulated tenants correctly know their rent regulation
status? While there have been extensive studies evaluating the policy’s impacts on
housing price, supply, and quality from the seminal work by Olsen (1972) to the recent
paper by Autor et al. (2014),3 much less is known about the policy’s spillover effects
on behavioral outcomes. Interest in spillover effects has grown recently, where the
outcomes of interest vary from crime (Autor et al., 2017) to eviction (Asquith, 2017)
to tenant mobility, displacement, and inequality (Diamond et al., 2019).4 However,
2Outside the United States, Berlin has introduced a five-year rent freeze plan to counter rising
rents in 2019 as well. A rent freeze is usually regarded as first generation rent regulation, commonly
known as rent control. Paris also reintroduced rent control earlier in 2019.
3Other empirical studies include Early (2000); Early and Olsen (1998); Gyourko and Linneman
(1990); Moon and Stotsky (1993); Nagy (1997); Olsen (1988); Sims (2007) and others. For excellent
reviews, see Arnott (1995); Metcalf (2018); Turner and Malpezzi (2003) and Pastor et al. (2018).
4Most studies are within the partial equilibrium framework in nature. The only exception is
Favilukis et al. (2019), who build a general equilibrium model and discuss the role of different
3
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the effect of rent regulation on tenant labor market outcomes in the United States
remains an unexamined question. Rent regulation matters for labor market outcomes
because it generates a rent subsidy for rent-regulated tenants. Such a rent subsidy
not only offers insurance value and eases the intertemporal budget constraint, but
it also induces “lock-in” by reducing residential and geographical mobility, both of
which could affect labor outcomes, such as job search behavior and unemployment.5
One of the main contributions of this paper is to propose and quantify a novel
causal claim of rent regulation on tenant labor market outcomes. Researchers have
studied the spillover effects of other assisted housing programs on recipients’ labor
market outcomes, such as Van Dijk (2019); Jacob and Ludwig (2012); Newman et al.
(2009); Shroder (2002); Susin (2005) and others.6 However, rent regulation differs in
critical ways from most assisted housing programs that have been studied, in partic-
ular, public housing and housing voucher programs. Specifically, rent regulation is
not a means-tested welfare program targeted at the low-income population. It has no
income eligibility rule, no formal application requirement, and no work requirement,
nor does the benefit decrease when a renter’s earnings increase. From an ex-ante
perspective, rent regulation acts like a universal in-kind transfer in which tenants
affordable housing policies on city welfare.
5To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that also links rent regulation with labor market
outcomes is Svarer et al. (2005), which looks at rent control in Denmark. However, the policy
institutions and the rental housing markets are fundamentally different between the United States
and Denmark. Moreover, to reach causation, my paper pays close attention to the self-selection in
rent-regulated housing, which is likely to be an endogenous choice.
6Olsen (2003) and Collinson et al. (2015) offer excellent reviews on the effect of assisted housing
programs on various outcomes.
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with all backgrounds are eligible to participate. Hence, not only is the overall effect
of rent regulation on tenant labor market outcome important, but so is the evidence
on the ex-post incidence of the program and its potential heterogeneous effects. Such
evidence sheds light on the equity, efficiency, and potential misallocation of rent regu-
lation policy, which have been emphasized in Gyourko and Linneman (1989), Glaeser
(1996) and Glaeser and Luttmer (2003).
This paper also offers empirical evidence about policy awareness and highlights
its important role in affecting tenant labor market outcomes. Program participants
are commonly assumed to be rational in the program evaluation/treatment effect
literature. This assumption suggests that rent-regulated tenants are fully aware of
their regulation status and, accordingly, their rent subsidy. However, I document
new evidence to verify this assumption and explore its implication. Policy awareness
matters because it affects tenants’ forward-looking decision-making - tenants who are
unaware of their status will not behave in this way.
This paper focuses on rent stabilization in New York City, in which rent increases
are limited.7 The empirical analysis uses the New York City Housing and Vacancy
Survey (NYCHVS). This data set is representative for the entire city and is conducted
about every three years by the U.S. Census Bureau. It contains detailed information
on both housing and household characteristics. A unique feature of this data set is it
provides accurate rent regulation status of each housing unit verified by administrative
7In 2017, New York City had about 1 million rent-stabilized housing units - even more than
private market-rate units.
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sources, irrespective of being occupied or vacant.
There are endogeneity concerns in assessing the causal impact of rent regulation
on tenant labor market outcomes, because renters living in rent-stabilized units might
be systematically different in unobserved ways from those living in private market-
rate units. Those differences, such as individual skills, preferences, or labor market
shocks, might also directly affect tenant labor market outcomes but be unobservable
to researchers. Therefore, any statistically significant association does not necessarily
convey causation. I first provide evidence that rent-stabilized tenants are observation-
ally similar to tenants in private market-rate units, particularly in terms of education
and income. This pattern is distinct from that is commonly found in other assisted
housing program studies in which program beneficiaries often have lower socioeco-
nomic background and educational attainment.
I use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to overcome the possible self-selection
concerns. Equipped with three decades of housing and vacancy data since 1978, I
achieve causal inference by leveraging the variation in the availability of rent-stabilized
units across New York boroughs over time. To strengthen the validity of the instru-
ment, various procedures are applied to alleviate different concerns such as unobserved
confounding factors at the borough level, move-in year endogeneity, and model mis-
specification. Last but not least, I apply the sorted effect method, recently developed
by (Chernozhukov et al., 2018), to discover heterogeneous effects beyond their aver-
ages.
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Furthermore, a unique feature of the data allows identification of policy awareness
because the data contain information about both the legal rent regulation status and
tenants’ self-perception on all units. This paper also leverages local rent-regulation
knowledge differences at the sub-borough level (inspired by Chetty et al. (2013)) as
an additional instrument for policy awareness to strengthen the causation and to
investigate whether policy awareness matters for the impacts of rent stabilization on
tenant labor market outcomes.
Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit baseline estimates show that rent-
stabilized tenants are more likely to be unemployed (about 2.3-3.5 percentage point)
when compared with renters in private market-rate units. The IV estimates con-
firm that the negative effect on unemployment is indeed causal. Moreover, the es-
timated coefficients are larger under IV estimation when compared with OLS and
probit baseline estimation. This suggests that the self-selected tenants may have bet-
ter characteristics, which is unobservable and leads to underestimating the negative
effect in baseline estimation8. Moreover, the effects are heterogenous and possibly
counterintuitive: the unemployment effects are only significant among high-skilled,
white tenants, while no significant effects having been found among low-skilled, non-
white tenants. There are no significant causal impacts regarding other labor market
outcomes, such as labor force participation or hourly wage rate.
This paper also documents a new empirical fact about the policy awareness of
8Possible examples of such characteristics include strong search skills or local networks that help
tenants to find both rent-stabilized units and jobs more easily.
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rent stabilization: not everyone knows about it! Among all rent-stabilized tenants,
I find that only 34 percent of those who live in rent-stabilized units are able to
correctly identify their rent regulation status. In contrast, more than 24 percent
are misinformed, believing their housing units are not regulated at all despite living
in rent-stabilized units.9 Descriptive analysis shows that aware renters have a much
better socioeconomic background compared with renters in private market-rate units,
while misinformed renters have a much worse socioeconomic background compared
with renters in private market-rate units.
Results based on the IV strategy demonstrate that rent-stabilized tenants who are
aware of their rent regulation status are more likely to be unemployed, when compared
to renters in private market-rate units. However, no significant causal impact is
found when comparing rent-stabilized tenants who are misinformed with renters in
private market-rate units. Such findings may help readers understand why the effect
of rent stabilization on unemployment is only seen among high-skilled tenants: the
aware group has a much higher education attainment even when compared with
private market renters. High-skilled workers are commonly observed to have higher
geographical mobility than low-skilled workers.10 Therefore, rent stabilization may be
expected to have a greater effect on the aware, high-skilled tenants who are “locked-
in” in a superstar city like New York City (Gyourko et al., 2013). This issue is also
9In addition, 22 percent do not know about regulation status and another 20 percent refused to
answer.
10See Austin et al. (2018); Bound and Holzer (2000); Ganong and Shoag (2017); Notowidigdo
(2019); Topel (1986) among others.
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broadly related to the Oswald hypothesis, which postulates the negative effect of
homeownership on unemployment and other labor market outcomes (Blanchflower
and Oswald (2013); Oswald (1999, 1996)).11
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.3 discusses the institutional
background. Section 2.5 introduces the data and the descriptive analysis. Section 1.5
offers theoretical discussion and then elaboration on the empirical strategy. Sec-
tion 1.6 reports the main results about the effect of rent regulation on labor market
outcomes. Section 1.7 extends the discussion to the role of policy awareness. Sec-
tion 1.8 offers evidence on suggestive mechanisms and checks the robustness. Sec-
tion 2.10 discusses policy implications and conclusions.
1.3 Institutional Background
Rent stabilization is the modern version of rent regulation, which began in New
York City in 1969. Rent stabilization protects tenants in two major ways: (1) ten-
ants are protected from sharp rent increases; (2) tenants have the right to renew their
leases and are protected against arbitrary evictions.12 It is far more popular today
than its predecessor - rent control, which is also known as the first generation of rent
regulation (Arnott, 1995). Rent control involves more stringent restrictions on rent
11Several studies have found negative effects of homeownership on unemployment and wages across
multiple countries and periods (Belot and van Ours, 2001; Coulson and Fisher, 2002; Green and
Hendershott, 2001; Munch et al., 2006; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; Yang, 2019).
12This provides more protection against eviction than in a private market-rate apartment. How-
ever, eviction may occur if a rent-stabilized unit is not used as a primary residence, among other
situations.
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increases (even freezing rents in extreme cases), but it has dwindled in popularity
due to rent-controlled units either become rent-stabilized or completely deregulated
upon vacancy. In 2017, of the 2 million rental market units in New York City, there
were 966,000 rent-stabilized apartments while only about 22,000 rent-controlled apart-
ments.13 This paper focuses exclusively on rent stabilization.14 Figure 1.1 shows the
spatial distribution of rent-stabilized units in the rental market.15
Eligibility of Rent Stabilization. In New York City, rent stabilization generally
applies to three types of apartments in buildings of: (1) six or more units built
between February 1, 1947, and January 1, 1974; (2) six or more units built before
February 1, 1947, and tenants who moved in after June 30, 1971; and (3) three or
more apartments constructed or extensively renovated since 1974 with special tax
benefits, such as J-51, 421a, or other programs. The third category only applies to
the period when tax abatement is effective, which usually lasts for 10-20 years. The
criteria are shown in Figure 1.2, wherein the shadowed areas represent rent-stabilized
units.
Rent Determination. The annual rent increases of rent-stabilized units in New
York City are capped and adjusted by the Rent Guidelines Board (RGB). For ex-
13Rent control in New York City is regarded as a dwindling stock occupied by an elderly, low-
income population. The median age of rent-controlled tenants was 70 in 2011, and the median
annual total household income in 2013 was less than ✩30,000 (in 2016 dollars).
14A brief comparison between these two types of rent regulation is summarized in Table 1.23. For
a complete history of rent regulation in New York City, readers can refer to https://www1.nyc.
gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/history/historyoftheboard.pdf.
15The spatial distribution of rental units and private market-rate units in the rental market are
shown in Figures 1.10 and 1.11.
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ample, between October 1, 2019, and September 30, 2020, a maximum 1.5 percent
increase is allowed for a one-year lease. This guideline has been re-set and has fluc-
tuated every year since 1969.16 Such adjustment is calculated based on the following
criteria: consideration of housing market conditions, economic trends, owner costs
and revenues, availability of financing, changes in housing supply, affordability of
rental housing, rental vacancy rates, cost-of-living indices and other factors. The
main impact of rent stabilization is that this annual adjustment is lower than the
market rent growth. Figure 1.3 documents the average monthly contract rent for pri-
vate market-rate and rent-stabilized units in New York City. Clearly, rent increases
are significantly smaller for rent-stabilized units compared with private market-rate
units.
Greater rent increases are allowed in two situations: (1) when certain types of
capital improvements are undertaken in the unit or large investments are put into the
building and (2) when turnover (known as “vacancy bonus” or “vacancy allowance”)
occurs if an unit is still subject to rent regulation.
Deregulation. There are several main cases for when a rent-stabilized unit is
deregulated. Most commonly, a rent-stabilized unit is deregulated when the rent
reaches the deregulation rent threshold (DRT)17 and when one of the following two
conditions are met: (1) there is a vacancy, or (2) the household’s income is above the
16The historical maximum increase approved by RGB is documented in Table 1.24.
17Between June 19, 1997, and June 23, 2011, the DRT was ✩2,000. In 2019, the DRT was ✩2,774.76
for New York City. More details can be found at https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/
2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.pdf.
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deregulation income threshold (DIT).18 A rent-stabilized unit may also be deregulated
upon vacancy during the conversion to a co-op or condo. Lastly, deregulation may
occur when tax abatements or exemptions that the owner receives expire (for example,
J-51 or 421-a tax benefits).19
Comparisons with Federal Assisted Housing Programs. Rent regulation is special
because it differs in critical ways from most assisted housing programs that have
been studied at the federal level.20 Specifically, rent regulation is not a means-tested
welfare program targeted at the low-income population. As a result, rent-stabilized
tenants have a much wider income distribution. In contrast, most assisted housing
programs have certain forms of income eligibility rules. For example, public housing
tenants can technically earn up to 80 percent of the area median income (AMI), while
such numbers have been lower for both the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC)
program (60 percent) and housing choice voucher program (50 percent).21 Also,
most assisted housing programs require participants to pay about 30 percent of their
adjusted income, such as the public housing or housing choice voucher programs.
In contrast, the rents of rent-stabilized units are not based on tenants’ income at
all, which is more similar to the LIHTC program with a flat rent scheme. Lastly,
18Between July 1, 1998, and June 30, 2011, the DIT income was ✩175,000. From July 1, 2011
onward, the DIT has remained at ✩200,000. See https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/
2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.pdf. for more information
19Rental units in buildings currently receiving J-51 or 421-a benefits are required to be stabilized,
regardless of whether the rent level exceeds the high rent deregulation level.
20Regarding U.S. federal assisted housing programs and the related policy discussion, see Collinson
et al. (2015); Green and Malpezzi (2003); Gyourko and Glaeser (2008); Olsen (2003) for excellent
reviews.
21See Table 2.1 in Collinson et al. (2015).
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unlike other assisted housing programs, rent-stabilized units do not require any formal
application process. Many tenants obtain their rent-stabilized units through good
fortune. If an apartment is indeed rent-stabilized, the landlord is supposed to attach
to the lease the rent stabilization “lease rider.” The rider informs rent-stabilized
tenants of their rights and responsibilities. However, it is not clear how strictly such
requirements are enforced in reality given it is the last step of signing the lease. One
of the novel empirical findings of this paper is that many rent-stabilized tenants are
indeed not aware of their good fortune.
Rent-Stabilized Units Are Difficult to Find. Rent-stabilized units are difficult to
find for the following reasons. First, although a building may contain rent-stabilized
units, not all units in the same building have the same rent-stabilization status.
Moreover, landlords might not advertise rent-stabilized units publicly. As shown in
Figure 1.4, less than 3 percent of online postings on the StreetEasy website contain
advertisements related to rent stabilization.22 However, historical NYCHVS data sug-
gests that at least 25 percent of vacant-for-rent units are rent-stabilized, which makes
searching for rent-stabilized apartments more difficult and often requires specialized
knowledge or local networks.
22The StreetEasy website (https://streeteasy.com) is unique because it allows users to di-
rectly search for keywords in addition to select various criteria. An online posting is considered to
have rent stabilization advertisement if any of the following words appear in the description section:
rent stabilization, rent stabilized, stabilized, and some others. Other websites do not even include
rent stabilization information at all.
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1.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
1.4.1 The New York City Housing and Vacancy
Survey (NYCHVS)
This paper takes advantage of a novel data set that is underexplored - the New
York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) - for the empirical analysis. It
is representative of the entire city and covers all the five boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island). Each wave of data contains approximately
18,000 units, both occupied (either rental-occupied or owner-occupied) and vacant.23
For occupied units, the survey includes comprehensive information about both hous-
ing and household characteristics.
The NYCHVS has a high interview rate of 98 percent and is conducted approx-
imately every three years by the U.S. Census Bureau in compliance with New York
state and New York City’s rent regulation laws.24 For this purpose, the rent regula-
tion status of each housing unit is verified through administrative sources, because
self-reported receipts are not accurate.25 This gives NYCHVS a unique angle on
answering how rent regulation affects tenant behavior and labor market outcomes.
23Each sample unit represents approximately 180 similar housing units. For each occupied housing
unit, there is a person-record in addition to a household record for each person in an occupied housing
unit. For vacant housing units, a house record is also available.
24The survey is sponsored by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development.
25As elaborated in a later section, the distinction between legal regulation status and self-reported
regulation status plays an important role - it identifies policy awareness.
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This paper uses the pooled 2002 and 2005 waves of NYCHVS to construct the
main analytic sample. Almost three decades of data beginning from 1978 are used to
construct IVs for causal identification. Previous studies using NYCHVS have almost
exclusively focused on the housing market in isolation.26 One of the contributions
of this paper is to take advantage of the rich household information and to answer
questions linking housing policy to labor market outcomes.
Moreover, the 2002 and 2005 waves are the most recent surveys that provide
information on both actual rent regulation status and tenants’ self-perceptions.27
Such distinction provides a unique opportunity to differentiate between rent-stabilized
tenants who are aware of their good fortune and those who are not aware and even
misinformed. To the best of my knowledge, this feature has never been used in the
literature before.
Sample Restriction. To construct the analytic sample for empirical analysis, I fol-
low these restrictions: (1) Only rental housing units that are either rent-stabilized or
private market-rate are kept. This excludes other rental housing units, such as rent-
controlled, public housing, and other subsidized rental units, as well as the owner-
occupied market. (2) Households benefiting from any federal, state, or city housing
26The earliest NYCHVS used in the literature was the 1968 wave (Olsen, 1972), (Gyourko and
Linneman, 1989, 1990) and (Ault et al., 1994) in which researchers focused on the role of rent control
(instead of rent stabilization) in the housing market. Later waves are used almost exclusively for
housing market analysis. For example, the 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1987 data are used in Linneman
(1987); Moon and Stotsky (1993); Nagy (1995, 1997) and the 2011 data is used in Sieg and Yoon
(2016).
27Since 2008, the survey question associated with self-reported perception on rent regulation has
been dropped.
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subsidy programs are excluded. The main example is the federal Section 8 hous-
ing choice voucher program.28 (3) Households where the household heads’ nominal
non-labor incomes are greater than ✩100,000 are excluded.29 (4) Households where
household heads are younger than age 26 or older than 54 are excluded.30 (5) House-
holds that moved into their current housing units before 1978, due to data limitations,
are excluded.31
Summary Statistics. Summary statistics on variables related to household and
housing are shown in Table 1.1.32 Detailed variable definitions are provided in ??.
As shown in panel A of Table 1.1, both rent-stabilized and private market-rate
tenants have the same high labor force participation rates (89 percent). These rates
are higher than the national average.33 Rent-stabilized tenants have a relatively higher
unemployment rate (6.3 percent) than private market-rate tenants (5.2 percent). The
difference here is significant at the 5 percent level.34 Rent-stabilized tenants are also
found to have lower wage rates and annual wage incomes. The differences here are
significant at the 1 percent level.
28I am grateful for Ingrid Gould Ellen for offering this suggestion.
29In 2002 and 2005, there are only 160 and 180 such cases are excluded out of the entire 15,894
and 15,547 rental units respectively.
30The empirical results are robust if the upper bound of the age range is extended to 64.
31The earliest NYCHVS data that are available are from 1978. IVs are constructed from the time
of move-in.
32More detailed summary statistics containing standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are
available in Table 1.13 and Table 1.14 respectively.
33The labor force participation rate among 25- to 54-year-olds was 83.3 percent in 2002, according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140106.
htm).
34National unemployment in 2002 and 2005 was 5.8 percent and 5.1percent, respectively, according
to the BLS (https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?periods=Annual+Data&periods_
option=specific_periods&years_option=all_years).
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Regarding individual characteristics, educational attainment is fairly balanced
between rent-stabilized and private market-rate tenants. In terms of demographics,
household heads living in rent-stabilized units are more likely to be female and slightly
older. They are less likely to be born in New York City, to be married, and to have
children, and they are more likely to have smaller families. In terms of ethnicity,
household heads living in rent-stabilized units are less likely to be white or Asian
(but more likely to be Hispanic). There is no significant difference regarding African-
Americans. Lastly, there is no observational difference in terms of the household
heads’ non-labor incomes. In the next section, a regression analysis is conducted
to further investigate what individual characteristics are predictive of being a rent-
stabilized tenant or not. Geographic differences at the sub-borough level, which are
not revealed here in the summary statistics comparison, are particularly considered.
Housing characteristics are shown in panel B of Table 1.1. First, the monthly
contract rent and monthly gross rent of rent-stabilized units are significantly smaller
than those of private market-rate units. The average rent difference is approximately
✩300 per month. Second, the tenure of residence is much longer (more than 2 years)
for tenants living in rent-stabilized units than for those in private market-rate units.
Furthermore, rent-stabilized units are generally smaller than private market-rate units
measured by number of rooms and bedrooms. Last, rent-stabilized units seem to be
of relatively lower quality at both the unit and building level. In the next section, a
regression analysis is conducted that takes such quality difference into account.
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1.4.2 Is Rent Stabilization Valuable?
One may ask if rent stabilization is valuable. When the regulated price is below
the market equilibrium price, landlords can financially benefit from reducing housing
quality in rent-regulated properties. In a static world, assuming housing quality is
linear in price, a landlord may be fully compensated for the wedge between equilibrium
price and regulated price by reducing housing quality sufficiently. In such a scenario,
tenants living in rent-stabilized units do not benefit at all.
Evidence from Rent Stabilization Dummy. Following Autor et al. (2014), I esti-
mate
Pijst = α + β RSi + λ RSi × Tenurei + γXijbt + ǫi (1.1)
where Pijbt indexes the monthly rental price (either in level or in log) of a housing
unit i in building/neighborhood j located in sub-borough s at year t. RSi indicates
whether a housing unit is rent-stabilized. RSi × Tenurei captures how the value of
rent stabilization is larger if one stays in the same dwelling longer. Xijst is a vector
that contains different levels of housing and building traits.
I first look at the effect of rent stabilization at the level of monthly contract rents.
The result is documented in panel A of Table 1.2, wherein different levels of housing
traits are progressively added. Overall, rent-stabilized units do have lower quality-
adjusted rents. The rent discount also increases with a longer tenure of the residence.
On average, the monthly quality-adjusted contract rent is more than ✩350 per month
for a newly moved-in tenant. Every additional year leads to an approximately ✩ 20
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additional discount per month. For someone who has lived in the same unit for 10
years, the average rent discount could be more than ✩550 per month.
The log of monthly contract rents is also considered as an alternative outcome
variable. The results are shown in panel B of Table 1.2. The general takeaway is the
same as in the previous paragraph: rent stabilization is valuable after adjusting for
quality differences. Without having duration of tenure, rent stabilization leads to a
24 percentage point reduction in contract rent. After adding duration of tenure, rent
stabilization leads to a 15 percentage point reduction in contract rent. In addition,
one additional year is linked with a further 1.8 percentage point decrease in rent.35
Evidence from Hedonic Rent Discount. An alternative approach to investigating
the value of rent stabilization is to estimate the rent discount directly, which allows
for greater heterogeneity beyond average. The rent discount is defined as the price
difference between the actual contract rent and the predicted counterfactual market
rent for a rent-stabilized unit. The predicted counterfactual market rent is calculated
using a hedonic pricing approach in the spirit of Rosen (1974).36 Detailed discussion
on how this rent discount is calculated can be found in Jiang et al. (2019). From
this related study, I can draw the estimated rent discount directly. In Figure 1.12,
the rent discount (vertical axis) is plotted against the contract rent for rent-stabilized
35One might wonder whether there is a nonlinear relationship between rent stabilization and
tenure of residence. I have worked on a quadratic interaction term of rent stabilization and tenure of
residence, but the result is not significantly different from the current linear interaction specification.
36Briefly, this exercise involves a two-step procedure. In the first step, the implicit prices of various
housing traits are recovered only by private market units. In the second step, the implicit prices are
used to predict the market price for rent-stabilized units.
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units (horizontal axis), and a local polynomial smooth line is fitted. It is clear that
there exists positive rent discount on average. Furthermore, the rent discount is
much larger for stabilized units with lower contract rents. The rent discount also,
on average, converges to zero when a rent-stabilized contract rent crosses more than
✩2,500, which is consistent with the high-rent deregulation policy institution. In
addition, Figure 1.13 shows the rent discount against total household income. A flat-
fitted line suggests that the overall rent discount is not correlated with family income,
which is consistent with the fact that rent stabilization is not means-tested.
1.4.3 Who Lives in Rent Stabilized Units?
Evidence from Observed Characteristics. I first investigate whether rent-stabilized
tenants have different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics compared with
tenants living in private market-rate units. The answers assist in thinking about
the possibly self-selection concern, which is a key question of any empirical policy
evaluation.
A regression analysis is conducted where the outcome variable is binary, equaling
1 for rent-stabilized tenants and 0 for private market tenants. The analysis includes a
rich set of individual characteristics and uses different model specifications, including
the linear probability model (OLS) as well as binary choice models, such as probit
and logit models. The results are represented in Table 1.3.37
37Column A of Table 1.3 is the the linear probability model, which means that coefficients can be
interpreted as marginal effects directly. Columns B and C of Table 1.3 are probit and logit models,
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Most individual characteristics are not significantly associated with living in rent-
stabilized units, particularly with respect to education and income (either the house-
hold head’s own total income or the total income of all the other family members).
This pattern is distinct from other assisted housing programs, such as public housing
or housing voucher programs in which tenants with lower education and income are
most likely to participate. Many other characteristics prove insignificant, such as age,
coresidence with parents, birth place, and others. The only distinct factors are gender
and family size.38 These findings are robust to alternative binary choice models, such
as probit and logit.
Sources of Endogeneity. Even though tenants in rent-stabilized units seem to
be observationally similar to tenants in private market-rate units, one may still be
concerned with other sources of endogeneity that are unobservable to researchers but
affect tenant labor market outcomes directly, that is, beyond variables included in
Table 1.3.
Let’s first revisit the canonical skill (or ability) bias, which is arguably the most
classical source of omitted variable bias in labor economics.39 On the one hand, given
that rent-stabilized units have lower rents on average, it is plausible that tenants with
respectively. The coefficients have been transformed as marginal effects to ease the interpretation
and comparison to a linear probability model.
38In addition to the baseline model, I also further explore whether there is any pattern associated
with a specific industry or occupation category. While no significant pattern associated with industry
types has been found, there is some level of heterogeneity associated with occupation. For example,
being a social scientist or lawyer is negatively associated with living in rent-stabilized units, while
being a physical scientist or cleaning and building service worker is positively associated with living
in rent-stabilized units. Results are available upon request.
39For example, the wage return to schooling literature summarized in Card (2001), among others.
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lower unobserved skills may have stronger incentives to search for cheaper housing
units. Such tenants with lower unobserved skills may also have worse labor market
outcomes, irrespective of living in rent-stabilized units or not. In this way, a naive
OLS estimation may be overestimating, if rent stabilization is found to be negatively
associated with labor market outcomes. On the other hand, given that rent-stabilized
units are difficult to find, it is plausible that tenants with higher unobserved skills
may more easily locate such units. For example, such tenants may be good at online
searching or have a strong local network, which may also help with job search and
improve other labor market outcomes. In this way, a naive OLS estimation may be
underestimating the true effect, and thus, theoretically ambiguous in terms of the
direction of bias.
Another source of endogeneity comes from reversed causation. For example, some
tenants may expect to have worse labor market outcomes in the future, which causes
them to spend more time and effort searching for rent-stabilized units. Hence, an
observed negative association between living in rent-stabilized units and labor market
outcomes cannot be interpreted as causation either.
A third type of endogeneity stems from unobserved heterogeneity relating to indi-
vidual preferences and tastes. For example, people who do not want to move and pre-
fer residential stability may spend more time and effort searching for rent-stabilized
units. Similarly, people who are more risk averse may also prefer to live in rent-
stabilized units so that they do not need to worry about unexpected rent volatility.
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In contrast, private market renters may be either more risk inclined or have less prefer-
ence for stability. The preferences could have effects in the labor market performance
as well. Therefore, a significant coefficient associated with rent stabilization may not
be causal, and living in a rent-stabilized unit may be a proxy for other preferences
and tastes.
In sum, people who expect to gain the most from rent stabilization may place
greater effort into searching for a rent-stabilized unit. The factors that drive search-
ing may also be correlated with tenants’ future labor market outcomes, which raise
concerns related to endogeneity. The next section will address this issue.
1.5 The Effect of Rent Regulation on La-
bor Market Outcomes
1.5.1 Theoretical Discussion
I first provide theoretical discussion on the effect of rent regulation on labor market
outcomes, particularly unemployment and wage.40 On the one hand, the canonical
theoretical framework to understand job search behavior and unemployment goes
back to McCall (1970) and Lippman and McCall (1976), where the reservation wage
40In the empirical analysis, I also evaluate the effect of rent regulation on labor force participation,
given that rent regulation lowers rent and eases intertemporal budget constraint, which may have
an income effect.
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is endogenously determined and affects unemployment duration in a stationary en-
vironment. When rent stabilization is incorporated in such canonical McCall-type
job search model, there is no impact of rent stabilization on job search behavior or
unemployment duration. The intuition is that for an unemployed worker, no matter
whether the worker accepts or rejects a job offer, s(he) would have to pay the exactly
the same amount of present discounted value of rents, which is a key property coming
out of the stationarity environment.
On the other hand, there are other theoretical alternatives, which are under differ-
ent assumptions compared with the McCall-type job search model, leading to different
predictions.
First, liquidity constraint is not considered in the canonical McCall-type model,
which is important in the job search literature, such as (Basten et al., 2014; Card et al.,
2007; Chetty, 2008) among others. If unemployed renters are liquidity-constrained,
then they would have to accept a job offer earlier than otherwise would be optimal.
Rent stabilization may also help ease liquidity constraint by allowing an unemployed
renter to search longer for a better job. This would predict that rent stabilization
leads to higher unemployment duration.41
Second, instead of applying the reservation wage framework, one could also apply
the search effort framework, such as (Chetty, 2008; DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005;
Paserman, 2008) and others. In this context, the income effects would predict less
41Wage is often assumed to be constant in classical job search model with liquidity constraint.
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job search intensity, which would also affect unemployment duration accordingly.
Last, spatial job search has not been considered yet, which is more commonly
applied in the homeownership and unemployment literature (e.g. Morescalchi (2016);
Munch et al. (2006, 2008)) In particular, as illustrated in Coulson and Fisher (2009),
different models would have completly different theoretical predictions on unemploy-
ment and wage, depending on the specific model assumption. In the end, whether and
how rent stabilization affects labor market outcomes demands empirical investigation.
1.5.2 Preliminary Analysis
I start the preliminary analysis by the following baseline empirical set-up:
Yijst = α + β RSijst + ηXit + ψVjt + λZs + πWt + ǫijst (1.2)
where i indexes householder, j indexes the housing unit in a specific building or
neighborhood, s indexes the sub-borough, and t indexes years.
Yijst is the outcome variable of interest. RSijst is the key variable of interest, which
equals 1 when a householder i lives in a rent-stabilized unit j with certain housing
traits in sub-borough s and year t.42 The estimate of interest is β. Xit stands for
individual-level and household-level characteristics. Vjt stands for housing traits at
the unit, building, and neighborhood levels. Zs is the sub-borough fixed effect and
Wt is the year fixed effect.
42RSijst equals 0 when a householder lives in a private market-rate unit instead.
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The underlying identifying assumption here is that, conditional on regressors Xit,
Vjt, Zs and Wt, rent stabilization is randomly assigned. As such, it is particularly
important to control variables that affect the rent stabilization eligibility. Thus, I
include variables such as how many units a building has and when a building is built,
that largely affect rent stabilization status.
Different sets of control variables are added progressively. The individual-level de-
mographic and socioeconomic characteristics include gender, ethnicity, marital status,
birth place, educational attainment, and nonlabor income (in log). Other household-
level characteristics include whether the householder is coresiding with parent(s),
whether younger children (< 6 years old) or older children (between 6 and 18 years
old) are present, whether non-relatives are present, total family size, householder’s
parental birth places, and total income of other family members (in log). If the
householder is married, then the spouse’s educational attainment and labor market
status are also controlled. Also controlled are housing traits at different levels, such
as the housing unit, building, and neighborhood. The richness of the NYCHVS data
also allows me to control for industry and occupation categories, which control those
unobserved sector-specific shocks.43 Last, the sub-borough and year fixed effects are
included in all model specifications to allow for unobservable local shocks. Households
that have lived in their current units for less than one year are excluded to alleviate
reverse causation concern.
43Both industry and occupation categories are available not only for those who are currently
working but also for those who are currently unemployed or out of the labor force. This excludes,
however, people who have been unemployed or out of the labor force for longer than 5 years.
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1.5.3 Instrumental Variable Strategy
1.5.3.1 Local Availability of Rent Stabilization as Instrumen-
tal Variable
To overcome the endogeneity concern from selection-on-unobservables, I propose
an instrumental variable (IV) approach to achieve causation. The goal is to find an
instrument Z that affects a tenant’s self-selection into a rent-stabilized unit RS but
does not affect the error term in the structural equation (Equation 1.2). This study
exploits the idea that different boroughs in New York City have different levels of rent-
stabilized units that are both vacant and available for rent (vacant-for-rent, hereafter)
in different years. This is referred to as the local availability of rent stabilization.
There are two related instruments that capture such variation. The first instru-
ment IVstabb,t−1 is defined as the ratio of the total number of vacant-for-rent units that







where b indexes different boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten
Island) and t− 1 indexes the year before a tenant moves into the current dwelling.
Similarly, I construct another instrument IVmktb,t−1 as the ratio of the total number
of vacant-for-rent units that are private market-rate Nmktb,t−1 and the total number of
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First, it is worth mentioning that the sum of IVstabb,t−1 and IV
mkt
b,t−1 does not equal to
1 and varies in different years because of the existence of other types of housing, such
as rent-controlled housing, public, and other subsidized housing. The total stock of
such other types of housing also varies by boroughs and years. IVstabb,t−1 and IV
mkt
b,t−1
also vary by borough and years.
Second, both the numerator and denominator in Equation 1.3 and Equation 1.4
specifically refer to units that are vacant-for-rent. A vacant unit could either be for
selling only or neither for sale nor rent.44 The differences between vacant-for-rent
and vacant have important implications for the validity of the instruments, which
are further elaborated on in the next section when discussing the validity of the
instruments.
To construct the proposed instruments, one needs to know the following infor-
mation: (1) when a tenant moves into the current dwelling, (2) how many vacant
units there are in each borough at the time 1 year before move-in, and (3) the rent
regulation status of all the vacant units in each borough at the time 1 year before
move-in.
The data are unique in satisfying all the requirements because NYCHVS depicts a
44A unit that is neither for sale nor rent could have the following reasons: (a) is under or awaiting
renovation; (b) is to be converted to other types of housing; (c) has a legal dispute; and (d) is being
hold for occasional, seasonal, or recreational use.
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complete picture of the New York City housing market for more than three decades.
Condition (1) is easily fulfilled because such information comes from the main analytic
sample in the 2002 and 2005 waves.
Conditions (2) and (3) are more challenging because they require historical data
before move-in years. The earliest data available from NYCHVS are from 1978, and
later waves are as follows: 1981, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005. No
earlier data currently exist accordingly to the best of my knowledge.45 In each wave
of the NYCHVS, even as early as 1978, there is precise, high-quality information
regarding condition (2). This precision exists because, as the U.S. Census Bureau
states, the primary policy tool out of NYCHVS is the vacant available for rent rate,
which is defined as the ratio of the vacant available-for-rent units to the total number
of renter occupied and vacant available-for-rent units for the entire city.46 Regarding
condition (3), all rent regulation statuses are also verified through administrative
sources, which removes any possibility of self-reported measurement error.
Since the sample of each wave of the NYCHVS is based on the decennial census,





b,t−1 at the population level to reduce any measurement error coming
from different survey methods or sampling designs.47 Lastly, for any specific year
45I are grateful for the confirmation from Joseph Gyourko, Choon-Geol Moon, Edgar Olsen, Janet
Stotsky, and the Furman Center at New York University.
46Such information is of high quality because the “The design requires the standard error of the es-
timate of the vacant available for rent rate for the entire city be no more than one-fourth of 1 percent,
if the actual rate was 3 percent.” See https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/nychvs/
technical-documentation/source-and-accuracy/source-2005.pdf for more information.
47For data before 1987, there are no sub-borough identifiers. Hence, the best I can do is construct
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that is not available from NYCHVS, I conduct within sampling interpolation using a
cubic spline interpolation method.
The variations of proposed instruments IVstabb,t−1 and IV
mkt
b,t−1 are shown in Figures 1.5
and 1.6 respectively. In both figures, blue dots are directly obtained and calculated
from NYCHVS, while the red lines represent fitted value based on cubic spline inter-
polation. There are clear variations across different boroughs. Moreover, the value
of the instruments also varies within the same borough because it is determined by
the year of move-in. There is clearly nonlinear variation over time within the bor-
ough. For example, in Manhattan, almost 80 percent of vacant-for-rent units were
rent-stabilized in 1985. Such percentage decreases over time, becoming less than 40
percent in the late 1990s. However, it started to increase since 1999. Such nonlinear
variation shifts the probability of self-selecting into rent-stabilized units and helps to
achieve identification.
1.5.3.2 Instrumental Variable Conditions and Discussion of
Potential Violations
This section assesses the validity of the proposed instruments so that estimation
results can be interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE) (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). The LATE captures the average causal effect on the subgroup of
compliers - tenants whose rent stabilization status is actually affected by the variation
measures at the borough level.
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of IVs. The discussion is largely inspired by Bhuller et al. (2018); Caliendo et al.
(2017); and Arni and Schiprowski (2019).
Relevance. The relevance condition requires that the instrument significantly af-
fects a tenant’s probability of sorting into a rent-stabilized unit given unobservable
heterogeneity. This condition is likely to be satisfied and can be easily verified based
on the first-stage results. The conceptual discussion uses IVstabb,t−1 for illustration pur-
poses. First, when IVstabb,t−1 is high, then there are relatively abundant rent-stabilized
units that are vacant and available-for-rent in a borough’s rental market. In that
case, whether a household is actively searching for a rent-stabilized unit or not, there
is still a relatively higher chance for any household to locate in a rent-stabilized
unit. Searching for rent-stabilized housing then becomes much easier and more fea-
sible. The effects change, when IVstabb,t−1 is low. Consider an extreme case in which
IVstabb,t−1 ≈ 0. No matter how strong the self-selection motive is, the chance of success-
fully locating and renting in a rent-stabilized unit is significantly low. The same logic
holds for IVmktb,t−1, but it affects the probability of a tenant locating in a rent-stabilized
unit in the opposite direction.48
Exogeneity. The second condition for a valid instrument is exogeneity, mean-
ing that the instrument should not correlate with the error term in the structural
equation regarding labor market outcomes (conditional independence). Another in-
48That is, a larger value of IVmktb,t−1 indicates more unregulated market-rate units in a specific
borough. This further reduces the likelihood for a tenant to locate and secure a rent-stabilized unit
irrespective of the search effort.
31
CHAPTER 1. RENT REGULATION, POLICY AWARENESS, AND LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY
terpretation is that the only way through which the proposed instrument affects labor
market outcomes is directly through its effect on the endogenous variable (exclusion
restriction). For this paper, this condition means that the only way through which
local availability of rent stabilization affects tenants’ labor market outcomes in the
future is by affecting tenants’ probability of locating a rent-stabilized unit or not.
First, one must recognize that the proposed instruments are constructed at the
borough-level, the variation of which are not affected by individual tenant’s hous-
ing choice decision one year later. Hence, the instruments are not correlated with
sources of endogeneity at the individual level, such as unobserved individual skills,
preferences, or labor market shocks.
Second, one may be concerned that the move-in year may be endogenous. This
endogeneity is unlikely, and there is direct evidence against such concern. In the
data, a tenant moves into a unit for certain reasons, which are reported. Following
Newman and Wyly (2006), I classify more than 30 different kinds of reasons into
several categories. In particular, I am interested in the employment-related category.49
There is no significant difference in terms of share of employment-related reasons
among all the reasons between rent-stabilized renters and private market renters.
Third, one may also be concerned that the variation of the instruments may be
correlated with other borough-level confounders. Such confounders may also persis-
tently affect the labor market in a way that is unobservable to a researcher. On the
49The employment-related category contains the following reasons: (a) job transfer or new job,
(b) retirement, (c) looking for work, (d) commuting reasons, and (e) other financial or employment
reasons.
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one hand, I argue that a lot of factors driving the variations of the instruments are





is used for illustration
purposes. The denominator, which is total number of vacant-for-rent units (Nallb,t−1),
could change even if the total number of vacant units remains unchanged. For ex-
ample, a vacant unit could become available for rent if renovation is completed, a
legal dispute is resolved, or is no longer held for seasonal or recreational use. A va-
cant unit could also become unavailable for rent if the landlord wants to convert it
to other types of housing. The numerator, which is total number of vacant-for-rent
units that are rent-stabilized N stabb,t−1, could change if (1) a rent-controlled renter moves
out or passes away so that the rent-controlled unit becomes decontrolled and rent-
stabilized, (2) a renovated or newly constructed apartment receives tax benefits and
becomes rent-stabilized, and (3) a previously rent-stabilized unit becomes deregulated
for a variety of reasons.
On the other hand, following Sieg et al. (2002), I measure the average unobserved
neighborhood quality directly and denote it as qb,t, wherein b indexes borough and t
indexes time. qb,t is constructed from the following rental pricing function:




lnqbtBbt + ǫt (1.5)
where Pmktibt is the rental price (measured as monthly contract rent) for private market-
rate unit i in borough b at year t. Xibt contains all the possible physical housing traits
at the unit, building, and neighborhood level - it does not represent the borough
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level. Bt is the borough dummy. Notice that the constant term is not allowed
in Equation 1.5, which makes it possible to estimate the coefficient of all borough
dummies. Heuristically, qbt captures all borough-level unobserved factors, such as
school-quality, crime rate, and pollution, some of which may affect future labor market
outcomes. These factors are capitalized into the market rental prices that cannot be
explained by observable physical housing traits. Most important, the variation of
qbt is informative of the changes in unobserved neighborhood quality dynamics on
average. qbt is then included as an additional control variable in the IV estimation
directly.
Such a procedure is feasible by leveraging the entire 30-year NYCHVS informa-
tion, which is similar to the way the previous instruments were constructed. In every
wave of NYCHVS, I use data at the occupied unit module and estimate Equation 1.5
by focusing only on private market-rate units. For years that are not available in
NYCHVS, I also use cubic spline interpolation. The results are shown in Figure 1.7,
with plots for both the estimated unobservable borough quality and average monthly
rent (in 2017 real value). The points represent actual data observation, and the lines
represent cubic spline interpolation. The rental price pattern is consistent with com-
mon expectations and further strengthens the validity of the interpolation. Overall,
Manhattan has undergone much larger unobserved quality changes when compared
with other boroughs.
Monotonicity. The monotonicity condition means that the participation probabil-
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ity (in this case, the probability of sorting into a rent-stabilized unit) is a (positive)
monotonic function of the instrument, excluding the presence of defiers. It is highly
unlikely that tenants would refuse to choose to live in rent-stabilized units when there
are larger availability vacant-for-rent units locally, because rent-stabilized units cover
a wide range of prices and quality, even including somewhat luxury apartments. Un-
like public housing, there is no stigma effect associated with rent-stabilized units. As
a result, the monotonicity assumption should be successfully satisfied.
1.5.4 The Sorted Effects Method
Last but not least, this paper applies the sorted effect method developed by Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2018) to understand heterogenous effects beyond their averages. The
basic idea of this method is straightforward: the marginal effect in a nonlinear model
(such as the probit model) is evaluated for each observation, which is then collected
and sorted in increasing order and indexed by percentiles. Instead of only relying on
the average marginal effect, this approach completely represents the range of the het-
erogeneous effects. One of the major technical advances Chernozhukov et al. (2018)
make is to offer a bootstrap procedure to calculate the confidence set. This sorted
effect method is applied to both an ordinary probit model (in the preliminary analysis
section) as well as one augmented with the IV strategy.
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1.6 Estimation Results
How does rent stabilization affect tenants’ labor market outcomes? First, I report
the average effect of rent regulation on different measures of labor market outcomes,
based on both OLS estimates and IV estimates, and then I discuss the heterogenous
effects.
1.6.1 Baseline Results
OLS Estimates. Before reporting on the causal effect of rent stabilization, I
first discuss OLS results as a baseline. The identifying assumption here comes from
selection-on-observables. Three sets of outcome variables - labor force participation,
unemployment, and wages - are considered. Table 1.4 contains results from the OLS
estimations, regressing the outcome variables on rent stabilization dummy while con-
trolling for individual covariates progressively and the sub-borough and year fixed
effect.
In panel A, there is no strong association between rent stabilization and labor
force participation. The estimated coefficient is not only statistically insignificant
but also economically negligible. Moreover, when progressively adding different sets
of control variables, the model’s explanatory power increases (R2 becomes larger).
This suggests that the insignificance is not because of a lack of overall prediction
power in the empirical model. Alternative nonlinear model specifications, such as
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probit and logit models, suggest that the result is robust across different models
(panel A of Table 1.15), meaning that the insignificant results are not because of the
special model assumption.
In contrast, a significant relationship emerges when looking at unemployment
status (panel B). Specifically, in column (1), when only the sub-borough and year
fixed effects are controlled, living in a rent-stabilized apartment is associated with
a 1.5 percentage point higher likelihood of being unemployed. This is statistically
significant at a the 1 percent level. However, this model alone is not very informative
given the lack of individual covariates. By adding individual demographic, education,
and other household-level covariates, the parameter of interest becomes robust in both
magnitude and statistical significance. At the same time, the model explanatory
power increases. When housing traits in particular are introduced, the coefficient
increases to 2.5 percentage point with a significant increase in model prediction power.
Last, when all observable characteristics in column (7) are included, the coefficient
is 2.3 percentage point and remains significant at the 1 percent level. Based on
the insights from Oster (2019), the estimate is robust, and the model prediction
power also increases when more individual covariates are introduced. This strengthens
confidence in the results that selection-on-observables is also informative for selection-
on-unobservables. Alternative model specifications, such as probit and logit models,
further confirm that such a relationship is not artificially driven by the linear model
specification assumption. Rather, non-linear models such as probit shows a relatively
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larger effect: 3.6 percentage point in the probit model compared to 2.3 percentage
point in the linear probability model (Ppanel B of Table 1.15).
In panel C of Table 1.4, a similar negative relationship has been found between
rent stabilization and hourly wage rate. The coefficient is approximately 7.1. Given
the log specification of wage rate, the result is interpreted as rent stabilization is
associated with a 7.1 percent lower wage rate.
IV Estimates. I now turn to causal analysis using local availability of rent stabi-
lization as an instrument for a tenant’s sorting into a rent-stabilized unit.
First, the first-stage results are in Table 1.5. The main instrument is IVstabb,t−1
(IV1). In column (1) of Table 1.5, the estimation is precise and the sign is expected.
The larger IVstabb,t−1 leads to a higher probability of living in a rent-stabilized unit.
Specifically, a 10 percent increase of vacant-for-rent and rent-stabilized units in a
borough’s rental market leads to about a 4.7 percentage point increase of likelihood for
living in a rent stabilized unit. The F-statistics in each panel is above 30, irrespective
of various outcome variables of interest. The values of this statistic are much larger
than the suggested rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock et
al., 2002a), which suggests a strong first-stage result. In column (2), the instrument
is IVmktb,t−1 (IV2). Similarly, the estimate is significant and the sign is as expected,
which means that when there are more private market-rate units among all vacant-
for-rent units, a tenant is less likely for a tenant to end up in a rent-stabilized unit.
The F-statistic is relatively smaller (around 20) but is still much larger than the
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threshold of 10. Last, these two instruments IVstabb,t−1 and IV
mkt
b,t−1 are used together
(IV3). Given that there is only one endogenous variable and are two instruments, the
over-identifying test can be conducted. As shown in column (3), the over-identifying
test cannot be rejected in all the panels, where the p-values are between 0.36 and
0.91 in three panels, which further strengthens confidence in the instruments.
I then turn to the main results of rent stabilization on labor force participation,
unemployment, and wage rate, which are shown in panels A, B and C of Table 1.6,
respectively. Overall, there are significant effects on unemployment (panel B) but
no significant results emerge regarding labor force participation (panel A) and wage
rate (panel C). The insignificant results with respect to labor force participation is
not surprising because the results under IV estimates are actually very similar to the
ones under the OLS estimates. The results regarding hourly wage rate are somewhat
surprising given that there is a significant negative relationship in the OLS estimates.
The estimated sign is still negative, but the standard errors become much larger.
This is probably because the hourly wage rate is noisier in such cross-sectional data
structure.
I now focus the discussion on unemployment (panel B), wherein both OLS and IV
results suggest the same direction and are statistically significant. Panel B of Table 1.6
confirms that rent stabilization indeed causes higher likelihood of being unemployed.
The estimates are robust in all three columns and precisely estimated at the 1 percent
level. Notably, the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, though both are
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statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Under our main instrument (IV1),
the point estimate is 0.12. Moreover, the predicted average unemployment rate for
rent-stabilized tenants is 8.33% while the predicted average unemployment rate for
tenants in the private market-rate units is 2.35%. This suggests an estimated impact
of 5.98%.
Why would IV estimates be larger than OLS estimates? This may be possible
because of two different types of reasons. First, the self-selected rent-stabilized tenants
could have better unobserved characteristics, which makes them less likely to be
unemployed in the first place. As mentioned earlier, one possible reason might be that
it is not easy to search for rent-stabilized units - it requires strong searching skills that
may be correlated with other high (unobserved) skills (see ?? for real suggestions on
how to find a rent-stabilized apartment using strong searching skills). Hence, the IV
estimates become larger when removing such unobserved skill premiums underlying
sorting behavior.
Similarly, Abel et al. (2019) emphasizes the importance of an intention-behavior
gap in job search behavior, and the gap is defined as a disconnection between the
intention to perform a particular behavior and the enactment of such behavior. As
a result, the self-selected tenants may have a less intention-behavior gap (regarding
the housing search), which would also be beneficial to their job search in the labor
market.
Another possible reason is related to the local network. Anecdotal stories suggest
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that the local network is important if a prospective tenant wants to find a rent-
stabilized unit. It is well-established that network plays an important role in the job
search as well (Cingano and Rosolia, 2012).
The fact that IV estimates are larger than the OLS or probit estimates is also
in line with the second explanation, which is related to the interpretation of IV
estimates. IV identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) on the subgroup
compliers, meaning those tenants induced to participate in the treatment because
of variation in the instruments (Angrist et al., 1996; Heckman, 1997; Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2005; Imbens, 2014). This means that the IV identifies the effects among
tenants who choose to sort into rent-stabilized units because of larger availability
of vacant-for-rent and rent-stabilized units. This may, though, be different from the
average treatment effect on all treated tenants (ATT). Nevertheless, the LATE in this
case is actually the policy relevant parameter (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001; Mogstad
and Torgovitsky, 2018; Mogstad et al., 2018) because the proposed instruments can
be easily affected by policy changes directly.
1.6.2 Heterogenous Treatment Effect
The IV estimates provide the local average treatment effect. How does the causal
treatment effect vary among different sub-groups? This is particularly important
given that rent stabilization is not a means-tested program. Answers to this question
sheds light on the on the ex-post incidence as well as the equity, efficiency, and
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potential misallocation of rent stabilization.
Four different types of sub-groups are considered. First, I distinguish between
white tenants versus non-white tenants. Secondly, I differentiate by skill level, where
low-skilled tenants are those who do not have a college degree while high-skilled
tenants hold at least a college degree.50 Moreover, I follow Diamond et al. (2019) and
divide the sample by age and tenure duration.51
The IV estimation results for different sub-groups are documented in Table 1.7.
Consistent with the main IV results in Table 1.6, there are no significant effects across
different sub-groups on either labor force participation (panel A) or hourly wage rate
(panel C). Again, the discussion is therefore focused on unemployment (panel B).
I first distinguish between whether tenants are white or nonwhite (Hispanic,
African-American, Asian, etc.) On the one hand, white tenants have a relatively
lower unemployment rate (4.5 percent) on average compared with nonwhite tenants
(6.7 percent). On the other hand, the negative effect of rent stabilization on unem-
ployment is only significant among white tenants, which is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. In contrast, no significant effect is found among non-white
tenants.
Second, I am particularly interested in the distinction by skill (or educational
attainment). Surprisingly, the estimated effect is not significant among low-skilled
50About 18 percent of all tenants in the analytic sample hold post-graduate degrees.
51Diamond et al. (2019) use 4 years of tenure of residence to distinguish between short tenants
versus long tenants. I follow their duration cutoff, which is also around the mean of the sample in
my paper.
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tenants but is only significant among high-skilled tenants (at the 1 percent level)
with larger effects. Why are effects only significant among high-skilled tenants who
are commonly found to have shorter unemployment spells compared with low-skilled
tenants? I offer one novel explanation that is discussed in the next section - the policy
awareness.
I then distinguish tenants by age and tenure duration. The effect is only significant
among tenants whose ages are between 41 and 55 while no significant effect is found
among tenants whose ages are between 26 and 40. Lastly, I do not have find any
significant patterns regarding short-term versus long-term tenants.
Sorted Effects Method. Furthermore, the sorted effects method developed in Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2018) is applied to understand the heterogenous effect beyond the
average. Since the sorted effects method works with nonlinear models, I first apply
this method to an ordinary probit model without using IV. The average marginal
effect is about 3.6 percentage point, which is displayed by the black line in the left
panel of Figure 1.8).52 In contrast, the sorted partial effect varies strongly from 0 to
about 9 percentage point, which is given as the blue line in the left panel of Figure 1.8.
It does not coincide with the average effect of 3.6 percentage point.
Ideally, I am more interested in applying the sorted effects method to the IV
estimation, so that the estimation results can be interpreted as causation directly.
However, the difficulty lies in the fact that the sorted effects method applies to non-
52This has been mentioned previously in Table 1.15.
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linear models while the previous IV estimation is based on two-stage least square
estimation in which both first stage and second stage estimations are based on lin-
ear models. When the outcome variable is continuous, one can apply the control
function method in which the first stage model can be nonlinear. However, for dis-
crete outcome variable, a traditional plug-in approach that would replace the rent
stabilization dummy with probit fitted values in the second-stage probit model, is
nonparametrically unidentified and inconsistent (Chesher, 2003; Imbens and Newey,
2009; Wooldridge, 2015).
An alternative approach is currently applied by adding residuals from the first-
stage probit model to the second-stage probit model (Terza et al., 2008). This might
provide an accurate correction for “small” amounts of endogeneity (Wooldridge,
2015). I admit that this approach may not fully remove all the endogeneity con-
cerns. Thus, the result is mainly for illustration purposes and the interpretation
needs caution. Nevertheless, the sorted partial effect varies strong from 0 to about 12
percentage point, shown by the blue line in the right panel of Figure 1.8). It does not
coincide with the average effect of 7.5 percentage point either, shown by the black
line in the right panel of Figure 1.8.
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1.7 Does Policy Awareness Matter?
So far, the empirical analysis has showed that rent stabilization causes higher
unemployment while has no significant impact on labor force participation or hourly
wage rate. This section moves beyond the classical assumption that program par-
ticipants are always aware of their participation status. Instead, I propose a novel
strategy that exploits the information set of rent-stabilized tenants and ask whether
policy awareness matters.
Theoretically, being aware or not affects tenants’ forecasting on future rent in-
creases. For example, rent-stabilized tenants who are aware of such policy benefits
would have a more stable expectation with lower annual rent increases than both
rent-stabilized tenants who are unaware and tenants in private market-rate units in
superstar cities like New York City. Being aware would further affect other types
of forward-looking decision making. It may also make effects more salient based on
insights from behavioral economics.
1.7.1 Not Everyone Knows!
A unique feature of the information in the 2002 and 2005 waves of the NYCHVS
is that householders are asked to self-report their rent regulation status in addition
to the available legal rent regulation status verified from administrative sources.53
One might expect that most rent-stabilized tenants are aware of their good fortune,
53Unfortunately, such information has been unavailable after 2005.
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that is, those who live in rent-stabilized units should know that their units are indeed
rent-stabilized. However, the simple summary statistics provided in Table 1.8 show
that clearly not every knows!
The first column in Table 1.8 lists the possible answers a tenant can report: (1)
under rent control, (2) under rent stabilization, (3) private market-rate unit (not
regulated), (4) do not know, and (5) do not report. The second and third columns
report the two possible legal regulation situations in the data: either private market-
rate (column (2)) or rent-stabilized (column (3)). This generates a 5 × 2 matrix
where each cell represents a specific pair of self-reported and legal rent regulation
status.
Let’s first focus on the third column, where all participants live in a rent-stabilized
unit. However, not all rent-stabilized renters know about their good fortune. It
may be more surprising than one expects: approximately 34 percent are properly
aware (8.60 percent choosing (1) “Under Rent Control” and 25.55 percent choosing
(2) “Under Rent Stabilization”). In other words, these rent-stabilized tenants think
their units are either rent-stabilized or rent-controlled.54 In contrast, there are more
than 24 percent of rent-stabilized tenants who think their housing units are private
market-rate units that are not regulated at all. Those tenants are clearly misinformed.
There are about 20 percent of rent-stabilized tenants who simply do not know their
54Given that housing units without rent control could still be rent stabilized, I think it may be too
strict to require tenants to be able to tell the distinction between rent control and rent stabilization.
I also argue that the distinction between rent-controlled and rent-stabilized is not very meaningful.
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regulation status.55
Why would so many rent-stabilized tenants not be able to correctly specify their
own housing regulation status? One possibility may be that the question is not well-
posed during the survey. One good way to verify this concern is to look at the second
column, which shows all the tenants who live in private market-rate units. Most
private market-rate renters (around 60 percent) have chosen the correct answer. In
contrast, there are less than 5 percent of private market-rate renters who are misin-
formed (1.79 percent choosing (1) “Under Rent Control” and 3.48 percent choosing
(2) “Under Rent Stabilization”). This means that they believe their apartments are
rent regulated. The misinformation rate among private market-rate tenants is much
lower than the rate among rent-stabilized tenants. Therefore, I am confident that the
survey question contains useful information.
Distinguishing between legal stabilization status and self-reported status provides
a novel strategy for investigating the role of policy awareness by dividing rent-
stabilized tenants into two groups: aware and misinformed. The two groups are
defined as the follows:
1. Aware tenants: rent-stabilized tenants who choose either “Under Rent Control”
or “Under Rent Stabilization” as the self-reported regulation status.
2. Misinformed tenants: rent-stabilized tenants who choose “Private Market-Rate”
as the self-reported regulation status - they clearly have the wrong answer and
55Twenty percent of rent-stabilized tenants choose not to report any answer for this question.
They are excluded in the analysis.
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are misinformed.56
Descriptive Analysis. Before moving to the empirical analysis, let’s first com-
pare the aware (and the misinformed) rent-stabilized tenants with the private market
renters in terms of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The previ-
ous section demonstrated how rent-stabilized tenants are observationally similar to
tenants in private market-rate units without making such policy awareness distinc-
tion.
As shown in Table 1.18, when comparing the aware group (column (1)) to the
private market-rate renters (column (3)), these two groups are considerably different
from one another.57 Perhaps most important, the aware group has considerably higher
educational attainment than private market-rate renters. More than 50 percent of
aware and rent-stabilized tenants have at least a college degree, as compared with
less than 40 percent of private market-rate renters. Similarly, around 10 percent of
aware rent-stabilized tenants are high school dropouts and 16 percent are high school
graduates. Both of these numbers are larger among private market-rate renters (15
and 24 percent, respectively). In terms of labor market outcomes, the aware renters
56An alternative definition could include a set of unaware rent-stabilized tenants, who either
choose “Private Market-Rate” or “Don’t Know” as the self-reported regulation status. However, one
may express concern regarding the underlying meaning and interpretation of “Don’t Know.”. For
example, if a tenant knows that the housing unit is rent-regulated but is unsure whether the housing
unit belongs to the rent control or rent stabilization specification, such a tenant may actually choose
“Don’t Know.” I express gratitude towards Katherine O’Regan for suggesting this perspective.
Such “Don’t Know” tenants should actually be classified in the aware group instead of the unaware
group. Defining misinformed tenants avoids any such potential ambiguity. The empirical results
are quantitatively similar but less precisely estimated when the unaware tenant instead definition is
used instead of misinformed tenant definition. Results are available upon request.
57An overall comparison among the three groups of tenants is documented in Table 1.16
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have both a higher labor force participation rate and higher unemployment rate -
both of which are statistically significant - than private market-rate renters. The
aware renters even have a relatively higher wage income (and wage rate) as well as
nonlabor income than private market-rate renters.
In contrast, the misinformed group (Table 1.19) is significantly different when
compared with private market-rate renters. In particular, the misinformed group ex-
presses worse educational attainment. Less 35 percent of misinformed rent-stabilized
tenants hold college degree or above, which is 5 percent lower than private market-
rate renters and 15 percent lower than the aware group). Almost 45 percent of
unaware rent-stabilized tenants are only high school graduates or dropouts. The un-
aware group also expresses lower income. However, there is no significant difference
in terms of labor force participation and only a weakly larger unemployment rate
among the misinformed compared to private market-rate renters.
1.7.2 Policy Awareness and Unemployment
This section investigates whether policy awareness matters for the impact of rent
stabilization on unemployment. Since being aware is likely to be endogenous, I pro-
pose an additional instrumental variable strategy by exploiting the local awareness
knowledge differences at the sub-borough level to reach causation.
Preliminary Analysis. This analysis is similar to the empirical model I have pre-
viously adopted, where the only difference is that the rent stabilized dummy (RSijst)
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Yijst is the outcome variable of interest and I focus on unemployment in this part.
Awareijst equals 1 when a householder i living in a rent-stabilized unit j in sub-
borough s and year t is aware, and it equals 0 when either a householder is misin-
formed or lives in a private market-rate unit. Similarly, Misinformedijst equals 1 when
a householder i living in a rent-stabilized unit j in sub-borough s and year t is misin-
formed, and equals 0 otherwise. Therefore, I am essentially comparing both the aware
and misinformed groups with the private market-rate renters, or when Awareijst = 0
and Misinformedijst = 0. The coefficients of interest are both β
A and βB. The other
variables are defined in the same way as previously demonstrated.
There is a high possibility that, besides rent stabilization, policy awarenesss is
also endogenous, particularly given the descriptive analysis provided earlier.
Instrumental Variable Strategy. To deal with self-selection, one must recognize the
two endogenous variables here: tenants being either aware or misinformed conditional
on living in rent-stabilized units. This requires at least two instrument variables to
exogenously shift both margins. One option is to use a previously implemented IV,
for example, IVstabb,t−1, which deals with sorting into rent-stabilized units. However,
additional instruments are needed that exogenously shift the policy awareness. In-
spiration comes from Chetty et al. (2013) who proxy for the Earned Income Tax
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Credit (EITC) knowledge with the fraction of individuals who manipulate reported
self-employment income to maximize their credit refund. Such knowledge varies sig-
nificantly across areas. Similarly, I use the variation of rent regulation knowledge at
the local neighborhood level (sub-borough level). More specifically, I use the share of
rent-stabilized tenants who are aware (IVawaresb,t ), misinformed (IV
mis
sb,t ), or don’t know
(IVdksb,t) in each sub-borough as the additional instruments




sb,t are at the sub-borough
level, which is much smaller and local than the borough level. In addition, they are
at the same year as when labor market outcomes are measured because self-selection
into rent-stabilized units has been taken care of by the inclusion of IVstabb,t−1.
I first briefly discuss the validity of the proposed instruments, which follows closely
with the discussion of the validity of IVstabb,t−1. On the one hand, the first-stage result
relies on meaningful geographic variation that affects individual tenant’s housing reg-
ulation knowledge - policy awareness. As shown in Figure 1.9 (and Figures 1.14, 1.15),
there is significant variation at the sub-borough level with respect to local knowledge
about rent stabilization. On the other hand, in terms of exogeneity, I discuss the share
of rent-stabilized tenants who are aware (IVawaresb,t ) for illustration. One may expect
that being aware is highly correlated with educational attainment, therefore Manhat-
tan should have the highest spatial concentration of such local awareness. However,
Figure 1.9 clearly shows that there are other non-Manhattan sub-boroughs that have
a large share of local regulation awareness. Moreover, there are significant differences
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even between two adjacent sub-boroughs. Last, I control for education, ethnicity, and
income level at the sub-borough level in addition to the sub-borough and year fixed
effects to tease out other possible confounding factors at the sub-borough level.
Estimation Results. This section discusses results from both OLS and IV esti-
mates. First, OLS estimates are reported as the baseline analysis in Table 1.9. In the
first column, the OLS result suggests that living in a rent-stabilized unit and being
aware is associated with a 1.9 percentage point higher likelihood of being unemployed
when compared with private market renters. This is significant at the 5 percent level.
In contrast, living in a rent-stabilized unit and being misinformed is associated with
a 1.5 percentage point higher likelihood of being unemployed when compared with
private market renters. This finding is not statistically significant. Both probit and
logit models yield similar results that are aligned with the OLS estimates. However,
since both the aware group and misinformed group are observationally different when
compared with private renters, respectively, the estimated coefficients are unlikely to
be causal.
I then turn to the IV estimations. The first stage result is shown in Table 1.10.
Regarding IV (1), the sign of the coefficients is consistent with expectation. The first
column marks the endogenous variable as being aware. Here, if a sub-borough has
more tenants who are aware on average, then individual rent-stabilized tenants are
more likely to be aware. In contrast, if a sub-borough has more tenants who are
misinformed on average, then individual rent-stabilized tenants are less likely to be
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aware. The opposite is true for misinformed tenants in the second column. All of
these estimates are conditional on the sub-borough characteristics and fixed effect.
One must also recognize that the original IV implemented for rent stabilization - the
fraction of vacant-for-rent and rent-stabilized at the borough level - is statistically
significant for being aware while insignificant for being misinformed. The share of
rent-stabilized tenants who are misinformed or don’t know are used as an alternative
set of instruments - IV (2).58 It is interesting to observe that when a sub-borough has
a larger share of rent-stabilized tenants who report “Don’t Know”, then individual
tenants are more likely to be aware and less likely to be unaware. This suggests that
“Don’t Know” may contain some hidden information.
The IV results for unemployment are shown in Table 1.11. The negative impact of
rent stabilization on unemployment is only significant among the aware tenants. By
removing unobserved confounding factors at the individual level, the estimated causal
effect is much larger than the OLS estimates. This effect is probably not surprising,
given that the aware tenants have a much better educational attainment, are more
likely to be born in New York City, and are more likely to be white. By removing
these socioeconomic premium, the actual causal effect becomes larger. However, there
is no significant effect among the misinformed tenants when compared with renters
in private market-rate units. In addition, the F-statistics are around 10. This further
strengthens confidence in the results.
58Using all three IVs jointly yield similar results quantitatively. Results are available upon request.
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Last, the results discussed here could also offer a rationale for one of the puzzling
findings in the previous section: why is the negative effect of rent stabilization on
unemployment is only significant among high-skilled and white tenant but not among
socioeconomically disadvantaged tenants (such as low-skilled or ethnically minority
tenants)? One likely explanation is because the policy awareness is also concentrated
among high-skilled and white tenants who live in rent-stabilized units. Such policy
awareness would further strengthens the underlying mechanisms - both the insurance
and mobility channels. There are strong evidence showing that quality-adjusted rent
discounts are much larger for tenants who are aware, and the aware tenants also have
much longer residential tenure compared with both misinformed tenants and private
market-rate tenants.
1.8 Discussions
1.8.1 Rent Discount and Mobility as Alternative
Mechanisms
The previous analyses are based on a binary dummy variable that indicates
whether a tenant lives in a rent-stabilized unit or private market-rate unit. While
this definition captures the extensive margin, it does not succeed in regards to the
intensity margin. This is important because rent-stabilized tenants may have differ-
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ent levels of rent discount benefits. Therefore, rent discount is used as an alternative
measure to test the robustness of the results. It is reasonable to expect that a larger
rent discount is associated with a larger effect on unemployment. Moreover, I add
tenure of residence, which is measured by how many years a tenant has lived in the
current dwelling as an additional covariate. This may shed light on the possible mech-
anisms between the rent discount and “lock-in” (mobility) channels. The results are
reported in Table 1.12, wherein the outcome variable is unemployment dummy.
The first column reproduces the result using the rent stabilization dummy from
the previous section. The second column, however, uses the continuous rent discount
measure (Jiang et al., 2019) instead of the rent stabilization dummy. The effect is
still statistically significant at the 1 percent level. More specifically, a ✩1,000 monthly
rent discount resulting from rent stabilization is associated with a 1.9 percentage
point higher likelihood of being unemployed on average. The third column adds
tenure of residence on top of the rent discount variable. Even though the coefficient
in front of rent discount has been slightly absorbed, it remains significant at the 5
percent level. In contrast, even though the coefficient in front of tenure of residence
is positive, it is not significant. One might be concerned that by having a single
tenure of residence variable, a strong assumption that every additional year of living
in the same unit yields the same effect is imposed. As an alternative specification,
I discretize the mobility measure into different categories. As shown in the fourth
column, the pattern remains the same. Namely, a higher rent discount is associated
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with a higher likelihood of being unemployed (at the 1 percent level) while mobility
measures are not significant.
The results might be suggestive in terms of the relative importance of the two
different mechanisms. However, the interpretation demands caution because (1) both
rent discount and mobility are truly endogenous variables, which may also depend on
unobservable heterogeneity; and (2) the analytic sample only includes tenants who
currently live in New York City, so people who move out of New York City to other
states cannot be tracked.
1.8.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Alternative Instruments for Rent Stabilization. As a robustness check, I also adopt
alternative instruments by using the numerators and denominators separately asso-
ciated with IVstabb,t and IV
mkt
b,t . This also allows for an over-identifying restriction test
given that the number of IVs are larger than the number of endogenous variables.
Therefore, I therefore use the total number of vacant-for-rent units, as well as vacant-
for-rent units being rent-stabilized (or market-rate), as instruments, respectively. The
same logic still applies. The difference is that I now rely on the change of absolute
number of different types of housing units directly, while previous IVs use the relative
change in shares of different types.
The first stage results using the alternative instruments are documented in Ta-
ble 1.20. The direction of each IV is still as expected. For example, the first column
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shows a larger total number of vacant-for-rent and rent-stabilized units leads to a
higher probability of living in a rent-stabilized unit. More specifically, an additional
1,000 vacant-for-rent and rent-stabilized units leads to a 2.8 percentage point higher
likelihood to live in a rent-stabilized unit. The opposite is true for the total number
of vacant-for-rent and market-rate units in the second and third columns.
The second stage results for unemployment are documented in Table 1.2159. The
qualitative story holds exactly the same as for the previous IV results: rent stabiliza-
tion does significantly lead to higher unemployment. Using alternative IVs leads to
a relatively smaller estimated coefficient - about 1-2 percentage point smaller in the
absolute number. Moreover, the analyses do not reject the over-identifying restriction
tests. Overall, the estimates are robust and provide convincing causal interpretation.
Missing Values in Policy Awareness. Lastly, I consider the implications of ex-
cluding those observations who have missing values in the policy awareness variable
as additional robustness check. As shown in Table 1.8, there are about 20% of ten-
ants have chosen “not reported” in answering to the question about self-reported rent
regulation status. Such tenants with missing values in the policy awareness variable
are excluded in the analytic sample in the previous section. However, one might be
concerned that such missing values are not random, which might create a sample
selection problem. Hence, I also include these tenants as an additional “missing” cat-
egory, in addition to the original “aware” and “misinformed” categories. Descriptive
59I do not report result on labor force participation and wage rate to save space, given their
insignificant results that are consistent with previous findings. Results available upon request.
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analysis shows that tenants in this “missing” category are observationally more sim-
ilar to renters who are private market renters, while much less similar to renters who
are misinformed. 60 Furthermore, empirical results from both linear regression model
and instrumental variable estimations are shown in Table 1.22. 61 It is confirmed
that the unemployment effect of rent regulation mainly comes from tenants who are
aware, even when the missing category is added.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper takes a first step in understanding the relationship between rent regu-
lation and tenant labor market outcomes and emphasized the role of policy awareness.
I find that rent stabilization causes higher unemployment for rent-stabilized tenants
comparing with tenants in private market-rate units. Effects are more significant
among high-skilled, white tenants. I take novel usage of a unique data set on rent
stabilization in New York City. To deal with self-selection into rent-stabilized units, I
propose an IV strategy. I leverage variation in the availability of rent-stabilized units
across New York boroughs over time.
Moreover, this paper moves beyond traditional program evaluation assumptions
and asks whether policy awareness matters. The unique data feature allows for dif-
60Descriptive summary statistics are available upon request.
61There are now three endogenous variables: rent-stabilized and aware, rent-stabilized and mis-
informed, and rent-stabilized and missing awareness. So at least three instrumental variables are
needed to achieve identification. In addition to the one instrumental variable used for rent stabiliza-
tion or not, I use both the share of rent-stabilized tenants who are aware, and share of rent-stabilized
tenants who are misinformed at sub-borough level.
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ferentiating between legal regulation status versus tenants’ perception. The rent-
stabilized tenants are classified into two groups: aware and misinformed. Aware
tenants know their housing units are regulated. Misinformed tenants live in rent-
stabilized units but believe their units are not regulated. Surprisingly, about 25
percent of rent-stabilized tenants are misinformed about their good fortune. Further-
more, the negative impact of rent stabilization on unemployment is only significant
among tenants who are aware when local housing regulation knowledge is used as
additional instruments to reach causation.
This paper sheds light on important policy implications, particularly in the pres-
ence of renewed legislative momentum at the local municipal level to impose new rent
control measures. The findings are particularly relevant given the recent rent regu-
lation reform in Oregon, New York, and California since 2019. Rent stabilization is
almost like a universal in-kind transfer program.62 It is not means-tested and poorly
targeted. This paper provides novel causal evidence that rent stabilization causes
higher unemployment, which has important aggregate implications. Given the data
limitation, it is hard to further tell whether higher unemployment could be owning to
either eased liquidity constraint or distorted job search behavior, both of which are
fundamental in the discussion of optimal unemployment insurance literature (Moffitt,
2014).
The results still offer implications for potential policy improvements. On the
62This may also be related to the recent discussion on the universal basic income (UBI) program
(Kearney and Mogstad, 2019) in the United States.
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one hand, if the higher unemployment effect is due to eased liquidity constraint -
allows unemployed rent-stabilized tenants to search longer for better jobs, then such
unemployment effect might be socially desirable. However, from a redistribution
perspective, who deserves better access to eased liquidity constraint? The current
policy seems to be inequitable because the effect is only significant among high-skilled,
white tenants. This can also be interpreted as additional type of misallocation cost
(Glaeser, 1996; Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003) broadly.
On the other hand, if the higher unemployment effect is because of distorted job
search behavior, such effect is thus inefficient and socially undesirable.63 If this is the
case, policy makers could learn from the enforcement of minimum job search effort,
which is commonly considered in both unemployment insurance and other welfare
programs, to counteract such inefficiency.
Overall, housing subsidy programs (such as the housing voucher) which target
lower income families might be much better than rent control or rent stabilization poli-
cies, because housing subsidy programs would have more favorable distributional ef-
fects than rent stabilization. The recent report “a roadmap to reducing child poverty”
by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine64 has projected that
expanding the number of housing vouchers would result in major reductions in the
U.S. poverty rate. Given that current housing subsidies are limited, millions of low
63Another possibility maybe that rent stabilization induces tenants to quit their jobs more fre-
quently than optimal (Topel and Ward, 1992).
64National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2019. A Roadmap to Reducing Child
Poverty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25246.
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income families cannot even get a voucher, and many families with vouchers are dis-
criminated by landlords, it seems expanding housing subsidy programs such as the
housing voucher with better enforcement would be more desirable than bringing back
rent regulation.
In addition to the efficiency and equity consideration, this paper also offers novel
evidence that suggests policy awareness matters. The effects on unemployment are
only significant among tenants who are aware, which may also suggest a new direction
for policy improvement as well as future research - what would happen if landlords
are not allowed to inform tenants about the rent stabilization status?
There are multiple avenues for future research. For example, since the data are not
longitudinal, I am unable to investigate the effect of rent stabilization on unemploy-
ment spell duration and re-employment wage. Both outcome variables are important
measures to better understand the implication on unemployment. Moreover, I am
not able to observe households when they move to other places or outside New York
City. This would require a similar panel data structure as used in (Diamond et al.,
2019). Having better data with more measures about job search and labor market
behaviors, as well as longitudinal structure, would allow for deeper understanding of
the underlying mechanisms to complement the findings of this paper.
Another important extension would be to investigate the interaction between rent
regulation and neighborhood effects (Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018). Since rent sta-
bilization leads to longer residential stability, it could potentially have different effects
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for not only adults contemporaneously but also for children in the long run, depending
on different neighborhood qualities. This would be important for understanding the
policy consequences on human capital development and intergenerational mobility.
These are left for future studies.
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1.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Spatial Concentration of Rent-Stabilized Units in NYC
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled 2002 and 2005 waves of New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS). Darker
color represents higher concentration of rent-stabilized units in the rental market in a sub-borough.
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Figure 1.2: Eligibility of Rent Stabilization
Notes: Rent stabilization in New York City generally applies to three types of apartments in buildings of: (a) six or more units built
between February 1, 1947 and January 1, 1974; (b) six or more units built before February 1, 1947 and tenants who moved in after
June 30, 1971; (c) three or more apartments constructed or extensively renovated since 1974 with special tax benefits such as J-51,
421a, or other programs. This only applies to the period when tax abatement is effective, which usually lasts for ten to twenty years.
This figure only considers rent-stabilized units that are not subject to de-regulation.
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Figure 1.3: Average Rent Comparison in New York City
Notes: Data is obtained from 1978 - 2005 waves of the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS). Rent is measured as
average monthly contract rent in 2017 ✩1000 real value. The solid line denotes the average monthly contract rent for rent-stabilized
units while the dashed line denotes the one for private market-rate units.
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Figure 1.4: Share of Online Postings with Rent Stabilization Advertisement
Notes: Data is obtained by author’s manual collection from StreetEasy website (https://streeteasy.com). An online posting is considered
to have rent stabilization advertisement if any of these word appear in the description section: “rent stabilization”, “rent stabilized”,
“stabilized”, etc. Historical New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) data suggests that at least 25% of total vacant-
for-rent units are rent-stabilized. This suggests only a small minority of actual rent-stabilized, vacant apartments are advertised for
their stabilization status.
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Figure 1.5: The Variation of IVstabb,t−1 over Time by Borough
Notes: The instrument IVstabb,t−1 is defined as the ratio of the total number of vacant-for-rent units that are rent-stabilized N
stab
b,t−1
and the total number of vacant-for-rent units Nallb,t−1. Blue dots are directly obtained and calculated from 1978-2005 waves of the
New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS), while the red lines represent fitted value based on cubit spline interpolation.
Staten-Island has fairly small share of rent stabilized rental units and is available upon request.
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Figure 1.6: The Variation of IVmktb,t−1 over Time by Borough
Notes: The instrument IVmktb,t−1 is defined as the ratio of the total number of vacant-for-rent units that are private market-rate N
mkt
b,t−1
and the total number of vacant-for-rent units Nallb,t−1. Blue dots are directly obtained and calculated from 1978-2005 waves of the
New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS), while the red lines represent fitted value based on cubit spline interpolation.
Staten-Island has fairly small share of rent stabilized rental units and is available upon request.
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Figure 1.7: The Unobserved Neighborhood Quality by Boroughs
Notes: Y-axis is measured in terms of 2017 U.S. dollar value. Dots are directly obtained and calculated from 1978-2005 waves of the
New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS). Red solid lines represent fitted value for unobserved neighborhood quality
based on cubit spline interpolation in each borough. Blue dashed lines represent fitted value for average rental price based on cubit



















































































Figure 1.8: The Sorted Effects Method

























































































Notes: Both figures apply the sorted effects method in Chernozhukov et al. (2018). In each figure, black solid line is the average marginal effect, dashed line is the confidence interval for
the average marginal effect, blue solid line represents the collection of sorted effects, and light blue region is the confidence sets. In the left figure, I apply the sorted effects method to an
ordinary probit model in Table 1.15. In the right figure I apply the sorted effects method to a probit model (the second stage) by adding residuals from a first-stage probit model using
instruments for illustration purpose. The interpretation of the right panel needs caution.
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Figure 1.9: Spatial Concentration of Policy Awareness (Aware)
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled 2002 and 2005 waves of New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS). Darker
color represents higher concentration of rent-stabilized tenants who are aware among all rent-stabilized renters in a sub-borough.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Rent Stabilization
Rent-stabilized N Market-rate N Difference
Panel A. Household Characteristics
Currently In the Labor Force 0.89 5514 0.89 3908 0.00
Currently Unemployed 0.06 4904 0.05 3471 0.01∗∗
HHH Wage Rate 29.02 4760 30.70 3333 -1.68∗∗∗
High School Dropout 0.17 5514 0.15 3908 0.01
High School Graduate 0.23 5514 0.24 3908 -0.01
Some College No Degree 0.20 5514 0.21 3908 -0.01
College Degree and Above 0.40 5514 0.40 3908 0.00
Female 0.51 5514 0.45 3908 0.06∗∗∗
Age 38.92 5514 38.19 3908 0.73∗∗∗
White, Non-Hispanic 0.36 5514 0.41 3908 -0.06∗∗∗
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.22 5514 0.22 3908 -0.00
Hispanic 0.31 5514 0.21 3908 0.10∗∗∗
Asian 0.10 5514 0.14 3908 -0.04∗∗∗
Married 0.35 5514 0.44 3908 -0.09∗∗∗
Born in NYC 0.21 5514 0.24 3908 -0.03∗∗∗
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) 0.14 5514 0.13 3908 0.01
Born in Other Country 0.47 5514 0.45 3908 0.02∗∗
Birth Place Missing 0.18 5514 0.18 3908 -0.00
Any Young Child in HH 0.16 5514 0.19 3908 -0.03∗∗∗
Any Child in HH 0.36 5514 0.41 3908 -0.04∗∗∗
Co-reside with Parents 0.04 5514 0.03 3908 0.00
HH Size 2.40 5514 2.69 3908 -0.29∗∗∗
Any Non-relative in HH 0.11 5514 0.13 3908 -0.02∗∗∗
HHH Salary Income, cond. work 52.56 4760 56.98 3333 -4.41∗∗∗
HHH Non-Labor Income 2.95 5514 3.12 3908 -0.17
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. 20.04 5514 26.75 3908 -6.71∗∗∗
Panel B. Housing Characteristics
Monthly Contract Rent 1.18 5514 1.49 3908 -0.31∗∗∗
Monthly Gross Rent 1.27 5514 1.62 3908 -0.35∗∗∗
Tenure of Residence 7.00 5514 5.05 3908 1.95∗∗∗
Num. of Rooms 3.17 5514 3.91 3908 -0.73∗∗∗
Num. of Bedrooms 1.34 5514 1.83 3908 -0.49∗∗∗
Num. of Unit Problems 0.91 5514 0.46 3908 0.45∗∗∗
Num. of Building Problems 0.26 5514 0.18 3908 0.07∗∗∗
Notes: Data comes from the analytic sample of pooled 2002 and 2005 waves of the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey
(NYCHVS). All the monetary values are in 2017 real dollar. Wage rate is in ✩ and all the income-related variables are in ✩1000. “HH”
stands for household and “HHH” stands for household head. Unit problems include toilet breakdown, heating equipment breakdown,
presence of mice and rats, cracks or holes in interior walls, holes in floors, broken plaster or peeling paint on inside walls, water leakage,
etc (see Table ?? for more details). Building problems include issues related to external walls, building windows, stairways, floors, etc
(see Table ?? for more details). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
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Table 1.2: Effect of Rent Stabilization on Monthly Contract Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Level of Monthly Contract Rent
Rent Stabilized -0.38*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.37***
(0.067) (0.059) (0.053) (0.085) (0.079) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
Stab × Duration of Tenure -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Y 1.297 1.297 1.297 1.297 1.297 1.297 1.297 1.297
N 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422
R2 0.425 0.444 0.457 0.548 0.569 0.574 0.581 0.623
Panel B. Log of Monthly Contract Rent
Rent Stabilized -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.046) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Stab × Duration of Tenure -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Y 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
N 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422 9422
R2 0.347 0.376 0.385 0.463 0.492 0.500 0.507 0.552
Sub-borough and Year FE X X X X X X X X
Building Year Built X X X X X X
Structure Characteristics X X X X X
Leasing Type X X X X
Unit Amenity and Quality X X X
Building and Nbhd Quality X X
Borough Interaction X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Structure
characteristics include: 1) number of rooms in the unit, 2) number of bedrooms in the unit, 3) number of units in the building, 4)
number of stories in the building, 5) unit level, 6) whether apartment building owner lives in the same building. Leasing type
includes: 1) the length of leasing, 2) whether electricity is included in rent, 3) whether gas is included in rent, 4) whether gas is
included in rent, 5) whether other fuel is included in rent. Unit amenity and quality include: 1) fuel type, 2) additional fuel, 3)
plumbing condition, 4) kitchen condition, 5) presence of mice and rats, 6) exterminator service, 7) cracks or holes in interior walls, 8)
holes in floors, 9) broken plaster or peeling paint, 10) water leakage, 11) number of heat breakdown, 12) number of toilet breakdown.
Building and neighborhood quality include: 1) elevator in building, 2) sidewalk to elevator/unit without using steps, 3) wheelchair
access to street entry/elevator/unit entrance, 4) has issue of building’s external wall/windows/stairways/floor, 5) overall rating of
building quality, 6) boarded up structures in neighborhood, 7) self-rating of neighborhood quality. Full results containing coefficients
of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.3: Determinants of Rent Stabilization Eligibility
A. LPM B. Probit C. Logit
Female 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
White, Non-Hispanic -0.040* -0.040* -0.039*
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Black, Non-Hispanic -0.019 -0.019 -0.022
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Age 0.010 0.0092 0.0096
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Married -0.013 -0.014 -0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Co-reside with Parents 0.034 0.033 0.033
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Born in Other Country 0.020 0.021 0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
High School Dropout 0.0074 0.013 0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
High School Graduate 0.024 0.027 0.025
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Some College No Degree 0.012 0.015 0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Spouse Has College Degree or Above -0.032 -0.027 -0.027
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Any Child in HH 0.035 0.037* 0.036
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
HH Size -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.041***
(0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0079)
Any Non-relative in HH -0.035** -0.035** -0.034**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
HHH Total Income (Log) -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.00099
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. (Log) 0.00028 0.00040 0.00036
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Sub-borough and Year FE X X X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Column A is linear
probability model (LPM). Column B and C are probit and logit models respectively, and the coefficients have been transformed to be



















































































Table 1.4: Effect of Rent Stabilization on Labor Market Outcomes (OLS)
Panel A. Labor Force Participation
Rent Stabilized -0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0024 0.0067 0.0092 0.0099
(0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.012) (0.0072) (0.0072)
R2 0.021 0.083 0.100 0.106 0.120 0.559 0.565
Panel B. Unemployment
Rent Stabilized 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.023***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0067)
R2 0.011 0.030 0.033 0.035 0.053 0.128 0.143
Panel C. Hourly Wage Rate
Rent Stabilized -0.082*** -0.061*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.086*** -0.076** -0.071**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
R2 0.138 0.199 0.268 0.272 0.292 0.315 0.332
Sub-borough and Year FE X X X X X X X
Demographic Control X X X X X X
Education Control X X X X X
Other Household Control X X X X
Housing and Neighborhood Control X X X
Industry Control X X
Occupation Control X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Demographic controls include gender, race and ethnicity, age, marital
status, co-residence with parents, birth place. Other household controls include presence of children, presence of non-relatives, household size, and spouse’s education and work status for
married renters. Housing and neighborhood controls particularly include factors affecting the rent stabilization eligibility such as year a building is built and number of units in a building
among others. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.5: First Stage of Instrumental Variable Estimation
IV1 IV2 IV3
Panel A. Labor Force Participation
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Stabilized 0.47*** 0.33***
(0.11) (0.071)
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Market-Rate -0.40*** -0.14*
(0.11) (0.074)
R2 0.756 0.756 0.756
F Statistics 37.425 26.303 19.866
Over-Identifying Test 0.8339
Panel B. Unemployment
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Stabilized 0.49*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.070)
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Market-Rate -0.42*** -0.15*
(0.11) (0.080)
R2 0.750 0.750 0.750
F Statistics 35.962 25.395 19.238
Over-Identifying Test 0.3631
Panel C. Hourly Wage Rate
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Stabilized 0.47*** 0.33***
(0.11) (0.076)
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Market-Rate -0.40*** -0.14*
(0.11) (0.086)
R2 0.748 0.748 0.748
F Statistics 34.191 24.934 18.013
Over-Identifying Test 0.9145
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Number of
observations (N) in each panel varies because the outcome variables are different. For example, comparing with panel A, the N is
smaller in panel B because tenants who are not in the labor force are coded as not applicable for answering question to unemployed or
not. All controls include sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood,
industry and occupation control variables included in the last column of Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other
variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.6: Effect of Rent Stabilization on Labor Market Outcomes
(Instrumental Variable Estimation)
Original OLS IV1 IV2 IV3
Panel A. Labor Force Participation
Rent Stabilized 0.010 0.039 0.043 0.040
(0.0073) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036)
R2 0.561 0.555 0.555 0.555
F Statistics 37.425 26.303 19.866
Over-Identifying Test 0.8339
Panel B. Unemployment
Rent Stabilized 0.023*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(0.0063) (0.037) (0.044) (0.037)
R2 0.132 0.091 0.073 0.088
F Statistics 35.962 25.395 19.238
Over-Identifying Test 0.3631
Panel C. Hourly Wage Rate
Rent Stabilized -0.072** -0.17 -0.16 -0.17
(0.033) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
R2 0.322 0.312 0.312 0.312
F Statistics 34.191 24.934 18.013
Over-Identifying Test 0.9145
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. All controls include
sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry and occupation




















































































Table 1.7: Rent Stabilization: Heterogenous Treatment Effects
White Skill Age Tenure
Yes No Low High 26-40 41-55 Short Long
Panel A. Labor Force Participation
Rent Stabilized 0.039 -0.0052 -0.14 0.076 0.029 -0.0013 -0.082 -0.12
(0.041) (0.090) (0.12) (0.047) (0.064) (0.057) (0.21) (0.11)
R2 0.578 0.560 0.586 0.428 0.519 0.640 0.500 0.602
F Statistics 50.745 15.782 13.579 37.002 24.695 36.247 3.673 17.720
Panel B. Unemployment
Rent Stabilized 0.15*** 0.035 0.088 0.14*** 0.046 0.13** -0.029 0.25
(0.029) (0.13) (0.13) (0.037) (0.059) (0.057) (0.18) (0.15)
R2 0.031 0.152 0.132 0.051 0.131 0.114 0.128 0.004
F Statistics 49.359 13.886 12.634 33.091 23.608 38.393 2.931 13.879
Panel C. Hourly Wage Rate
Rent Stabilized -0.15 -0.24 -0.29 -0.063 -0.18 -0.29 -0.13 -0.21
(0.16) (0.30) (0.33) (0.14) (0.21) (0.20) (0.64) (0.37)
R2 0.227 0.273 0.204 0.217 0.314 0.314 0.337 0.301
F Statistics 43.101 16.575 14.667 27.840 22.149 34.838 3.463 12.066
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Low skill tenants are those who do not have a college degree while high
skill tenants hold at least a college degree. Short tenants are those who have lived in their housing units for less than 5 years while long tenants have lived for at least 5 years. All controls
include sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry and occupation control variables included in the last column of
Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.8: Legal Status versus Self-Reported Regulation Status
Self-Reported Status Legal Status
Market-rate Rent-stabilized Total
Rent-controlled 70 474 544
1.79% 8.60% 5.77%
Rent-stabilized 136 1409 1545
3.48% 25.55% 16.40%
Market-rate 2317 1338 3655
59.29% 24.27% 38.79%
Don’t Know 621 1198 1819
15.89% 21.73% 19.31%
Not Reported 764 1095 1859
19.55% 19.86% 19.73%
Total 3908 5514 9422
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Notes: Data comes from pooled 2002 and 2005 waves of the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS).
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Table 1.9: Effect of Rent Stabilization Awareness on Unemployment (Full Sample)
OLS Probit Logit
Aware 0.019** 0.023** 0.022**
(0.0072) (0.0097) (0.0088)
Misinformed 0.015 0.017 0.015
(0.0094) (0.011) (0.010)
R2 0.130 0.104 0.103
All Other Controls X X X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. A rent-stabilized
tenant is aware if the self-reported regulation status is either rent-controlled or rent-stabilized. A rent-stabilized tenant is misinformed
if the self-reported regulation status is market-rate. Unemployment is a binary variable, i.e. Y=1 if a renter is currently unemployed.
All controls include sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry
and occupation control variables included in the last column of Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are
available upon request.
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Table 1.10: First Stage of Instrumental Variable for Policy Awareness
IV (1) IV (2)
Aware Misinformed Aware Misinformed
Fraction of Vacant-for-Rent that are Stabilized 0.80*** 0.045 0.80*** 0.050
(0.12) (0.055) (0.12) (0.056)
Local Rent Regulation Knowledge: Aware 0.28** -0.14 0.54*** -0.49***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Local Rent Regulation Knowledge: Misinformed -0.33*** 0.43***
(0.086) (0.091)
Local Rent Regulation Knowledge: Don’t Know 0.31*** -0.42***
(0.11) (0.11)
R2 0.242 0.148 0.241 0.146
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. All controls include
sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry and occupation
control variables included in the last column of Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are available upon
request.
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Table 1.11: Effect of Policy Awareness on Unemployment
(Instrumental Variable Estimation)
Original OLS IV (1) IV (2)
Aware 0.019** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.0072) (0.043) (0.043)
Misinformed 0.015 0.046 0.025
(0.0094) (0.095) (0.10)
Y 0.061 0.061 0.061
N 6157 6157 6157
R2 0.131 0.107 0.105
F Statistics 10.764 8.733
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. A rent-stabilized
tenant is aware if the self-reported regulation status is either rent-controlled or rent-stabilized. A rent-stabilized tenant is misinformed
if the self-reported regulation status is market-rate. Unemployment is a binary variable, i.e. Y=1 if a renter is currently unemployed.
All controls include sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry
and occupation control variables included in the last column of Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are
available upon request.
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Table 1.12: Rent Discount and Mobility as Suggestive Mechanisms
Rent Stab. Dummy Rent Discount + Mobility Alter. Mobility
Rent Stabilized 0.022***
(0.0070)
Rent Discount 0.019*** 0.016** 0.017***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0063)
Tenure of Residence 0.00061
(0.00054)
Tenure: 2-4 Years -0.0097
(0.0071)
Tenure: 5-7 Years 0.0029
(0.0086)
Tenure: 8-10 Years -0.00085
(0.011)
Tenure: 10+ Years 0.0041
(0.012)
R2 0.149 0.135 0.135 0.136
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Full results
containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request. Rent discount is obtained from Jiang et al. (2019).
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1.11 Appendix
Figure 1.10: Spatial Concentration of Rental Occupied Units in NYC
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 2002 and 2005.
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Figure 1.11: Spatial Concentration of Private Market-Rate Units in NYC
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 2002 and 2005.
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Figure 1.12: Rent Discount v.s. Contract Rent
Notes: Calculation is based on the rent discount estimated in Jiang et al. (2019) where different empirical hedonic
pricing models are analyzed and compared. The unit of both Y-axis and X-axis are in ✩1000 2017 value.
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Figure 1.13: Rent Discount v.s. Total Household Income
Notes: Calculation is based on the rent discount estimated in Jiang et al. (2019) where different empirical hedonic pricing models are
analyzed and compared. The unit of both Y-axis and X-axis are in ✩1000 2017 value.
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Figure 1.14: Spatial Concentration of Policy Awareness (Misinform)
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 2002 and 2005.
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Figure 1.15: Spatial Concentration of Policy Awareness (Don’t Know)
Notes: Author’s calculation based on pooled New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 2002 and 2005.
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Table 1.13: Summary Statistics of Household by Rent Stabilization
Rent Stabilized Market Rental
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Currently In the Labor Force 0.889 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.888 0.32 0.00 1.00
Currently Unemployed 0.063 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.052 0.22 0.00 1.00
HHH Wage Rate 29.017 25.84 0.45 172.18 30.697 27.20 0.45 172.18
High School Dropout 0.166 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.154 0.36 0.00 1.00
High School Graduate 0.233 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.241 0.43 0.00 1.00
Some College No Degree 0.199 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.206 0.40 0.00 1.00
College Degree and Above 0.402 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.399 0.49 0.00 1.00
Female 0.511 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.449 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age 38.925 7.80 26.00 54.00 38.194 7.77 26.00 54.00
White, Non-Hispanic 0.356 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.414 0.49 0.00 1.00
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.220 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.225 0.42 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 0.313 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.213 0.41 0.00 1.00
Asian 0.103 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.140 0.35 0.00 1.00
Married 0.349 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.438 0.50 0.00 1.00
Born in NYC 0.215 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.243 0.43 0.00 1.00
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) 0.141 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.132 0.34 0.00 1.00
Born in Other Country 0.467 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.446 0.50 0.00 1.00
Birth Place Missing 0.177 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.179 0.38 0.00 1.00
Any Young Child in HH 0.160 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.195 0.40 0.00 1.00
Any Child in HH 0.364 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.408 0.49 0.00 1.00
Co-reside with Parents 0.037 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.035 0.18 0.00 1.00
HH Size 2.397 1.43 1.00 11.00 2.688 1.58 1.00 15.00
Any Non-relative in HH 0.108 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.132 0.34 0.00 1.00
HHH Salary Income, cond. work 52.563 40.85 0.09 215.23 56.978 44.38 0.37 215.23
HHH Non-Labor Income 2.948 10.28 0.00 68.73 3.119 10.59 0.00 68.73
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. 20.037 31.36 -0.00 170.46 26.745 37.06 -0.00 170.46
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Table 1.14: Summary Statistics of Housing Characteristics
Rent Stabilized Market Rental
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Monthly Contract Rent 1.176 0.50 0.02 3.67 1.489 0.75 0.17 3.67
Monthly Gross Rent 1.271 0.50 0.14 3.81 1.618 0.77 0.17 3.81
Tenure of Residence 6.998 5.89 1.00 27.00 5.048 4.62 1.00 27.00
Num. of Rooms 3.174 1.16 1.00 8.00 3.908 1.30 1.00 8.00
Num. of Bedrooms 1.341 0.81 0.00 7.00 1.834 0.92 0.00 8.00
Num. of Unit Problems 0.909 1.22 0.00 6.00 0.463 0.87 0.00 6.00
Num. of Building Problems 0.257 0.76 0.00 5.00 0.184 0.67 0.00 5.00
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Table 1.15: Effect of Rent Stabilization on Labor Force Participation and
Unemployment (Alternative Model Specifications, Full Sample)
LPM Probit Logit
Panel A. Labor Force Participation
Rent Stabilized 0.0099 0.0053 0.0078
(0.0072) (0.012) (0.015)
R2 0.565 0.176 0.178
Panel B. Unemployment
Rent Stabilized 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.0067) (0.011) (0.0099)
R2 0.143 0.114 0.115
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Labor force
participation and unemployment are binary variables, i.e. Y=1 if a renter participates in currently the labor force in Panel A and
Y=1 if a renter is currently unemployed in Panel B. Demographic controls include gender, race and ethnicity, age, marital status,
co-residence with parents, birth place. Other household controls include presence of children, presence of non-relatives, household size,
and spouse’s education and work status for married renters. Housing and neighborhood controls particularly include factors affecting
the rent stabilization eligibility such as year a building is built and number of units in a building among others. Full results
containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.16: Summary Statistics of Household by Policy Awareness
Aware Misinformed Market-Rate
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Female 0.525 0.50 0.496 0.50 0.449 0.50
Age 39.445 7.97 38.142 7.81 38.194 7.77
White, Non-Hispanic 0.474 0.50 0.255 0.44 0.414 0.49
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.189 0.39 0.233 0.42 0.225 0.42
Hispanic 0.249 0.43 0.383 0.49 0.213 0.41
Asian 0.076 0.26 0.123 0.33 0.140 0.35
Married 0.319 0.47 0.401 0.49 0.438 0.50
Born in NYC 0.300 0.46 0.257 0.44 0.243 0.43
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) 0.245 0.43 0.140 0.35 0.132 0.34
Born in Other Country 0.431 0.50 0.586 0.49 0.446 0.50
Birth Place Missing 0.024 0.15 0.017 0.13 0.179 0.38
Any Young Child in HH 0.129 0.34 0.221 0.42 0.195 0.40
Any Child in HH 0.311 0.46 0.446 0.50 0.408 0.49
Co-reside with Parents 0.031 0.17 0.047 0.21 0.035 0.18
HH Size 2.221 1.34 2.675 1.52 2.688 1.58
Any Non-relative in HH 0.111 0.31 0.119 0.32 0.132 0.34
High School Dropout 0.114 0.32 0.173 0.38 0.154 0.36
High School Graduate 0.165 0.37 0.264 0.44 0.241 0.43
Some College No Degree 0.202 0.40 0.220 0.41 0.206 0.40
College Degree and Above 0.519 0.50 0.344 0.48 0.399 0.49
Currently In the Labor Force 0.914 0.28 0.891 0.31 0.888 0.32
Currently Unemployed 0.071 0.26 0.065 0.25 0.052 0.22
Annual Hours of Work, cond. work 1968.118 677.59 1970.438 653.40 2011.216 664.04
HHH Salary Income, cond. work 59.590 43.87 49.784 38.43 56.978 44.38
HHH Wage Rate 32.630 26.94 27.489 24.47 30.697 27.20
HHH Non-Labor Income 3.677 11.77 2.608 9.38 3.119 10.59
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. 21.214 33.34 23.064 32.73 26.745 37.06
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Table 1.17: Summary Statistics of Housing by Policy Awareness
Aware Misinformed Market-Rate
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Monthly Contract Rent 1.208 0.51 1.200 0.53 1.489 0.75
Monthly Gross Rent 1.297 0.51 1.299 0.54 1.618 0.77
Tenure of Residence 8.153 6.35 6.641 5.64 5.048 4.62
Num. of Rooms 3.070 1.17 3.282 1.19 3.908 1.30
Num. of Bedrooms 1.270 0.79 1.430 0.84 1.834 0.92
Nbhd Rate: Excellent 0.165 0.37 0.117 0.32 0.175 0.38
Nbhd Rate: Good 0.509 0.50 0.514 0.50 0.489 0.50
Nbhd Rate: Fair 0.254 0.44 0.301 0.46 0.138 0.34
Nbhd Rate: Poor 0.052 0.22 0.055 0.23 0.019 0.14
Nbhd Rate: Missing 0.020 0.14 0.013 0.12 0.180 0.38
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Table 1.18: Summary Statistics of Household: Aware v.s. Private Market
Aware N Market-Rate N Difference
Female 0.525 1883 0.449 3908 0.075∗∗∗
Age 39.445 1883 38.194 3908 1.250∗∗∗
White, Non-Hispanic 0.474 1883 0.414 3908 0.060∗∗∗
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.189 1883 0.225 3908 -0.036∗∗∗
Hispanic 0.249 1883 0.213 3908 0.036∗∗∗
Asian 0.076 1883 0.140 3908 -0.065∗∗∗
Married 0.319 1883 0.438 3908 -0.118∗∗∗
Born in NYC 0.300 1883 0.243 3908 0.057∗∗∗
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) 0.245 1883 0.132 3908 0.113∗∗∗
Born in Other Country 0.431 1883 0.446 3908 -0.016
Birth Place Missing 0.024 1883 0.179 3908 -0.154∗∗∗
Any Young Child in HH 0.129 1883 0.195 3908 -0.066∗∗∗
Any Child in HH 0.311 1883 0.408 3908 -0.097∗∗∗
Co-reside with Parents 0.031 1883 0.035 3908 -0.004
HH Size 2.221 1883 2.688 3908 -0.467∗∗∗
Any Non-relative in HH 0.111 1883 0.132 3908 -0.021∗∗
High School Dropout 0.114 1883 0.154 3908 -0.040∗∗∗
High School Graduate 0.165 1883 0.241 3908 -0.076∗∗∗
Some College No Degree 0.202 1883 0.206 3908 -0.004
College Degree and Above 0.519 1883 0.399 3908 0.120∗∗∗
Currently In the Labor Force 0.914 1883 0.888 3908 0.026∗∗∗
Currently Unemployed 0.071 1722 0.052 3471 0.019∗∗∗
Annual Hours of Work, cond. work 1968.118 1727 2011.216 3476 -43.099∗∗
HHH Salary Income, cond. work 59.590 1655 56.978 3333 2.613∗∗
HHH Wage Rate 32.630 1655 30.697 3333 1.933∗∗
HHH Non-Labor Income 3.677 1883 3.119 3908 0.558∗
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. 21.214 1883 26.745 3908 -5.531∗∗∗
95
CHAPTER 1. RENT REGULATION, POLICY AWARENESS, AND LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY
Table 1.19: Summary Statistics of Household: Misinformed v.s. Private Market
Misinformed N Market-Rate N Difference
Female 0.496 1338 0.449 3908 0.046∗∗∗
Age 38.142 1338 38.194 3908 -0.052
White, Non-Hispanic 0.255 1338 0.414 3908 -0.159∗∗∗
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.233 1338 0.225 3908 0.008
Hispanic 0.383 1338 0.213 3908 0.169∗∗∗
Asian 0.123 1338 0.140 3908 -0.017
Married 0.401 1338 0.438 3908 -0.037∗∗
Born in NYC 0.257 1338 0.243 3908 0.015
Born in U.S. (Non-NYC) 0.140 1338 0.132 3908 0.007
Born in Other Country 0.586 1338 0.446 3908 0.140∗∗∗
Birth Place Missing 0.017 1338 0.179 3908 -0.162∗∗∗
Any Young Child in HH 0.221 1338 0.195 3908 0.026∗∗
Any Child in HH 0.446 1338 0.408 3908 0.038∗∗
Co-reside with Parents 0.047 1338 0.035 3908 0.013∗∗
HH Size 2.675 1338 2.688 3908 -0.013
Any Non-relative in HH 0.119 1338 0.132 3908 -0.013
High School Dropout 0.173 1338 0.154 3908 0.018
High School Graduate 0.264 1338 0.241 3908 0.023∗
Some College No Degree 0.220 1338 0.206 3908 0.013
College Degree and Above 0.344 1338 0.399 3908 -0.055∗∗∗
Currently In the Labor Force 0.891 1338 0.888 3908 0.003
Currently Unemployed 0.065 1192 0.052 3471 0.013∗
Annual Hours of Work, cond. work 1970.438 1197 2011.216 3476 -40.778∗
HHH Salary Income, cond. work 49.784 1159 56.978 3333 -7.194∗∗∗
HHH Wage Rate 27.489 1159 30.697 3333 -3.208∗∗∗
HHH Non-Labor Income 2.608 1338 3.119 3908 -0.511
Other HH Mem. Tot. Inc. 23.064 1338 26.745 3908 -3.681∗∗∗
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Table 1.20: First Stage of Alternative Instrumental Variable (Unemployment)
IV4 IV5 IV6
Total Number of Vacant-for-Rent Units (1000) -0.014*** 0.011***
(0.0035) (0.0025)
Total Number of Vacant-for-Rent and Stabilized Units (1000) 0.028*** 0.013***
(0.0060) (0.0027)
Total Number of Vacant-for-Rent and Market-Rate Units (1000) -0.028*** -0.017***
(0.0065) (0.0042)
Y 0.585 0.585 0.585
N 8335 8335 8335
R2 0.751 0.751 0.752
All Other Controls X X X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Full results
containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.21: Effect of Rent Stabilization on Unemployment (Alternative IV)
Original Share IV Alternative IV
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5 IV6
Stabilized 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.099** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040)
Y 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
N 8335 8335 8335 8335 8335 8335
R2 0.092 0.073 0.088 0.104 0.094 0.099
F Statistics 34.364 24.401 18.330 19.192 16.719 19.130
Over-Identifying Test 0.3631 0.2579 0.2306 0.1842
All Other Controls X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Full results
containing coefficients of other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.22: Effect of Policy Awareness on Unemployment












Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at sub-borough level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. A rent-stabilized
tenant is aware if the self-reported regulation status is either rent-controlled or rent-stabilized. A rent-stabilized tenant is misinformed
if the self-reported regulation status is market-rate. Unemployment is a binary variable, i.e. Y=1 if a renter is currently unemployed.
All controls include sub-borough and year fixed effect, demographic, education, other household, housing and neighborhood, industry
and occupation control variables included in the last column of Table 1.4. Full results containing coefficients of other variables are
available upon request.
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Supplementary Info about Institution
Table 1.23: Rent Stabilization v.s. Rent Control in NYC
Rent Stabilization Rent Control
Enact Time 1969 1943
Current Stock (2017) 966,000 out of 2,183,064 (44%) 22,000 of 2,183,064 (1%)
Rent Increase Operation Rent Guidelines Board (RGB) Maximum Base Rent (MBR)
Succession Right Yes Yes
Criterion 1: Construction Time (1) Between 2/1/1947 and 1/1/1974 Only before 2/1/1947
(2) Post-1974 units with tax benefits
Criterion 2: Number of Units Mainly ≥ 6 Mainly ≥ 3
Criterion 3: Move-in Time Move-in after 6/30/1971 for units Move-in before 7/1/1971
built before 2/1/1947
Vacancy De-regulation (1) Deregulation (1) Deregulation
if exceeds High-Rent threshold if < 6 units
(2) “Vacancy Bonus” (2) Become rent stabilized
if below High-Rent threshold if ≥ 6 units
Other De-regulation (1) Post Condo or Co-op conversion
(2) Exceeds High-Income threshold
(3) Tax benefit expires
Notes: Author’s own summarization based on legal regulation documents.
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Table 1.24: Permitted Annual Increase of Rent Stabilized Apartments (1978-2020)
Renewal Leases Time One Year Lease Two Year Lease
10/1/19 to 9/30/20 1.5% 2.5%
10/1/18 to 9/30/19 1.5% 2.5%
10/1/17 to 9/30/18 1.25% 2%
10/1/16 to 9/30/17 0% 2%
10/1/15 to 9/30/16 0% 2%
10/1/14 to 9/30/15 1% 2.75%
10/1/13 to 9/30/14 4% 7.75%
10/1/12 to 9/30/13 2% 4%
10/1/11 to 9/30/12 3.75% 7.25%
10/1/10 to 9/30/11 2.25% 4.5%
10/1/09 to 9/30/10 3% 6%
10/1/08 to 9/30/09 4.5% 8.5%
10/1/07 to 9/30/08 3% 5.75%
10/1/06 to 9/30/07 4.25% 7.25%
10/1/05 to 9/30/06 2.75% 5.5%
10/1/04 to 9/30/05 3.5% 6.5%
10/1/03 to 9/30/04 4.5% 7.5%
10/1/02 to 9/30/03 2% 4%
10/1/01 to 9/30/02 4% 6%
10/1/00 to 9/30/01 4% 6%
10/1/99 to 9/30/00 2% 4%
10/1/98 to 9/30/99 2% 4%
10/1/97 to 9/30/98 2% 4%
10/1/96 to 9/30/97 5% 7%
10/1/95 to 9/30/96 2% 4%
10/1/94 to 9/30/95 2% 4%
10/1/93 to 9/30/94 3% 5%
10/1/92 to 9/30/93 3% 5%
10/1/91 to 9/30/92 4% 6.5%
10/1/90 to 9/30/91 4.5% 7%
10/1/89 to 9/30/90 5.5% 9%
10/1/88 to 9/30/89 6% 9%
10/1/87 to 9/30/88 3% 6.5%
10/1/86 to 9/30/87 6% 9%
10/1/85 to 9/30/86 4% 6.5%
10/1/84 to 9/30/85 6% 9%
10/1/83 to 9/30/84 4% 7%
10/1/82 to 9/30/83 4% 7%
10/1/81 to 9/30/82 10% 13%
7/1/80 to 6/30/81 11% 14%
7/1/79 to 6/30/80 8.5% 12%
7/1/78 to 6/30/79 2.5% 2%
Notes: information is obtained from https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/guidelines/aptorders.pdf.
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Child Development
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2.1 Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on
children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Given that the theoretical impact of the
EITC on child development is ambiguous, this paper particularly emphasizes the un-
derlying mechanisms. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and its Child Development Supplement (CDS) in combination with an augmented
sample of all non-parental child care histories, increased EITC generosity is found to
negatively affect cognitive skills of children from single-mother families. No significant
effect on children from married-mother families is found. Positive effects are found
regarding children’s non-cognitive skills, irrespective of family structure. Further-
more, several mechanisms are shown to be important. First, there is strong evidence
that both single-mother and married-mother families increase their non-parental child
care usage when facing higher EITC generosity, but this is enacted in different forms.
Single mothers mainly utilize relatives for child care, while married mothers tend to
utilize formal child care programs. Second, single mothers tend to shift from actively
engaged time with children to passively accessible time. Third, single mothers are
found to have increased psychological distress. Both the time input and psychological
distress channels are not salient among married-mothers. Finally, the analysis shows
that increased goods inputs, measured by income, may not directly correspond with
increased child-specific expenditures.
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2.2 Introduction
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is one of the most important welfare
programs in the U.S., as it has proven to contribute to increases in employment, labor
supply, and earning, as well as decreases in welfare use, and poverty among families.2
Given that primary recipients of EITC are working parents with children, a small
but growing group of studies have explored the potential intergenerational effects
of the EITC on infant health (Hoynes et al., 2015; Strully et al., 2010), children’s
academic achievements (Dahl and Lochner, 2012), and their education and labor
market outcomes in the long run (Bastian and Michelmore, 2018; Maxfield, 2013).
However, few studies have investigated the impact of the EITC on children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive skill formation. Moreover, there have been even fewer studies that
discuss underlying mechanisms given that the theoretical impact of the EITC on child
outcome is ambiguous in sign.3
It has been well-documented that human capital skills developed in early stages,
both cognitive and non-cognitive, have long-term positive impacts on socioeconomic
outcomes in the life-cycle.4 Among all of the inputs that shape skills, maternal time
2See Hotz and Scholz (2003), Grogger (2003) and ? for recent reviews.
3Unlike unconditional cash assistance programs, the EITC has a strong “pro-work” nature, lead-
ing to its bipartisan support from the policy side. However, an EITC-induced labor supply change
does not necessarily imply an one-to-one mapping to the change of maternal time input into a child,
which is a result of maternal utility maximization. Moreover, a mother may also switch to alter-
native child care arrangements when a child is young, the quality of which is often questionable.
Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective, it is ambiguous to predict the overall effect of the EITC on
child development. Meanwhile, an ex-post insignificant estimate of the effect of EITC on any child
outcome might not be very meaningful either, if different mechanisms are simply acting in different
directions and therefore offsetting each other.
4See Currie and Almond (2011); Heckman and Mosso (2014) for recent summaries.
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investment on children has particularly positive effects and the rate of return is much
larger in early stages as opposed to later stages (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Cunha
et al., 2010). In contrast, maternal employment and low-quality child care have been
shown to be detrimental to children’s cognitive development (such as Bernal (2008);
Bernal and Keane (2011) among others).5 Hence, an important question remains
unclear is to understand the different mechanisms through which the EITC affects
child development.
This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Devel-
opment Supplement (CDS) in a novel way to address these issues. The PSID is suit-
able not only for its detailed longitudinal information about children’s developmental
outcomes but also for its unique feature called a time diary. This allows for a key
differentiation between a mother’s time with her child and her leisure time (Del Boca
et al., 2017, 2014).6 Moreover, to better understand the child care channel, I leverage
the CDS data in an innovative way by transforming the retrospective cross-sectional
information on non-parental child care arrangement to a complete panel history up
until kindergarten for each sample child.
The empirical identification relies on a key measured - EITC generosity, which
is defined as the maximum potential federal and state credit a child’s family could
5None of these studies have been put in the context of the EITC.
6Most studies have been using maternal employment as a proxy measure for maternal time input
in understanding child development (including Bernal (2008); Bernal and Keane (2011); Liu et al.
(2010); Todd and Wolpin (2007)), which assume a monotonic one-to-one mapping between these
two factors but ignore the possibility that a mother can sacrifice her leisure, maintain the same (or
even increase) time with her child, and increase her labor supply. Such limitation is mainly due to
the fact that most socioeconomic surveys lack precise measure of a mother’s time allocation.
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receive given their residence, family size, and tax year. EITC generosity does not
depend on family income or parental marital status.7 In recent studies (including
Bastian and Michelmore (2018); Hoynes et al. (2015); Maxfield (2013)), this mea-
sure has been used to take advantage of a series of federal and state EITC changes
as opposed to relying on one single reform.8 The identification comes from three
sources of exogenous variation: (1) the year the individual was born, which affects
the generosity of the federal credit in a specific year; (2) the state of residence in each
year, which leads to different state EITC generosity; (3) the number of children in
the household in each year, which leads to larger benefits for larger households. Fur-
thermore, alternative evaluation methods have been used including state fixed effect,
individual fixed effect and value-added models. The results are robust and highlight
differences on the basis of family structure.
The estimated results suggest that, on the one hand, EITC has negative impacts
on cognitive skills for children from single-mother families as compared to married-
mother families. On the other hand, EITC is also found to improve children’s non-
7The actual eligibility and the amount of EITC are endogenous, because they are determined by
household earning. Notably that the PSID does not have the actual amount of EITC an eligible
family receives. However, all the relevant household demographic and income information allows me
to simulate both the eligibility and the federal and state credit using NBER’s TAXSIM.
8The majority of literature on the effect of the EITC on certain outcomes has been predominantly
using quasi-experimental approach, particularly the Difference-in-Differences (DID) strategy, by
exploiting the three major federal level expansion of EITC. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86)
which mainly increased the credit rate, has been most notably used by Eissa and Liebman (1996).
The 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA90) created the separate benefit schedules for
1 and 2 and more-child families, which has been used Boyd-Swan et al. (2016). The 1993 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA93), which generated significant differences in the EITC benefits
between families with 2 and more children and those with only 1 child, has been used most widely
in the literature as it is regarded as the largest expansion to-date of the EITC by: Cowan and Tefft
(2012) and Averett and Wang (2013) (women’s smoking), Evans and Garthwaite (2014) (maternal
mental and psychical health), and Hoynes et al. (2015) (infant health).
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cognitive skills. Such a positive effect is salient for children from both single-mother
families and married-mother families. The results are robust based on different em-
pirical model specifications.
There are at least three channels that may help explain the effects of EITC on
child outcomes. The first important channel is non-parental child care. Both single
mothers and married mothers tend to increase child care usage at both extensive and
intensive margins. However, single mothers are more likely to choose informal child
care arrangements with relatives, which is usually thought to be of low quality and as
potentially causing negative consequence on child development. In contrast, married
mothers are more likely to use formal child care. Second, single mothers are more
likely to change their time inputs by switching between time types. In other words,
they reduce their actively engaged time but increase their accessible time. Such a
shift has not been found among married mothers. Reduced engaged time may also
be detrimental to children’s cognitive development. Third, single mothers are in a
worse position and experience more distress when faced with increased EITC gen-
erosity. However, the EITC has a modest positive effect on the psychological distress
of married mothers.9 The effects based on these three channels may help explain why
children from single-mother families are in a worse position regarding their cogni-
tive skills. Finally, it remains questionable whether increased family incomes directly
relate to increased child-specific expenditure.
9See Ronda (2016) for a discussion on the relationship between maternal psychological distress
and children’s cognitive development.
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This paper is closely related to Dahl and Lochner (2012) that exploits the ex-
ogenous variation of family income from the federal EITC expansions in the 1990s.
They find that a ✩1000 increase in family income raises math and reading test scores
by about 4% of a standard deviation.10 The effects are larger for younger children
(under age 12), for boys (doubled than for girls), and for black or Hispanic children.
Dahl and Lochner (2012) also confirm that contemporaneous income has the largest
effect on achievement. However, according to Nichols and Rothstein (2015), the in-
terpretation of those estimates could be “hazardous” because the labor-supply effects
may exact an independent role, in addition to the weak instrument issue.11 Moreover,
Dahl and Lochner (2012) do not address effects at early childhood stages, because
most children in their sample (92%) are between ages 8 and 14, while children in PSID
and its CDS in this paper can be as young as age 3 when developmental outcomes
begin to be measured.
Along with other limited evidence linking EITC with children’s educational out-
comes, the empirical results are also conflicting. Most studies lack a theoretical model
and their results vary by evaluation strategies based on different underlying identify-
ing assumptions. One set of research has found positive effects concentrated among
younger children (including Dahl and Lochner (2012), Michelmore (2013), Maxfield
(2013)). The effects are then much smaller, or nonexistent, for older children, which
10In their original Dahl and Lochner (2012) paper, their result is around 6%. However, corrections
have been made due to several coding error issues, and IV estimates falls by 32%, from 0.0610 to
0.0413, discussed in Lundstrom (2017) and Dahl and Lochner (2017)
11Weak instruments can lead to inconsistent and misleading results. See Bound et al. (1995);
Stock et al. (2002a,b)
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is consistent with the “window of opportunity” theory,. This theory emphasizes the
importance of early childhood investment in shaping life-cycle skill formation. On the
other hand, other studies (including Chetty et al. (2011), Manoli and Turner (2018),
Bastian and Michelmore (2018)) have found only positive effects for older children in
late adolescence, meaning around the time of high school graduation, which is con-
sistent with the “cash on hand” hypothesis. Even certain negative effects have been
found in Bastian and Michelmore (2018), where they find that family income from
ages 6-12 has a negative impact (-0.0017) on a child’s high school graduation, while
family income from age 13-18 has a positive impact (0.0021). Both of these results
are statistically significant at the same 10% level.12 To mitigate such controversy,
this paper recognizes the nature of children’s human capital formation as a dynamic
acquisition process, where at least three important channels are important (the goods
input, the time input, and the non-parental child care). All of these inputs would
be shifted differently by the EITC, so the overall effect not only depends on the pro-
ductivity of each input but also the complementarity (or substitution) pattern across
inputs. An ideal approach would be to estimate a production function of child skill
formation in the spirit of Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010), and to
contain various inputs that are all affected by EITC policy variables. Unfortunately,
this type of exercise is not the most feasible given the data structure as well as the
sources of identification.
12See Table 6, Effect of EITC exposure on Education, Employment, and Earnings (IV Results) in
Bastian and Michelmore (2018).
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 introduces the institutional
background of the EITC in terms of eligibility and credit schedule. Section 2.4 con-
tains a bare-bones model showing why the EITC may affect child development in
which channels. Section 2.5 describes the data used in the empirical analysis and the
construction of key variables. Section 2.6 presents the identification strategy based on
EITC generosity. In Section 2.7 and Section 2.8, I provide the evidence of the EITC
on different child developmental outcomes and potential mechanisms. Section 2.9
interprets the results and Section 2.10 concludes.
2.3 Institutional Background
Since introduced and enacted as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the EITC
was made permanent in 1978 and experienced several major expansions with the Tax
Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, and
the OBRA of 1993. Notably, OBRA 1993 was the largest among these expansions,
doubling the payments to eligible families and sharply increasing the benefits to those
with two or more children (?). In this section, I briefly introduce the eligibility and
credit schedule of both federal and state EITC.
Eligibility. Eligibility for the federal EITC is based on two major criteria: (i)
family structure, i.e., the number of “qualifying children” in the household, and (ii)
family earnings and income. One of the main determinants for qualification is that a
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child must be younger than 19 years old.13 When the EITC was initially introduced,
and until 1994, families without children could not benefit from it. Now, the benefit
is much more generous for families with children and increases with the number of
children. The second requirement is earned income, which must be positive and below
a certain threshold. For families with positive tax liabilities from regular income tax
or self-employment tax, the EITC is first used to offset these liabilities. Moreover,
when the EITC exceeds other liabilities, it becomes refundable. In fact, over 85
percent of the EITC claimants benefit in terms of refunds.
Credit Schedule. The EITC schedule contains three different regions. The first
region is called the “phase-in” or credit region, where the credit rate (subsidy rate)
is positive (so the marginal tax rate, MTE, is negative). In this region, the higher
a family’s earning, the more tax credits can be claimed, until the earning reaches
the threshold where the phase-in region ends. The second region is called the “flat”
or “plateau” region, where a family earns the maximum amount of tax credit and
the MTE becomes zero. This region ends as the family’s income increases, finally
reaching another threshold where the third region, “phase-out”, starts. In the phase-
out region, the EITC is reduced in proportion to the difference between earnings and
the end of the plateau range, and the MTE is positive. The phase-out region ends at
the next income threshold, when credit ultimately becomes zero and families are no
longer eligible.
1324 if a full-time student, or any age if totally disabled.
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The expansion of the EITC is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.1, where the credit
schedules for single parents with two children at 1979, 1993, 1996, and 2014 are
depicted. As can be seen, there is moderate expansion from 1979 to 1993 in terms
of both subsidy rate and the amount of maximum subsidy. Moreover, significantly
increased generosity had taken place between 1993 to 1996, where the maximum
subsidy nearly doubled and the subsidy rate increased by 100%. Though the phase-
out rate had also been increasing over time, it was much flatter and grew more slowly
than the subsidy rate.
State EITC. Since the late 1980s, some states have also begun to enact their
own EITC schedules in addition to the federal EITC. The state-level EITC rule is
much simpler, and is typically defined as a fixed percentage of the federal EITC.
In addition to different percentages, another difference across states is whether the
benefits are refundable. Detailed information about state-level EITC can be found
at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-eitc.html.
2.4 A Bare-Bones Model
To facilitate an understanding of the different mechanisms through which the
EITC may affect child development, I propose a static model in this section to fix the
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C +M + pCCCC = WH +N + EITC
L = TT −H −MT
(2.1)
The utility function contains three components, where C is consumption, L is
leisure, K is the child’s human capital skill, θ is a vector of preference parameters
varying in the population, and U is assumed to satisfy the usual concavity conditions.
Leisure L is assumed to be a normal good.
The child’s human capital skill is produced by different inputs, including maternal
time (both quantity MT and quality µ), material goods M , and non-parental child
care CC. Notably, child’s human capital skill is not only affected by the amount
of each output, but also by the underlying relationship across different inputs, i.e.
whether inputs are complementary or substitutable.
The third line of Equation 2.1 constitutes the normal budget constraint, where
the income comes from three components: (1) labor earnings WH as the product of
wage rate W and hours of work H; (2) non-labor income N , including father’s labor
income for married parents14; and (3) the EITC.
The last line of Equation 2.1 captures the mother’s time allocation, where her
14To save space, I choose not to incorporate father’s labor income as a separate factor, that should
then be augmented by an index function depending on whether the mother is married or single.
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total time TT is allocated among three parts: (1) labor supply H, (2) child’s time
input MT , and (3) leisure L.

















ψin ×WH if WH ≤ Ψin
ψin ×Ψin if Ψin < WH ≤ Ψout
max{0, ψin ×Ψin − ψout × (WH −Ψout)} if WH > Ψout
(2.2)
The EITC schedule produces a non-convex budget set that contains four regions
and three kinks. Region I is the “phase-in” region, where the individual receives
wage subsidy equaling ψin as long as the individual’s income is less than the first
income threshold Ψin. Region II is the “flat” region, where the individual receives
the maximum credit ψin ×Ψin as long as the individual’s income is between the first
and second income thresholds Ψin and Ψout respectively. Region II is the “phase-
out” region, where the credit is reduced by rate ψout until the credit is fully phased
out, when income is larger than the second threshold Ψout. Region IV is the original
budget constraint without the EITC.
Based on this simple model, it is clear that the EITC can affect all three inputs
of child’s skill production function: goods, time, and child care.
First, the EITC leads to an eased budget constraint, which generates higher dis-
posable income. This could potentially lead to higher material goods investment M ,
depending on the tradeoff between the marginal utility of the mother’s own con-
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sumption and the marginal utility of the chid’s skill, which further depends on the
productivity of goods investment compared to other inputs. If M is related to goods
used to fulfill a child’s daily nutritional and health needs or to books and studying
resources, then this increase would be beneficial to the child. However, if the eased
budget constraint does not directly result in increased M , this goods input channel
may be more nuanced than it initially appears to be.
Second, the EITC will also change the mother’s time allocation decision resulting
from policy-induced labor supply change. On the one hand, theoretically speaking,
the effect of the EITC on the time input MT is ambiguous because the effect on
the mother’s labor supply H is ambiguous, depending on which region she is in. On
the other hand, the EITC has been mainly found to increase labor supply of single
mothers at the extensive margin. The effect on married mothers has been found to be
modestly negative at the intensive margin, while no effect has been observed at the
extensive margin. Thus, it is important to discuss single mothers and married mothers
separately. Moreover, it is unclear even for single mothers, whether an induced labor
supply increase would lead to increased or decreased time investment in children,
which is essentially a choice variable depending on both mother’s observable and
unobservable characteristics. A mother could choose to sacrifice her own leisure to
both increase her labor supply and maintain the amount of time invested in her
children. Moreover, MT only captures the change of quantity, while the quality of
a mother’s time µ can also be changed when the mother changes her labor force
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participation decision. In the empirical analysis of this paper, maternal psychological
distress is used as a proxy measure that could affect maternal time quality.15
Third, the maternal decision also depends on outside options, such as non-parental
child care, the third input CC in child’s skill production function. A working mother
may need to choose alternative child care options, such as center-based child care
or an informal arrangement with a neighbor or relatives, such as grandparents when
she works full-time. In the case of single mother, an informal child-care arrangement
might be a more likely option when she re-joins the labor force and starts to work.
This could hinder child development if the quality of the informal child care is worse
than the mother’s own time input. Married mothers might be more likely to choose
formal institutional child care programs, the quality of which is also heterogenous.
In sum, based on this simple model, I illustrate the various mechanisms through
which the EITC may affect a child’s human capital skill. The effect of the EITC on
both time input and non-parental child care mechanisms is particularly ambiguous,
not only due to the ambiguous effect of the EITC on maternal labor supply, but also
because each behavioral response is a matter of her utility maximization.
15Conditional on the quantity of maternal time input, maternal psychological distress would affect
the quality of the parental interaction with the child.
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2.5 Data
2.5.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
In this paper, I utilize the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child
Development Supplement (CDS) and Time Diary (TD). In total, the PSID contains a
representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in the United
States.16
Beginning in 1997, the CDS collected information on 3,563 children aged 0 -
12 years old in 2,394 PSID families. A maximum of two children per family were
randomly selected. Given that the children were between 0 and 12 years old in
the first wave, their mothers were matched from PSID surveys in the years 1985 -
1997, as depicted in Table 2.17. The second and third waves of CDS were collected
in 2002 and 2007, respectively. The CDS is particularly well-suited for this study
because it provides detailed information about children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes, as well as the quantity of interaction between mother and child through
its TD component 17.
Among the original 3,563 CDS children, there were 89 non-sample cases who
16The PSID is a nationally longitudinal study that began in 1968 with a core nationally repre-
sentative sample called the Survey Research Center (SRC) sample, as well as an oversample that
mainly represents low-income and black families, called the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO)
sample.
17The unique feature of its Time Diary (TD) component makes PSID an ideal data set for studying
the mechanisms through which the EITC affects child development. Other longitudinal micro-data,
such as NLSY-79, has also been widely used in the context of child development, such as by Bernal
(2008), Cunha and Heckman (2008), and Cunha et al. (2010). However, one of the major drawbacks
is the lack of quantity of time investment in children.
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were mistakenly selected for CDS, leading to an effective sample of 3,474 cases. The
CDS children can be linked with the PSID core data, where maternal labor market
outcomes, as well as other household characteristics are available (Table 2.13).
2.5.2 Variable Construction
In this section, I describe the measures of both child developmental outcomes and
various mechanisms through which the EITC affects child development .
Children’s Cognitive Skills. The CDS has used subtests from theWoodcock-Johnson
Psych-Educational Battery-Revised (WJ-R) to objectively assess the children’s aca-
demic skills in both reading and mathematics in all three waves of the survey.18
Specifically, letter-word identification (LW) and passage comprehension (PC) tests
are related to reading skills, and applied problems (AP) and calculations tests are
related to mathematics skills. Descriptions of and the youngest age to participate in
each test are summarized in Table 2.14.
Children’s Non-cognitive Skills. The CDS contains two different types of measure-
ments of children’s non-cognitive skills. The first is the behavior problem index (BPI)
which further includes two subscales: externalizing BPI and internalizing BPI. The
former describes external or aggressive behaviors, while the latter describes internal
or withdrawn behaviors. Both of these indexes have been commonly used in the lit-
erature, and the same sets of items have been used in other well-known longitudinal
18A detailed introduction can be found in Duffy and Sastry (2014)
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studies as well, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).19 The
second is the positive behaviors scale (PBS), which measures childhood emotional
or social competence. Descriptions and the possible age range for participation are
summarized in Table 2.15.
Maternal Time Investment. The availability of the time diary (TD), a unique fea-
ture of the CDS, provides detailed accounting of the type, number, duration, and lo-
cation of children’s activities during sampled 24-hour days, beginning at midnight and
remaining as precise as possible on a minute-by-minute basis. One random weekday
and one random weekend were chosen. Interview participants include 2,904 children,
2,569 children, and 1,442 children in the original CDS-I, CDS-II, and CDS-III, and
the response rates were 82%, 88%, and 86%, respectively.20
In particular, the social context of each activity is specified, and a distinction is
made between with whom the child was doing the activity and who else was present
but not engaging. The former time a mother spent with her child was labeled as
“engaged time” (also known as “active time” in the literature), while the latter was
labeled as “accessible time” (also known as “passive time” in the literature). Both
types of time investment could be productive as active engagement in shared activities
has demonstrated to be important (Altintas (2016) and Kalil et al. (2012)), while
passive accessible time input, or “being there”, may also play a role in supervising,
19A detailed description can be found in The Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics Child Development Supplement User Guide Supplement:
https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/cds/cdsi usergd.pdf
20The PCG completed the diary for the young children but older children and adolescents were
expected to complete the time diaries themselves or with the assistance of the PCG, as needed.
119
CHAPTER 2. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, MATERNAL BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSE AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
monitoring, and facilitating children’s activities. (Folbre et al. (2005), Sandberg and
Hofferth (2001), and Sayer et al. (2004)).
Thus, three types of maternal time investment are constructed, “engaged”, “ac-
cessible”, and total (the sum of “engaged” and “accessible”), by taking a weighted
sum 5
7
for the weekday and 2
7
for the weekend.
It is important to recognize that such a construction, though commonly used
in the literature, does impose rigidity and may therefore amplify any atypicality.21
This should be considered in later analysis. The TD also provides information about
who filed the TD (mother alone, child alone, mother and child together, or others),
whether it was completed on a weekday or weekend, and how typical the day was
(from very typical to very atypical). These variables are therefore included in the
later empirical analysis to alleviate the potential atypicality concern.
Maternal Child Care Arrangement. The CDS provides retrospective information
about sample children’s child care information in terms of type, frequency of use, and
costs of arrangements for children through (and possibly after) kindergarten. When
the CDS-I and CDS-II data are combined,22 a near-complete picture of child care
arrangement history from birth to the age of the child at the time of the CDS-II
interview can be generated.
Thus, the retrospective information stored in CDS-I and CDS-II can be trans-
formed into a longitudinal data structure, which is not only helpful to increase total
21CDS time diaries measure school year time.
22Children are aged 0 to 12 in CDS-I and 5 to 17 in CDS-II. In CDS-III, children will become at
least age 10.
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sample size, but significantly strengthens the identifying power, given that major
federal EITC expansions took place in the early 1990s. Table 2.16 illustrates an
example in which the specific calendar years have been listed between ages 0 and
5 for children in CDS-I. As discussed earlier in the institutional part of the EITC
and as further discussed in greater detail in the next section, the three highlighted
years (1986, 1990 and 1993) witnessed greatest federal EITC expansions, which have
been used extensively in the difference-in-differences research design. Most children,
meaning those older than age 3 in CDS-I, could experience at least one of such large
federal expansion; for those who were aged between 7 and 12, they experienced two
out of three expansions. By linking these child care arrangements to the maternal
labor market outcomes in the PSID core data, we can at least partially utilize those
federal expansions, to increase the power of identification.
I first construct a child age-specific binary dummy to indicate whether any non-
parental child care had been used. I also explore different types of child care ar-
rangements and generate two additional dummies to indicate whether the child care
was done by any relative; or was from any formal program (such as Head Start, a
pre-school program, or any other child care center). Though not perfect, these addi-
tional measures capture a certain degree of quality heterogeneity. Finally, I construct
an age-specific weekly hours of child care arrangement, i.e., the intensive margin of
non-parental child care usage.
Maternal Psychological Distress. Maternal psychological distress is another poten-
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tial channel through which the EITC affects a child’s skill formation. The PSID-CDS
has provided the commonly used K-6 Non-Specific Psychological Distress Scale, de-
veloped by Ronald Kessler (Kessler et al. (2003)), to “discriminate cases of serious
mental illness from non-cases in a general population survey”. The K-6 includes six
items answered by the primary caregivers about how they have been feeling during
the prior four weeks. The original response items are based on a scale of 1-5, and
the final K-6 scale has been recoded so that a lower score indicates a better condi-
tion. This measure is available in all three waves of PSID-CDS, as well as for the
respondents in the PSID core data 2003.23
Others. Most variables associated with mothers’ labor market outcomes as well as
socioeconomic characteristics, come from the PSID core data, including the mother’s
age, race, years of education, state of residence, number of children, age of youngest
child, annual earnings, and annual hours of work, among other data. Other child
characteristics come from either the CDS or the PSID core data, including the child’s
gender, race, age, and other variables.
2.5.3 Summary Statistics
Henceforth, I make a distinction between two different analytical samples. The
first one is called the Original CDS, which is based on three waves of PSID-CDS: 1997,
23The PSID has included the K-6 scale for all respondents from 2001 and onward, since the CDS-
I, II, and III are from 1997, 2002, and 2007, respectively. The only additional information we can
match from the PSID core data is thus 2003.
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2002, and 2007. The second is called the Augmented CDS and contains the trans-
formed longitudinal non-parental child care arrangements, as well as other household
characteristics. It is worth noting that child development outcomes - both cognitive
skills and non-cognitive skills - and maternal time input are only available in the
Original CDS sample.
The summary statistics based on Original CDS data are displayed in Table 2.1.
First, the EITC generosity, defined as the maximum federal and state EITC a family
could possibly receive, indeed reveals large variation across the three years of CDS
data. The smallest amount is about ✩3,000 while the largest amount exceeds ✩8,000.
Approximately 20% of families in the CDS sample have ever received EITC. The
percentage of African American mothers and children is about 40% due to the fact
that the SEO component of the PSID has oversampled low-income families. In terms
of the major input of the child skill production function, there is no significant dif-
ference between active time versus passive time, and approximately 40% of families
have ever used child care arrangements, and the percentage of relative-based child
care is almost double than that of the formal center-based child care.
To gain a understanding of the role of the EITC, I further split the sample,
based on EITC eligibility as well as marital status, as documented in other columns
of Table 2.1. On the one hand, I restrict the sample to EITC recipients and those
without EITC, respectively. It seems that children in EITC families generally perform
worse on both cognitive achievement tests and non-cognitive behavioral problems.
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Mothers receiving EITC, on average, work less hours, earn less income, spend less
time with their children, less frequently used formal child care (but use more relative-
based child care), and have larger psychological distress issues. This initial glance
is perhaps unsurprising given that the EITC is essentially part of the social safety
net and is targeted toward low-income families. On the other hand, I also provide
descriptive analysis by mother’s marital status. Single mother families are much
more likely to receive EITC and have worse socioeconomic outcomes and children’s
developmental outcomes when compared with married mother families.
2.6 Empirical Strategy
For the empirical analysis, I use EITC generosity (also known as EITC exposure)
as the key variable of interest, which is defined as the maximum potential federal and
state credit a child’s family could receive given their state of residence, family size,
and tax year, regardless of the family’s income or parental marital status. Thus, this
measure does not suffer from endogeneity, as would the actual amount of the EITC
a family receives, which is determined by the choice of labor supply.
Theoretically, there are three main sources of exogenous variation: (1) the year the
individual was born, which affects the generosity of the federal credit in a particular
year; (2) the state of residence in each year, which leads to variations in state EITC
generosity; and (3) the number of children in the household in each year, given the fact
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that there are larger benefits for larger households. These three sources of variation
lead to changes of the EITC generosity, which identifies the effect of EITC policy
change on different variables of interest, including both child developmental outcomes
and various mechanism variables. This approach can be interpreted as a continuous
version of difference-in-differences method.
It is also worth noting that for results related to child developmental outcomes,
given the timing of the CDS, i.e. 1997, 2002, and 2007, the identification cannot
benefit much from the (1) variation24 because the federal EITC schedule remained
stable during that period, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. However, non-trivial (2) state
EITC variation helps with identification, as depicted in Figure 2.3. The number of
children could also ease the identification when families had more children from wave
1 to wave 2, e.g. having one child in CDS 1997 but two or more children in CDS
2002.25
When the Augmented CDS sample is used for the non-parental child-care arrange-
ment, all (1), (2), and (3) sources of variation help with identification, particulary
the (1), which is not possible with the Original CDS sample analysis. Major federal
EITC expansions in late 1980s and early 1990s generate non-linear changes to EITC
generosity, further strengthening the identification power.
24(1) the year the individual was born, which affects the generosity of the federal credit in a
particular year
25To better understand the different sources of variation, I conduct a simple analysis by regress
the EITC generosity on year, number of children dummy, and child fixed effect. The results are
displayed in Table 2.19 using the previously described PSID-CDS data. R2 suggests how much
proportion can be explained by these observable variations included in the regression, while 1−R2
suggests how much can be explained by state heterogeneity.
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Overall, I use three different empirical model specifications: (i) pooled OLS model
with state fixed effect (Pooled OLS with State FE); (ii) child fixed-effect model (Child
FE); and (iii) child value-added model (Child VA), each of which is discussed.
First, the pooled OLS model with state fixed effect is follows Equation 2.3:
Yijst = α + βEITC Generosityjst + ηXij + ψVst + λZs + πWt + ǫijst (2.3)
where i indexes individuals, j indexes families, s indexes states, and t indexes years.
Yijst is the outcome variable of interest, which could either be child developmental
outcomes or variables associated with different mechanisms. EITC Generosityjst rep-
resents the EITC generosity a family j could possibly receive given state s and year t.
The coefficient of interest, β, represents the impact of an additional ✩1,000 of EITC
exposure on outcome variables of interest.
When the outcome variable of interest is child developmental outcomes, Xij is
a vector of personal characteristics that includes the child’s gender, age, ethnicity,26
and birth year; the mother’s age, ethnicity, education, and marital status; and the
number of children and age of the youngest child at the family level. When the
outcome variable of interest is maternal time input, additional variables related to
TD characteristics are also controlled, including the how typical the chosen weekday
and weekend are, and who completed the TD, in addition to the variables previously
mentioned in Xij.
26Indicators for whether a child is African American, Hispanic, or other Non-White respectively.
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Vst includes state-by-year policy and economic indicators, to alleviate the concern
that state EITC may not be completely exogenous. Variables include GDP per-capita,
personal income per-capita, unemployment rate, minimum wage, maximum welfare
benefits for combined AFDC/TANF and SNAP, per-pupil K-12 public educational
spending, and poverty rate. These variables have been commonly used in various
contexts in the literature related to EITC. Zs and Wt are state and year fixed effects,
and ǫijst is the idiosyncratic error term.
To add robustness, on the one hand, I conduct analysis by excluding high-income
families and by focusing on low-educated versus high-educated families separately. On
the other hand, in addition to the state fixed effect model, two additional empirical
models are utilized: the child fixed effect model and the value-added model. The
child fixed effect model is very similar to Equation 2.3, as illustrated in Equation 2.4:
Yijst = α + βEITC Generosityjst + ηXij + ψVst + λCi + πWt + ǫijst (2.4)
where state fixed effect Vst is replaced with child fixed effect Ci. On the one hand,
child fixed effect further eliminates child-specific time-invariant unobservables. On
the other hand, the identification based on the child fixed effect model is slightly
different from one based on the state fixed effect, when a family changes its state
of residence. However, only a small portion of the sample changed their state of
residence in the CDS years.
Finally, I also use a value-added model, augmented with a lagged outcome variable,
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based on Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Todd and Wolpin (2007) and illustrated in
Equation 2.5:
Yijst = α+ βEITC Generosityjst + ρYijs(t−5) + ηXij +ψVst + λZs + πWt + ǫijst (2.5)
Since the lagged outcome variable is used as an additional control variable, the sample
size of the analytic sample is reduced as expected. Thus, the interpretation associated
with the value-added model is whether EITC generosity can explain the change of
outcome variable values between two waves, or every 5 years in CDS.
2.7 EITC and Child Development
In this section, the effects of the EITC (as measured by EITC generosity) on vari-
ous measures of a child’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills is investigated separately.
2.7.1 Main Result
The baseline results based on pooled OLS with state fixed effect are documented
in Table 2.2. Each column represents a different child development measure, where
the first four columns are associated with child cognitive skills and the last three
columns are associated with child non-cognitive skills. Table 2.2 also contains three
panels. In Panel A, all CDS children are included in the analysis, while panels B and
C distinguish by family structure: single-mother families only versus married-mother
families only. For each child development measure, the estimated parameter of the
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key variable of interest (EITC generosity) is presented, together with the mean of
outcome variable (Y ), number of observations (N), and R-squared (R2).
In Panel A of Table 2.2, with all CDS children included, different patterns can
be observed between cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills. On the one hand, no
effects of the EITC are specifically found on cognitive skills. On the other hand, the
EITC has a significant effect on non-cognitive skills, with a particularly strong effect
on reducing internalizing problems (0.079 S.D.). However, results differ by family
structure.
As mentioned, Panel B of Table 2.2 only looks at children from single-mother
families. A ✩1,000 increase in EITC generosity is found to be significantly related
to a 0.08 to 0.11 S.D. decrease in reading skill across all three measures. A weaker
negative effect is also found regarding mathematical skill. In contrast, the EITC leads
to improved non-cognitive skills, such as reduced behavioral problems and increased
positive behaviors. In particular, a ✩1,000 increase in EITC generosity significantly
reduces internalizing behaviors by 0.13 S.D.. It is also important to note that children
from single-mother families, on average, have worse cognitive and non-cognitive skills,
as indicated by the below-zero and above-zero means of outcome variables, which
is unsurprising given that single-mother families are often more socio-economically
disadvantaged.
Panel C of Table 2.2 turns to married-mother families. The results are distinct
from what are found among single-mother families. Namely, there is no such detri-
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mental link between EITC and cognitive skills. The effects with respect to reading
skills are neither economically meaningful (less than 0.01 S.D.) nor statistically signifi-
cant. The EITC has a weak positive effect on mathematical skills. However, improved
outcomes for children’s non-cognitive skills are found. It is also worth noting that
children from married-mother families, on average, have much better cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, as indicated by the means of the outcome variables.
Overall, based on Table 2.2, notably distinct results have been found by fam-
ily structure and by child skill type. On the one hand, the EITC is found to be
detrimental to children’s reading skills among those who come from single-mother
families while no such effect are found for those who come from married-mother fami-
lies. On the other hand, the EITC is found to improve children’s non-cognitive skills,
irrespective of family type.
Although the EITC generosity does not suffer from selection bias, one possible
limitation underlies the pooled OLS with state fixed effect is it ignores the panel
nature of the CDS data structure. To better account for the potential unobserved
heterogeneity, and to test the robustness of our baseline results, I use child fixed effect
model, the results of which are documented in Table 2.3. The overall structure of
Table 2.3 is exactly the same as that of Table 2.2. Panel A again demonstrates that,
overall, the EITC is not significantly linked with child cognitive skills but improves
child non-cognitive skills. The latter positive effects are salient across all three non-
cognitive measures: externalizing behavior problems, internalizing behavior problems,
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and positive behavior. When the analysis is separated by family structure, the result
again becomes distinct. As depicted in Panel B, children’s reading test skills are
found to be negatively linked with EITC generosity. However, the results are flipped
when for children’s non-cognitive skills, as the EITC reduces both externalizing and
internalizing behavior problems. In Panel C, the EITC is not found to significantly
affect children’s cognitive skills among those from married-mother families. Mean-
while, the EITC also improves these children’s non-cognitive skills, with a particular
increase on the positive behavior scale.
It is also helpful to compare the results based on two specifications in Table 2.2
and Table 2.3. First, the pattern is highly consistent between the two tables across
different panels. Second, the estimated effects tend to be larger under the fixed effect
as compared to the pooled OLS with state fixed effect. For example, EITC generosity
is found to reduce children’s broad reading score by 0.11 S.D. under pooled OLS with
state fixed effect, but the detrimental effect increases to 0.13 S.D. under child fixed
effect. Such increase is also found generally regarding children’s non-cognitive skills,
irrespective of family structure.
Lastly, in addition to pooled OLS and child fixed effect models, a value-added
model with lagged child outcome is also evaluated to further enhance the robustness,
even though our empirical models do not suffer from endogeneity concerns associated
with family inputs. Moreover, the value-added model is conceptually more appro-
priate because it is consistent with the argument of “self-productivity” of child skill
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formation. The results are displayed in Table 2.4. First, there is a reduced number of
observations, due to adding lagged outcome as an additional regressor. Thus, those
children who only appear once in the CDS sample are left out of this analysis. Second,
since CDS only has three waves, the first wave (CDS97) is essentially not used as an
outcome variable in this specification. Thus, there lacks the opportunity to observe
the effect of the EITC on younger children’s developmental outcomes, a caveat worth
considering when it comes to interpretation.
Overall, the estimated effects listed in Table 2.4 are smaller in magnitude, as
expected, due to the emergence of lagged outcome as a regressor. However, the
pattern remains exactly the same as in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Again, EITC has
been found to have different impacts for different outcomes. Regarding cognitive
skills, the EITC is found to be detrimental to child’s reading scores, though the
estimation becomes less precise due to a reduced sample size. For non-cognitive
skills, the EITC is found to be beneficial, irrespective of family structure. Among
various non-cognitive skills, internalizing behavior problems have the largest effect.
Children from single-mother families benefit more than children from married-mother
families.
2.7.2 Robustness
Several additional robustness checks are conducted. On the one hand, I exclude
high-income households in the analytic sample. For example, in Table 2.20, 2.21,
132
CHAPTER 2. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, MATERNAL BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSE AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
and 2.22, I exclude families whose income are larger than ✩150,000, ✩100,000, and
✩85,000, respectively, since the EITC is only affecting low-income populations. The
results turn out to be robust and the effects of the EITC remain significant and
concentrated among single-mother families. It is worth noting that the estimated
coefficients of interest are slightly larger. On the other hand, I also conduct the
analysis separately by whether mothers have high school degree or not. Results for
mothers who are high-school dropouts are depicted in Table 2.23 and for mothers
who have at least high school degrees are depicted in Table 2.24. The results are also
as expected, with more significant results and larger coefficients among mothers with
lower education.
In addition, given the natural correlation between cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, I also conduct the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) analysis where vari-
ous child developmental outcomes are estimated jointly. In Table 2.30, each column
represents the results among the full sample, single-mother families, and married-
mother families respectively. The smaller standard errors come from the fact that
SUR are more efficient due to the underlying correlation among outcome variables.
The Breusch-Pagan test of independence is rejected at 1 percent level for each column.
The correlation matrix of residuals also suggest that there are strong correlations be-
tween cognitive and non-cognitive skills.27
In sum, among different measures, the EITC is consistently found to have a nega-
27For example, the correlation of residuals between broad reading and internalizing behavioral
problem is -0.14, while the correlation of residuals between internalizing and externalizing is 0.66
for the full sample. The full results of correlation matrix of residuals are available upon request.
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tive impact on children’s reading skills among those from single-mother families, while
it benefits children’s non-cognitive skills, especially reducing internalizing behavior
problems, irrespective of family structure. This differs from Bastian and Michelmore
(2018), who found a small positive effect of EITC generosity on children’s composite
test scores. However, their construction of composition have flaws, and their analysis
did not distinguish between single-mother families and married-mother families.
2.8 Understanding Mechanisms
Given that the EITC has different impacts on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
skills and such impacts differ by family structure, a natural question to ask, then, is
why? If additional cash assistance coming from the credit is assumed to be helpful,
or at least not harmful to child development, then there must be some additional
maternal behavioral changes in response to the EITC that lead to the presented re-
sults. Understanding the underlying mechanisms through which the EITC generates
heterogenous impacts is key to discussing meaningful policy implications.
In this section, I focus on the mechanisms suggested from economic theory: goods
input, time input, and non-parental child care input. Contributions are made in all
three mechanisms, with a particular emphasis on the latter two. Moreover, I at-
tempt to go beyond the quantity to investigate the potential quality heterogeneity.
For the former, I explore the impact of the EITC on maternal psychological distress,
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which may affect the quality of maternal time with the child. For the latter, I ex-
plore different types of child care and distinguish between care given by relatives and
institutional child care programs.
2.8.1 Goods Input Channel
In Table 2.5, it is first verified whether EITC generosity is associated with an
increase in the imputed amount of EITC eligibility and family resources. As expected,
EITC generosity is found to be predictive of imputed amount of EITC generosity
(column 1 of Table 2.5). In Panel A, an ✩1,000 of EITC generosity is linked with
✩180 of EITC eligibility, which is fairly consistent with what has been found in the
literature. For example, Bastian and Michelmore (2018) obtained an estimate of ✩160
also using PSID. Overall, EITC generosity also predicts an increased total family
income, as ✩1,000 of EITC generosity is linked with ✩1,270 total family income. In
Panel B of Table 2.5, single-mother families exhibit a much larger linkage between
EITC generosity and EITC eligibility, while the link is almost negligible for married-
mother families (Panel C). Moreover, the linkage between EITC generosity and total
family income is weaker for married-mother families.
Moreover, there is both qualitative (Edin and Lein (1997)) and quantitative
(Meyer and Sullivan (2008)) evidence suggesting that income differs from consump-
tion among single-mother families, both promoting the use of household consumption
expenditure instead of household income or wealth to better measure children’s ma-
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terial well-being. As Hao and Yeung (2015) argue, distinguishing between household
income and household consumption expenditure helps conceptually clarify that house-
hold income measures resources, while household consumption expenditure measures
the results of resource allocation.28
In the second and third waves of the CDS, several questions associated with child-
specific expenditures are asked. Though these questions cannot provide a complete
measure of parental goods input in children. They can at least provide some clues.
I construct an aggregate measure of child-specific expenditure that covers four cat-
egories commonly existing in two waves: clothes, toys, school supplies, and travel.29
The results are displayed in column 3 of Table 2.5. No significant link is found between
EITC generosity and child expenditure, irrespective of family structure. However, the
interpretation warrants caution, since there are only two waves of expenditure data,
which may also suffer from measurement error and lack sufficient identifying power
resulting from EITC generosity variation. Nevertheless, the exercise here at least illus-
trates that the transmission from family-level total income to child-level expenditure
might be less clear and more complex than a linear mapping.
In Table 2.6, child fixed effect confirms what has previously been found, though
28There is also potentially a race difference, i.e., the black-white gap. Charles et al. (2009) found
that blacks spent significantly more on “visible goods” (such as clothes, cars, and jewelry) than
whites with comparable income, in an effort to seek social status in communities. Meanwhile, blacks
tend to spend a lower share of their expenditures on education than did their white counterparts (Fan
and Lewis (1999)). However, Hao and Yeung (2015) found the opposite, i.e., black parents spend less
on status-signaling items than did comparable white parents, particularly in the lower-expenditure
groups.
29Child-specific food expenditure is also asked but only in the second wave.
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it likely suffers more from attenuation bias because both income and expenditure are
self-reported.
2.8.2 Time Input Channel
Time input could be particularly salient in the context of the EITC, which has
been found to shift maternal labor supply decisions. The unique feature of the TD
module of CDS allows one to precisely examine if maternal time input might be
affected by EITC. Moreover, I am able to not only look at the total quantity of
maternal time input, but also differentiate between two types: the engaged maternal
time input and the accessible maternal time input.
In Table 2.7, I first provide the overall effect without splitting the sample (Panel
A). On the one hand, a negative effect of EITC is revealed in the first column on
maternal engaged time. A ✩1,000 increase in EITC generosity is associated with a
0.55 weekly hour reduction in maternal engaged time. On the other hand, a positive
effect of EITC has been found on maternal accessible time - a ✩1,000 increase in
EITC generosity is associated with a 1.28 weekly hour increase in maternal accessible
time. This shift between the two different types helps explain the insignificant result
found in the third column, with respect to total weekly hours spent with child. Given
that, on average, mothers spend 17 hours per week in engaged time and accessible
time, these effects represent about 3 percent and 7 percent reduction and increase,
respectively.
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When dividing the sample by family structure, distinct patterns emerge again. In
Panel B, single-mothers are significantly reducing their engaged time (1.69 hours per
week) at 1 percent level in response to ✩1,000 EITC generosity increase. This maps to
an 11 percent reduction, given that, on average, single-mothers spend about 15 hours
per week in engaged time. The number is large in magnitude. In contrast, single-
mothers also tend to increase their accessible time: 1.76 hours per week maps to an
11 percent increase. Overall, there is a slight reduction in total time single-mother
spend with their children, though it is not precisely estimated. In Panel C, EITC is
not found to be negatively related to any time input category, which is distinct from
what has been found associated with single-mother families.
Such finding is qualitatively similar when compared to results in child fixed effect
model (Table 2.8), even though the coefficients are less precisely estimated.
2.8.3 Non-Parental Child Care Channel
Third, I look at the non-parental child-care channel. It is worth mentioning that
the data used in this section is no longer the three waves of CDS data. Instead, the
augmented CDS sample, a constructed panel data based on retrospective child-care
history in CDS 1997 and CDS 2002 is used, in addition to the original CDS. The
advantage is clear: to take advantage of major federal EITC expansions since the
fiscal year can be as early as 1983.
The patterns between Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 are similar and I focus the dis-
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cussion on Table 2.10, since it is more precisely estimated. Overall (Panel A), it
suggests that the EITC leads to increased child care usage at both extensive and
intensive margins and across two different types, i.e. by relative and formal child care
programs.
As depicted in Panel B, single-mother families are found to increase any child care
usage by 5.8 percentage point, which maps to about a 15 percent increase. However,
when considering different types, it is striking to observe that single mothers are
mainly choosing informal child care by relatives, which is commonly considered to be
of low quality. The magnitude is large, since 3.7 percentage point increase in child
care by relatives maps to a 20 percent increase. In contrast, there is no significant
impact of EITC on formal child care programs. The effect on intensive margin is
also large: 4.10 weekly hours of increase in any child care program maps to over 20
percent increase.
In Panel C, married mother families share similar results in terms of increased
child care usage at both the intensive and extensive margin. However, one major
distinction lies in the child care type. Unlike single-mother families who increase child
care by relatives, married-mother families increase formal child care usage instead.
Though it may be difficult to compare the quality of formal child care centers
versus maternal time for married mothers, it is arguably fair to infer that child care
by relatives is detrimental to children of single-mother families. This may further
help explain the fact that the EITC leads to worse reading skills for children from
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single-mother families, together with the evidence that single-mothers tend to shift
from engaged time to accessible time.
2.8.4 Psychological Distress
As demonstrated in the previous section, single mothers are found to respond
actively to the EITC, i.e. reduce their engaged time input while increasing their
accessible time input with their children. This is more about the quantity perspective
of time. Another perspective is related to quality of time. If the quality of maternal
time were increased, even with reduced quantity of time, a child would not necessarily
be worse off. In contrast, if both quality and quantity of time were decreased, then a
child could become worse off.
The maternal psychological distress is used as one proxy measure for the quality of
maternal time. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 suggest that single-mothers would be more likely
to become distressed, while married mothers would possibly become less distressed.
The former effect is significantly estimated at the 1 percent level using the child fixed
effect model in Panel B of Table 2.12, which represents a nearly 20 percent increase.
The latter effect is negative, meaning a reduction in maternal psychological distress,
though it is not precisely estimated.
The evidence suggests that not only the quantity, but also the quality, of maternal
time input, might be responsible for explaining the negative impact on children’s
cognitive skills among single-mother families.
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2.9 Interpreting Empirical Results
Being equipped with an understanding of the various mechanisms discussed, an
ideal next step is to estimate a production function of child skill formation in the spirit
of Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010), which contains various inputs,
all inputs instrumented with EITC policy variables. Assuming this can be done, then
one would be able to interpret the results in terms of how the EITC leads to specific
changes of inputs in the child skill production function, which ultimately results in
corresponding changes in child skill formation. Unfortunately, this type of exercise is
hardly feasible given the data structure I have, as well as the sources of identification,
which requires EITC policy-related exclusion restrictions or instrumental variables for
each of the inputs, especially for different types of maternal time and for non-parental
child care.
Although not directly possible, I try to indirectly interpret the results based on
results from other literature related to these mechanisms and how they shape child
skill formation.
First, the literature has demonstrated that engaged and enriching maternal time
is particularly significant to child development in the U.S. (Del Boca et al. (2014)),
Australia (Fiorini and Keane (2014)), and the UK (Del Bono et al. (2016)). On the
one hand, a reduction in engaged time could be detrimental to a child’s cognitive
development. On the other hand, a shift from engaged time to accessible time and
keeping the total time roughly unchanged could be less harmful to a child’s non-
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cognitive skills.
Second, there is strong evidence that center-based former child care can generate
better child outcomes than at-home informal child care (Heckman et al. (2013), Kline
and Walters (2016), and Feller et al. (2016)). Bernal (2008); Bernal and Keane
(2010, 2011) have also found that non-parental child care is detrimental to children’s
cognitive development for both single mothers and married mothers, even though
they have not differentiated much at the quality dimension. A detrimental effect
of non-parental child care on preschool-aged children’s cognitive development is also
found by Herbst (2013). Therefore, the fact that both single mothers and married
mothers increase non-parental child care usage but single mothers are more likely to
choose informal child care by relatives while married mothers are more likely to choose
formal, center-based child care programs, provides a rationale for the detrimental
effect of EITC generosity on the cognitive skills of children who come from single-
mother families.
Third, Ronda (2016) illustrates the different mechanisms through which maternal
psychological distress may impair a child’s cognitive development. EITC generosity
leads to increased psychological distress for single mothers, which may consequently
result in negative effects on children’s cognitive development. Herbst (2017) also finds
that working mothers experience an increase in depressive symptoms as a mechanism
through which the welfare reform’s work requirements negatively affect child welfare,
which shares a similar perspective to what has been found in the present research.
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This could be possible, given the pro-working nature of the EITC that generates
strong labor supply incentive for mothers which is similar to the welfare reform’s
work requirements.
Last, much less is known about determinants of children’s non-cognitive skills,
aside from the recent work of Akee et al. (2018), which highlights the importance of
family income in affecting personality traits. If the positive effect of family income is
stronger for non-cognitive skills than for cognitive skills, or if the total maternal time
with a child matters more than the specific-type of time in affecting non-cognitive
skills as compared with cognitive skills, then the varying results between cognitive
and non-cognitive skills could be partially resolved.
2.10 Discussions and Conclusions
This paper investigates the mechanisms through which the EITC affects maternal
decision making and child skill formation using the PSID and its CDS.
On the one hand, among different measures, the EITC has been found to have a
negative impact on children’s cognitive skills among those come from single-mother
families, as compared to their counterparts from married-mother families. On the
other hand, the EITC is associated with improvements in children’s non-cognitive
skills. The positive effect is salient for children from both single-mother families and
married-mother families. Moreover, the effect is much larger for the more disadvan-
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taged children, which differs from the case of cognitive skills. The results are robust
based on different empirical model specifications.
At least three channels may help explain the effect of the EITC on child outcomes.
The most striking channel comes from non-parental child care. Both single mothers
and married mothers tend to their increase child care usage at both extensive and
intensive margins. However, single mothers are more likely to choose informal child
care arrangements by relatives, which is usually thought to be of low quality and may
have negative consequences for child development. In contrast, married mothers are
more likely to use formal child care. Second, single mothers are likely to respond
by changing their time inputs by switching between time types, i.e. reducing their
actively engaged time but increasing accessible time. Such a shift is not observed
among married mothers. Reduced engaged time may also be detrimental to children’s
cognitive development. Third, single mothers are worse off and more distressed when
faced with increased EITC generosity. However, the EITC has a modest positive effect
on married mother’s psychological distress. The combined effects based on these
three channels may help explain why children from single-mother families exhibit
worse cognitive skills. Finally, whether increased family income directly leads to
increased child-specific expenditures remains unclear and requires better data; this
should therefore be explored in future research.
These findings also shed light on potentially important policy implications. One of
the most direct policy suggestions is to promote the accessibility of high-quality child
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care for disadvantaged families. As summarized by Hotz and Wiswall (2019), the
current policy landscape on child care policies also has its limitations. For example,
child care subsidies have consistently shown that subsidy receipt reduces cognitive de-
velopment and increases behavioral problems (Herbst and Tekin (2010, 2016)). Head
Start may be different, the heterogeneous effect of which, as well as the importance
of care substitution, has been emphasized recently. (Feller et al. (2016); Kline and
Walters (2016); Morris et al. (2018)). One of the most relevant findings is that the
impacts of Head Start are substantially larger for children who would have otherwise
received parental or informal non-parental care and are small or non-existent for chil-
dren who would have otherwise been cared for via center-based formal centers. Thus,
promoting Head Start for children from single-mothers families in the context of the
EITC could potentially be beneficial, as these mothers have been found to increase
their usage of informal child-care arrangements by relatives. A specific comparison
of how different child care policies may differently alleviate the detrimental effects
revealed in this paper in the context of the EITC is beyond the scope of this paper
and remains to be explored in future research.
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2.11 Figures
Figure 2.1: EITC Schedule for Single Parents with Two Qualifying Children
Note: 1979,1993, 1996 and 2014; obtained from Nichols and Rothstein (2015); calcu-
lations assume no unearned income.
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Figure 2.2: Federal EITC Evolution
Figure 2.3: State EITC Evolution
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2.12 Tables
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics Based on CDS Data
Overall with EITC w/o EITC Single Married
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
EITC Generosity 3.73 0.76 3.77 0.71 3.71 0.78 3.71 0.82 3.73 0.73
Household: Whether Has EITC or Not 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.49 0.18 0.38
Household: ✩ of Federal EITC 0.56 1.06 1.82 1.18 0.00 0.00 1.16 1.32 0.29 0.79
Household: ✩ of State EITC 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.07
Household: ✩ of Total EITC 0.58 1.11 1.88 1.24 0.00 0.00 1.21 1.39 0.30 0.81
Letter Word Z Score 0.03 1.00 -0.27 0.93 0.15 1.00 -0.28 0.97 0.17 0.97
Passage Comprehension Z Score 0.03 1.00 -0.27 0.93 0.16 1.00 -0.31 0.98 0.19 0.97
Broad Reading Z Score 0.03 1.00 -0.30 0.92 0.17 1.00 -0.32 0.99 0.19 0.96
Applied Problems Z Score 0.07 0.98 -0.28 0.89 0.22 0.98 -0.26 0.94 0.22 0.97
BPI: Externalizing Z Score -0.04 0.98 0.09 1.01 -0.09 0.97 0.13 1.03 -0.12 0.95
BPI: Internalizing Z Score -0.03 0.97 0.04 1.00 -0.06 0.96 0.05 1.04 -0.07 0.94
PBS: Z Score 0.03 0.98 0.04 1.03 0.02 0.96 -0.01 1.02 0.05 0.96
Child: Girl 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50
Child: Black 0.39 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.24 0.43
Child: Hispanic 0.08 0.26 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.09 0.29
Child: Age 10.35 4.69 10.07 4.64 10.48 4.70 10.85 4.48 10.13 4.76
Mother: Black 0.38 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.71 0.46 0.24 0.43
Mother: Unmarried at Child Birth 0.33 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.68 0.47 0.17 0.38
Mother’s Age at Child Birth 26.45 5.84 24.39 5.81 27.37 5.62 24.73 6.12 27.22 5.54
Mother: Age 36.31 7.21 33.97 7.19 37.35 6.97 35.09 7.59 36.85 6.96
Mother: Married 0.69 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.82 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Mother: Years Completed Education 12.95 2.38 11.85 2.26 13.44 2.27 12.35 1.97 13.22 2.50
Mother: Cognitive Skill 30.87 5.39 28.51 5.16 31.92 5.15 28.48 5.41 31.90 5.04
Household: Number of Children 2.30 1.06 2.43 1.08 2.24 1.05 2.32 1.14 2.29 1.03
Household: Age of Youngest Child 6.84 4.47 6.10 4.24 7.17 4.53 6.97 4.45 6.78 4.48
Mother: No Work 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42
Mother: Annual Hours of Work 1269.30 940.33 1212.01 885.30 1294.64 962.67 1382.81 942.66 1220.39 935.19
Household: Total Income with EITC 50.08 31.69 25.24 12.97 61.94 31.12 27.60 19.53 60.21 30.90
Child Expenditure 1.06 0.72 0.80 0.61 1.18 0.74 0.88 0.67 1.15 0.73
Mother: Weekly Hours of Active Time 16.94 11.28 16.25 11.26 17.23 11.28 14.91 11.24 17.78 11.20
Mother: Weekly Hours of Passive Time 16.73 11.15 16.28 11.18 16.91 11.13 15.42 11.27 17.27 11.06
Mother: Weekly Hours of Total Time 35.90 15.92 35.18 15.99 36.20 15.88 33.18 15.85 37.01 15.81
Mother: Whether Uses Any CC 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.48 0.29 0.45
Mother: Whether Uses CC by Relatives 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.34
Mother: Whether Uses Formal CC 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32
Mother: Weekly Hours of CC 5.75 12.33 6.61 13.09 5.37 11.97 7.13 13.49 5.16 11.75
Mother: Psychological Distress Index 3.93 3.62 4.66 4.00 3.62 3.39 4.74 4.19 3.57 3.27
Note: (1) Number of observations for the overall sample is 6915. It is 2126, 4789, 2118, and 4797 for households with EITC, households
without EITC, households with single-mothers, and households with married-mothers respectively. (2) Household EITC-related variables
(whether has EITC or not, actual amount of federal EITC, actual amount of state EITC, and actual amount of total EITC) are simulated
using relevant information in PSID and NBER’s TAXSIM. (3) Actual amount of federal/state/total EITC, total income with EITC are
scaled in ✩1,000. All monetary variables are in 2014 real values.
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Table 2.2: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.022 -0.031 -0.031 0.012 -0.057* -0.079*** 0.025
(0.038) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028)
Y 0.035 0.050 0.044 0.087 -0.044 -0.025 0.012
N 4296 3762 3760 3815 4465 4474 4513
R2 0.226 0.263 0.280 0.289 0.068 0.061 0.050
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.085* -0.090** -0.11** -0.054 -0.057 -0.13** 0.0083
(0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049)
Y -0.315 -0.330 -0.350 -0.270 0.141 0.043 -0.020
N 1311 1159 1158 1168 1365 1367 1382
R2 0.176 0.222 0.228 0.222 0.077 0.117 0.085
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity 0.0018 -0.018 -0.0057 0.040 -0.073** -0.056 0.038
(0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036)
Y 0.189 0.220 0.220 0.244 -0.126 -0.055 0.026
N 2985 2603 2602 2647 3100 3107 3131
R2 0.198 0.227 0.244 0.270 0.059 0.057 0.051
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.3: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcome
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.046 -0.071* -0.042 -0.0076 -0.074** -0.10*** 0.082**
(0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
Y 0.035 0.050 0.044 0.087 -0.044 -0.025 0.012
N 4296 3762 3760 3815 4465 4474 4513
R2 0.050 0.057 0.052 0.113 0.022 0.042 0.012
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.11* -0.13 -0.13** -0.0024 -0.22*** -0.20** 0.090
(0.064) (0.083) (0.064) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.11)
Y -0.315 -0.330 -0.350 -0.270 0.141 0.043 -0.020
N 1311 1159 1158 1168 1365 1367 1382
R2 0.070 0.118 0.114 0.167 0.038 0.082 0.041
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.021 -0.050 -0.013 0.011 -0.037 -0.067 0.11***
(0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
Y 0.189 0.220 0.220 0.244 -0.126 -0.055 0.026
N 2985 2603 2602 2647 3100 3107 3131
R2 0.068 0.059 0.069 0.113 0.028 0.042 0.017
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum
wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF
and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
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Table 2.4: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcome
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Child VA)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.034 -0.067* -0.065** -0.013 -0.077** -0.12*** 0.064*
(0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Y 0.022 -0.031 0.001 0.022 -0.076 -0.028 0.006
N 2085 1652 1650 1697 2229 2229 2266
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.063 -0.100* -0.097* -0.068 -0.11* -0.16*** 0.0099
(0.052) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059)
Y -0.325 -0.410 -0.393 -0.362 0.120 -0.020 -0.011
N 652 513 512 531 696 693 710
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.028 -0.048 -0.055 0.0036 -0.055 -0.10** 0.089**
(0.041) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
Y 0.180 0.140 0.179 0.197 -0.165 -0.031 0.014
N 1433 1139 1138 1166 1533 1536 1556
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.5: Impact of EITC on Goods Input
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Pooled OLS with State FE)
EITC Eligibility Total Income with EITC Child-Expenditure
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.18*** 1.27** -0.040
(0.028) (0.54) (0.027)
Y 0.578 50.159 1.067
N 6262 5797 2853
R2 0.237 0.488 0.171
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample 0.39*** 0.52 -0.048
(0.046) (0.71) (0.052)
Y 1.246 26.526 0.876
N 1896 1778 943
R2 0.121 0.274 0.143
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.061* 1.66* -0.026
(0.035) (0.86) (0.033)
Y 0.288 60.614 1.162
N 4366 4019 1910
R2 0.153 0.350 0.157
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010. Each cell represents
a separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate,
real state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly
maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are in the
online appendix or available upon request.
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Table 2.6: Impact of EITC on Goods Input
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Child FE)
EITC Eligibility Total Income with EITC Child-Expenditure
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.084** 0.94 -0.099**
(0.033) (0.78) (0.042)
Y 0.578 50.159 1.067
N 6262 5797 2853
R2 0.086 0.234 0.080
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample 0.20* 1.98 -0.036
(0.10) (1.24) (0.075)
Y 1.246 26.526 0.876
N 1896 1778 943
R2 0.104 0.170 0.154
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.045 1.04 -0.16***
(0.029) (1.02) (0.054)
Y 0.288 60.614 1.162
N 4366 4019 1910
R2 0.041 0.226 0.110
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010. Each cell represents
a separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate,
real state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly
maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are in the
online appendix or available upon request.
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Table 2.7: Impact of EITC on Maternal Time Input
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Engaged Time Accessible Time Total Time
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.55 1.27*** 0.40
(0.38) (0.37) (0.42)
Y 17.316 17.133 36.416
N 4223 4205 4135
R2 0.241 0.067 0.183
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -1.69*** 1.76** -0.20
(0.55) (0.69) (0.79)
Y 15.166 15.787 33.666
N 1176 1181 1151
R2 0.267 0.113 0.199
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.016 1.03** 0.70
(0.42) (0.42) (0.56)
Y 18.145 17.659 37.476
N 3047 3024 2984
R2 0.250 0.082 0.199
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010. Each cell represents
a separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate,
real state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly
maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are in the
online appendix or available upon request.
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Table 2.8: Impact of EITC on Maternal Time Input
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Child FE)
Engaged Time Accessible Time Total Time
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.63 0.91 1.87**
(0.50) (0.58) (0.76)
Y 17.316 17.133 36.416
N 4223 4205 4135
R2 0.247 0.064 0.194
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.70 0.086 0.44
(1.14) (1.44) (1.77)
Y 15.166 15.787 33.666
N 1176 1181 1151
R2 0.225 0.126 0.285
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 1.30** 0.83 2.13**
(0.63) (0.69) (0.93)
Y 18.145 17.659 37.476
N 3047 3024 2984
R2 0.267 0.071 0.208
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010. Each cell represents
a separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate,
real state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly
maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are in the
online appendix or available upon request.
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Table 2.9: Impact of EITC on Non-parental Child Care
(Augmented CDS - Full Sample, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Any Child Care CC by Relative Formal CC Weekly Hours
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.027** 0.0022 0.018** 2.34***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.0085) (0.77)
Y 0.368 0.134 0.161 16.563
N 17390 17380 17390 17369
R2 0.161 0.058 0.111 0.153
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample 0.037 0.026 -0.014 2.28*
(0.025) (0.018) (0.014) (1.23)
Y 0.376 0.164 0.157 16.603
N 4458 4458 4458 4453
R2 0.186 0.111 0.134 0.188
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.025* -0.0040 0.032*** 2.46**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.0090) (0.97)
Y 0.366 0.124 0.163 16.550
N 12932 12922 12932 12916
R2 0.175 0.065 0.120 0.167
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum
wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF
and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
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Table 2.10: Impact of EITC on Non-parental Child Care
(Augmented CDS - Full Sample, Child FE)
Any Child Care CC by Relative Formal CC Weekly Hours
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.043*** 0.015* 0.042*** 3.65***
(0.012) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.76)
Y 0.368 0.134 0.161 16.563
N 17390 17380 17390 17369
R2 0.141 0.024 0.074 0.157
Panel B: Single-Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample 0.058** 0.037** 0.029 4.10**
(0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (1.75)
Y 0.376 0.164 0.157 16.603
N 4458 4458 4458 4453
R2 0.104 0.053 0.067 0.138
Panel C: Married-Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.038*** 0.0053 0.048*** 3.44***
(0.014) (0.0095) (0.011) (0.83)
Y 0.366 0.124 0.163 16.550
N 12932 12922 12932 12916
R2 0.163 0.026 0.079 0.165
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the child-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum
wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF
and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
158
CHAPTER 2. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, MATERNAL BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSE AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
Table 2.11: Impact of EITC on Psychological Distress
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Kessler-6 Psychological Distress Scale


















Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum
wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF
and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
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Table 2.12: Impact of EITC on Psychological Distress
(Original CDS - Full Sample, Child FE)
Kessler-6 Psychological Distress Scale


















Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child
in the household; year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum
wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF
and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
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2.13 Appendix
2.13.1 Details on Data and Variables
PSID-CDS
Table 2.13: Data Availability in the PSID-CDS
Variables Source Available Year
Child Human Capital Outcomes CDS 1997, 2002, 2007
Maternal Time Investment CDS-TD 1997, 2002, 2007
Non-parental Child Care CDS 1997, 2002, 2007
Maternal Labor Market Outcomes PSID 1985-1997, biennial afterwards
Household Characteristics PSID 1985-1997, biennial afterwards
Notes: (i) Non-parental child care information is obtained based on retrospective questions on all
arrangements used from birth until kindergarten enrollment and questions on the arrangement used
at the time of survey. (ii) Child human capital outcomes are only available for children in older year,
i.e. at least age 3 or 6 depending on specific measure.
In CDS-I, among the 2,803 children who are eligible to participate in any of the
WJ-R subtests, 2,223 children attempted the assessment and 2,190 children completed
all appropriate WJ-R subtests 30. The detailed counts for the number of children who
30Potential reasons for a child not to complete the testing include: Caregiver terminated the test;
Child would not respond; Major interruption; Child did not understand the WJ-R; A language
problem; An emotional condition; A physical condition; Child was tired; or Other reason. In
subsequent waves, a couple of factors lead to change in the number of children eligible for testing
based on Duffy and Sastry (2014). Firstly, younger children who are too young to participate in
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Table 2.14: Measurements of Cognitive Skills
WJ-R Subtest Description Age
Letter-Word Identification Assesses symbolic learning and reading identification
skills
≥ 3
Passage Comprehension Assesses reading comprehension and vocabulary ≥ 6
Applied Problems Assesses mathematics reasoning, achievement, and
knowledge
≥ 3
Notes: i. Passage Comprehension is also available for Primary Care Giver in CDS 1997. 2. Another
math-related test, Calculations, is only available in CDS 1997 but not accessed in either CDS 2002
or CDS 2007.
are eligible, who have started and who have completed WJ-R subtests are listed in
Table 2.18.
CDS-I become eligible for the tests in CDS-II, i.e. those younger than age 3 or age 6 for different
tests. Secondly, older children who reach age 18 would leave the CDS sample. Thirdly, some children
have been lost to follow-up due to family’s attrition from the Core PSID or from the CDS.
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Table 2.15: Measurements of Non-cognitive Skills
Measure Description Age
Externalizing BPI external or aggressive behaviors ≥ 3
Internalizing BPI internal or withdrawn behaviors ≥ 3
Positive Behaviors Scale emotional or social competence ≥ 3
Table 2.16: An Illustration Example of Child Care History in CDS-I
Age in 1997 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
12 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
11 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
10 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
9 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
7 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
6 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
5 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
4 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
3 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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Table 2.17: Cohorts of Children in the PSID-CDS
Year of Birth Child’s Age and Corresponding Calendar Year
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 · · · t=7 t=8 t=9 · · · t=12 t=13 t=14 t=15 t=16
1985 1986 1987 1988 · · · 1992 1993 1994 · · · 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1986 1987 1988 1989 · · · 1993 1994 1995 · · · 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1987 1988 1989 1990 · · · 1994 1995 1996 · · · 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1988 1989 1990 1991 · · · 1995 1996 1997 · · · 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1989 1990 1991 1992 · · · 1996 1997 1998 · · · 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1990 1991 1992 1993 · · · 1997 1998 1999 · · · 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1991 1992 1993 1994 · · · 1998 1999 2000 · · · 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1992 1993 1994 1995 · · · 1999 2000 2001 · · · 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1993 1994 1995 1996 · · · 2000 2001 2002 · · · 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1994 1995 1996 1997 · · · 2001 2002 2003 · · · 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1995 1996 1997 1998 · · · 2002 2003 2004 · · · 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1996 1997 1998 1999 · · · 2003 2004 2005 · · · 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1997 1998 1999 2000 · · · 2004 2005 2006 · · · 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Table 2.18: Counts, by Wave, of Children Eligible for WJ-R Subtests
CDS-I (3563 children) CDS-II (2907 children) CDS-III (1608 children)












Letter-Word Identification 2,803 2,223 2,218 2,907 2,644 2,633 1,608 1,491 1,490
Passage Comprehension 1,877† 1,532 1,522 2,856 2,595 2,541 1,608 1,491 1,491
Applied Problems 2,803 2,223 2,209 2,907 2,644 2,625 1,608 1,491 1,485
Calculations 1,877† 1,532 1,517 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Notes: † Approximate number of eligible children for Passage Comprehension and Calculation
subtests based on age at 1997 Core PSID interview. This is reproduced from Duffy and Sastry
(2014)(Table 3).
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The Aggregate Test Score in Bastian and Michelmore (2018)
In a recent paper by Bastian and Michelmore (2018), they use the PSID and its
CDS to investigate the long-run impact of the EITC on children’s education and
employment outcomes. In “Table: Effect of EITC Exposure on Intermediate Out-
comes (OLS Results)”, they show that contemporaneous EITC generosity leads to
an 0.126 increase of Standardized Test Scores at the statistical significance of 5%.
However, this conclusion is questionable, because of the error in their construction of
such “standardized test score”.
However, such “standardized test score” measure may contain some issues, based
on the description in “Appendix C: Description Description of Data and Variables”
of their working paper31.
Inconsistent and Misclassification in the Math score measure
1. Q3BMA SS is the Broad Math Score 97, which contains Applied Problem and
Calculation in CDS-97. This is the only available broad math variable in all
three waves of CDS, because Calculation is only assessed in the first wave of CDS
1997. In other words, no consistent measure of such same variable is available
in CDDS 02 and CDS 07. Moreover, this variable is objectively assessed.
2. MATH02 and MATH07 are Ability Self Concepts Math 02 and 07. These questions
are answered by children subjectively.
31https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2674603
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Hence, it is inappropriate and inconsistent to treat these three variables as if they
are the same variable being measured in different waves. These two are essentially
different variables.
Duplication in both Reading and Math score
1. The “Reading” (Q24BRSS, Q3BRE SS, Q34BRSS) is already a a combination of
both Letter-Word and Passage Comprehension. Therefore, including both such
“Reading” score and “Passage Comprehension” cause duplication, i.e. Passage
Comprehension is calculated twice in all three waves of CDS.
2. Q3BMA SS is already a combination of both Applied Problem and Calculation.
Therefore, including both such “Math” and “Applied Problem” cause duplica-
tion, i.e. Applied Problem is calculated twice in the first wave of CDS.
Hence, the authors are duplicating Passage Comprehension for twice for all CDS
waves and duplicating the Applied Problem for once for CDS97.
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2.13.2 Additional Results
Table 2.19: Understanding Sources of Variation
Overall Single-Mother Married-Mother
Two Children or More 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.80***
(0.0053) (0.011) (0.0051)
Year 2002 0.031*** 0.0045 0.041***
(0.0043) (0.0098) (0.0053)
Year 2007 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.058***
(0.0075) (0.015) (0.0097)
Constant 2.43*** 2.48*** 2.43***
(0.0088) (0.018) (0.0093)
Observations 7163 2092 4814
R2 within Model 0.899 0.881 0.907
R2 between Model 0.664 0.649 0.692
R2 overall Model 0.721 0.679 0.750
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010.
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Table 2.20: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩150k), Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.021 -0.020 -0.026 0.017 -0.050 -0.072** 0.022
(0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030)
Y -0.003 0.018 0.004 0.039 -0.027 -0.018 0.009
N 4072 3549 3547 3602 4228 4236 4275
R2 0.214 0.256 0.269 0.272 0.066 0.062 0.051
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.083 -0.088* -0.10** -0.049 -0.058 -0.13** 0.0069
(0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050)
Y -0.316 -0.331 -0.351 -0.273 0.143 0.044 -0.021
N 1308 1157 1156 1166 1362 1364 1379
R2 0.175 0.221 0.228 0.221 0.076 0.116 0.084
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity 0.0028 0.0021 0.0026 0.051 -0.062 -0.043 0.036
(0.043) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
Y 0.146 0.187 0.175 0.188 -0.107 -0.047 0.023
N 2764 2392 2391 2436 2866 2872 2896
R2 0.189 0.225 0.237 0.257 0.059 0.059 0.052
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.21: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩100k), Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.030 -0.024 -0.032 0.020 -0.054 -0.071** 0.0080
(0.046) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Y -0.057 -0.036 -0.058 -0.029 0.002 -0.002 0.005
N 3657 3162 3161 3213 3788 3796 3834
R2 0.206 0.255 0.263 0.250 0.065 0.066 0.053
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.082 -0.10** -0.11** -0.055 -0.057 -0.12** 0.0027
(0.050) (0.042) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051)
Y -0.322 -0.337 -0.358 -0.276 0.144 0.041 -0.018
N 1294 1143 1142 1152 1348 1350 1365
R2 0.176 0.222 0.230 0.220 0.076 0.116 0.085
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.0033 0.010 0.0060 0.069 -0.075** -0.041 0.020
(0.055) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042)
Y 0.088 0.134 0.112 0.109 -0.076 -0.027 0.018
N 2363 2019 2019 2061 2440 2446 2469
R2 0.187 0.234 0.240 0.241 0.063 0.068 0.057
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.22: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩85k), Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.035 -0.023 -0.034 0.018 -0.044 -0.075** -0.0024
(0.050) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Y -0.088 -0.072 -0.094 -0.063 0.017 0.004 0.004
N 3416 2938 2937 2985 3542 3548 3585
R2 0.204 0.248 0.259 0.240 0.065 0.069 0.055
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.080 -0.097** -0.11** -0.049 -0.059 -0.12** 0.00055
(0.052) (0.044) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051)
Y -0.329 -0.340 -0.364 -0.279 0.146 0.044 -0.020
N 1282 1131 1130 1140 1336 1338 1353
R2 0.177 0.225 0.231 0.221 0.075 0.116 0.084
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.013 0.0028 -0.0011 0.066 -0.058 -0.041 0.0069
(0.061) (0.048) (0.054) (0.051) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043)
Y 0.057 0.095 0.075 0.071 -0.061 -0.021 0.018
N 2134 1807 1807 1845 2206 2210 2232
R2 0.188 0.234 0.242 0.231 0.064 0.070 0.061
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.23: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Only High-school Dropouts, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.053 0.019 -0.032 0.032 0.032 -0.068 0.0065
(0.10) (0.074) (0.096) (0.063) (0.074) (0.085) (0.093)
Y -0.473 -0.530 -0.545 -0.455 0.116 0.124 0.095
N 531 462 462 472 552 557 561
R2 0.255 0.295 0.318 0.219 0.159 0.126 0.116
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.24** -0.17* -0.24*** -0.084 -0.030 -0.15 0.20*
(0.091) (0.092) (0.087) (0.073) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Y -0.710 -0.707 -0.764 -0.551 0.286 0.201 -0.002
N 239 208 208 212 249 252 255
R2 0.298 0.435 0.409 0.381 0.185 0.231 0.144
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.031 0.093 0.023 0.11 -0.065 -0.10 0.013
(0.14) (0.072) (0.11) (0.092) (0.095) (0.13) (0.12)
Y -0.280 -0.385 -0.365 -0.377 -0.024 0.061 0.176
N 292 254 254 260 303 305 306
R2 0.291 0.342 0.355 0.217 0.281 0.197 0.215
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.24: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Only High-school Graduates and Above, Pooled OLS with State FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
EITC Generosity -0.012 -0.037 -0.027 0.0043 -0.064** -0.076*** 0.027
(0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028)
Y 0.107 0.131 0.127 0.163 -0.067 -0.046 0.000
N 3765 3300 3298 3343 3913 3917 3952
R2 0.204 0.238 0.254 0.278 0.063 0.061 0.050
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity -0.061 -0.059 -0.073 -0.038 -0.076 -0.14** -0.015
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.045)
Y -0.227 -0.247 -0.259 -0.208 0.109 0.007 -0.024
N 1072 951 950 956 1116 1115 1127
R2 0.148 0.193 0.201 0.218 0.073 0.117 0.103
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
EITC Generosity 0.0019 -0.037 -0.016 0.023 -0.062* -0.042 0.040
(0.038) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036)
Y 0.239 0.285 0.283 0.312 -0.137 -0.068 0.010
N 2693 2349 2348 2387 2797 2802 2825
R2 0.186 0.204 0.225 0.253 0.055 0.059 0.047
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.25: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩150k), Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.055 -0.048 -0.035 0.0033 -0.065* -0.090** 0.077*
(0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.043)
Y -0.003 0.018 0.004 0.039 -0.027 -0.018 0.009
N 4072 3549 3547 3602 4228 4236 4275
R2 0.048 0.057 0.050 0.117 0.022 0.043 0.010
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.11* -0.13 -0.13** -0.0036 -0.23*** -0.20** 0.089
(0.064) (0.083) (0.064) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.11)
Y -0.316 -0.331 -0.351 -0.273 0.143 0.044 -0.021
N 1308 1157 1156 1166 1362 1364 1379
R2 0.068 0.119 0.113 0.167 0.039 0.080 0.041
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.037 -0.011 -0.0046 0.019 -0.019 -0.043 0.12**
(0.048) (0.060) (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048)
Y 0.146 0.187 0.175 0.188 -0.107 -0.047 0.023
N 2764 2392 2391 2436 2866 2872 2896
R2 0.064 0.058 0.062 0.125 0.033 0.049 0.017
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
173
CHAPTER 2. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT, MATERNAL BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSE AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
Table 2.26: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩100k), Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.054 -0.050 -0.043 0.00017 -0.086** -0.091** 0.079
(0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.049)
Y -0.057 -0.036 -0.058 -0.029 0.002 -0.002 0.005
N 3657 3162 3161 3213 3788 3796 3834
R2 0.051 0.068 0.063 0.113 0.021 0.046 0.011
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.10 -0.11 -0.11* 0.00083 -0.24*** -0.22** 0.078
(0.065) (0.083) (0.064) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.12)
Y -0.322 -0.337 -0.358 -0.276 0.144 0.041 -0.018
N 1294 1143 1142 1152 1348 1350 1365
R2 0.068 0.118 0.115 0.165 0.041 0.079 0.038
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.043 -0.023 -0.027 0.0033 -0.030 -0.029 0.14**
(0.054) (0.066) (0.056) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057)
Y 0.088 0.134 0.112 0.109 -0.076 -0.027 0.018
N 2363 2019 2019 2061 2440 2446 2469
R2 0.069 0.070 0.072 0.111 0.031 0.054 0.022
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.27: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Excluding High-Income Households (> ✩85k), Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.064* -0.066 -0.062 0.011 -0.10** -0.11** 0.065
(0.039) (0.050) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.052)
Y -0.088 -0.072 -0.094 -0.063 0.017 0.004 0.004
N 3416 2938 2937 2985 3542 3548 3585
R2 0.054 0.076 0.067 0.111 0.021 0.045 0.012
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.10 -0.11 -0.12* -0.00084 -0.25*** -0.22** 0.084
(0.065) (0.083) (0.064) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.12)
Y -0.329 -0.340 -0.364 -0.279 0.146 0.044 -0.020
N 1282 1131 1130 1140 1336 1338 1353
R2 0.068 0.120 0.117 0.165 0.043 0.078 0.039
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.061 -0.041 -0.046 0.0097 -0.048 -0.035 0.11*
(0.058) (0.075) (0.064) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.063)
Y 0.057 0.095 0.075 0.071 -0.061 -0.021 0.018
N 2134 1807 1807 1845 2206 2210 2232
R2 0.071 0.093 0.080 0.108 0.031 0.057 0.023
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.28: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Only High-school Dropouts, Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample 0.037 -0.24** -0.11 0.015 -0.14 -0.028 -0.0028
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.100) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
Y -0.473 -0.530 -0.545 -0.455 0.116 0.124 0.095
N 531 462 462 472 552 557 561
R2 0.123 0.254 0.261 0.254 0.080 0.097 0.099
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.23 -0.64*** -0.51*** -0.22 -0.41* -0.31 0.00012
(0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22) (0.25) (0.32)
Y -0.710 -0.707 -0.764 -0.551 0.286 0.201 -0.002
N 239 208 208 212 249 252 255
R2 0.196 0.393 0.326 0.530 0.159 0.137 0.147
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample 0.020 -0.090 -0.040 0.17 0.093 0.36** 0.15
(0.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15)
Y -0.280 -0.385 -0.365 -0.377 -0.024 0.061 0.176
N 292 254 254 260 303 305 306
R2 0.221 0.425 0.452 0.271 0.131 0.179 0.188
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.29: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
(Only High-school Graduates and Above, Child FE)
Cognitive Skill Non-cognitive Skill
Letter Passage Broad Applied Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Word Comprehension Reading Problem Problem Problem Behavior
Panel A: Full CDS Families
Full Sample -0.051 -0.072 -0.042 -0.0080 -0.055 -0.10*** 0.086**
(0.036) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)
Y 0.107 0.131 0.127 0.163 -0.067 -0.046 0.000
N 3765 3300 3298 3343 3913 3917 3952
R2 0.052 0.049 0.045 0.113 0.022 0.044 0.013
Panel B: Single - Mother Families Only
Single-Mother Sample -0.077 -0.044 -0.065 0.057 -0.18* -0.16 0.12
(0.067) (0.093) (0.074) (0.099) (0.096) (0.098) (0.12)
Y -0.227 -0.247 -0.259 -0.208 0.109 0.007 -0.024
N 1072 951 950 956 1116 1115 1127
R2 0.096 0.106 0.110 0.152 0.050 0.108 0.068
Panel C: Married - Mother Families Only
Married-Mother Sample -0.035 -0.069 -0.031 -0.0029 -0.041 -0.097** 0.10**
(0.047) (0.059) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Y 0.239 0.285 0.283 0.312 -0.137 -0.068 0.010
N 2693 2349 2348 2387 2797 2802 2825
R2 0.069 0.057 0.068 0.119 0.029 0.040 0.023
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state-level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a
separate regression with full set of control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square,
marital status, educational attainment, whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in
the household; region, state, and year dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real
state minimum wage, combined state and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon
request.
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Table 2.30: Impact of EITC on Child Developmental Outcomes
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
Full Single Married
Sample Mother Mother
Broad Reading -0.030 -0.10** -0.0096
(0.026) (0.047) (0.032)
BPI: Internalizing -0.087*** -0.15*** -0.055
(0.030) (0.053) (0.036)
BPI: Externalizing -0.084*** -0.090* -0.094***
(0.029) (0.053) (0.035)
Y 0.047 -0.347 0.221
N 3707 1138 2569
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each cell represents a separate regression with full set of
control variables, including child’s gender, race, age, age square; mother’s race, age, age square, marital status, educational attainment,
whether mother is unmarried at child birth; number of children and age of the youngest child in the household; region, state, and year
dummy; state policy and characteristics including per-capital real GDP, unemployment rate, real state minimum wage, combined state
and federal current per pupil real spending on K-12 public education, combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps
benefits for 3-person family. The full results including coefficients for all variables are available upon request.
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Chapter 3
Paternal Migration, Investment in
Children, and Children’s
Non-cognitive Development:
Evidence from Rural China
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Abstract: Many children worldwide are left behind by parents who are migrating
for work. While previous literature has studied the effect of parental migration on
children’s educational outcomes and cognitive achievements, this study focuses on how
paternal migration affects children’s non-cognitive development. We use longitudinal
data of children in rural China and adopt labor market conditions in destination
provinces as instrumental variables for parental endogenous migration choice. We
find that father’s migration has a significant negative effect on children’s non-cognitive
development, particularly for boys. We test and discuss several mechanisms including
parental financial inputs, parental time inputs, children’s own time input, household
bargaining, and parenting style.
Keywords: Left-behind Children, Parental Migration, Parental Input, Non-cognitive
Development, Rural China
JEL Classification: J12, J13, J24, J61, R23
3.1 Introduction
International and internal migrants together account for about 1 billion people
worldwide (United Nations, 2013). Migrants often leave their children behind because
of rigid migration policies, high cost of migration, or uncertain living conditions in
the destination region. For example, in China, about 61 million children are left
appreciate Emily Hannum and Albert Park for generously providing data.
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behind in rural areas by their parents who have migrated in search of jobs in urban
cities, with an increasing trend of one-parent migration (usually the father).2 This
“left-behind children” phenomenon has received growing attention in the literature.
So far, substantial research has studied the effect of parental migration on left-behind
children’s cognitive, educational, and health outcomes.3 Yet, studies on the causal
impacts of parental migration on left-behind children’s non-cognitive development
remain limited.4 Moreover, we know even less about the underlying mechanisms
through which parental migration affect children’s development.
This paper is among the first to examine the impact of father’s migration on left-
behind children’s non-cognitive outcomes by using the Gansu Survey of Children and
Families (GSCF), a longitudinal study of children between 9 and 16 years old in rural
China. The GSCF is one of the few datasets that measure children’s non-cognitive
skills in a developing country context, which allows us to expand the scope of existing
studies by linking parental migration to children’s non-cognitive development. More
important, by taking advantage of the richness of the GSCF, this paper can evaluate
the mechanisms behind parental migration in a more comprehensive way. Our results
2This number is estimated based on the 2010 population census by the All-China Women’s
Federation.
3These studies found that parental migration has significant effects on education outcomes
(Acosta, 2011; Alcaraz et al., 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2010; Antman, 2011, 2012; Binci
and Giannelli, 2018; Cortes, 2015; Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010;
Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Kroeger and Anderson, 2014; Macours and Vakis, 2010; McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2011; Nobles, 2011; Powers, 2011; Yang, 2008; Zhang et al., 2014) and health outcomes
(De Brauw and Mu, 2011; Gibson et al., 2011b; Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Mu and De Brauw,
2015; Stillman et al., 2012). Also see Antman (2013) for a survey of the effects of migrant parents
on the left-behind family.
4This is partially because of the lack of reliable data.
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are not only important for understanding the consequences of parental migration,
which is major phenomenon in developing countries, but also add to our knowledge
about the formation of children’s non-cognitive skills in general.
Non-cognitive skills can be broadly defined as social-emotional skills, which are
usually referred to as the second dimension of individual heterogeneity in addition to
cognitive skills in labor economics.5 Understanding the impact of parental migration
on children’s non-cognitive skills is of particular interest given growing evidence that
non-cognitive skills have a large impact on economic outcomes (Flossmann et al., 2006;
Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Kautz et al., 2014; Lindqvist
and Vestman, 2011; Weinberger, 2014) and are more malleable in later childhood than
cognitive skills (Akee et al., 2018; Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008).
Theoretically, in an intact rural family, father’s migration can affect the non-
cognitive development of children left behind through several mechanisms. Financial
inputs and time inputs are two such mechanisms that have been heavily discussed in
the literature. First, migration is usually motivated by and associated with higher
income. Thus, migrant parents can send home remittances that are higher than the
wages they could have earned at home. The additional financial resources can have a
positive impact on children’s non-cognitive development by reducing emotional and
5These skills have many names in the literature including soft skills, personality traits, non-
cognitive abilities, character skills, and socio-emotional skills. See Almlund et al. (2011); Borghans
et al. (2008); Humphries and Kosse (2017); Thiel and Thomsen (2013) for measurements and in-
terpretations of non-cognitive skills across different disciplines such as psychologic, sociologic and
economics.
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behavioral problems caused by financial distress.6
Second, parental migration likely reduces parental time inputs - not only pater-
nal time input directly, but also maternal time input indirectly7, which may have a
negative impact on children’s non-cognitive development, especially considering that
several studies have documented that parental time investments are vital for chil-
dren’s non-cognitive outcomes (Bono et al., 2016; Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Cunha
et al., 2010; Fiorini and Keane, 2014; Hsin and Felfe, 2014).8 Since the above two
mechanisms work in opposite directions, the effect of parental migration on children’s
non-cognitive development is theoretically ambiguous and can only be determined
empirically.
The tradeoff between financial and time inputs has been intensively investigated
in the literature studying the effect of mother’s labor supply and children’s human
capital outcomes (See Heckman and Mosso (2014) for a recent review). These papers
argue that an increase in maternal hours worked generates an income effect, with
additional resources coming from a boost in labor income. At the same time, changes
in maternal hours worked can also generate a substitution effect, with changes in the
6Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Yang (2011) both provide empirical evidence that migration
increases remittances. Additionally, Akee et al. (2018) find that household financial wellbeing has
large beneficial effects on children’s emotional and behavioral skills.
7Amother may have to conduct more household production and thus spend less time with children
when the father is away.
8Parental migration is also associated with parental absence which is found to have an adverse
effect on children’s psychological development and emotional well-being (Ginther and Pollak, 2004;
McLanahan et al., 2013). Most existing research on parental absence is in the context of developed
countries where parental absence is usually caused by divorce, military separation, or non-martial
childbearing. In developing countries such as China and Mexico, parental absence is usually caused
by internal or international migration (Nobles, 2011).
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time that mothers allocate to childcare. Parental migration induces a similar tradeoff
between family income and parental time inputs, but the empirical evidence on these
mechanisms is limited.
Besides financial and time inputs, parental migration can affect child development
through other important channels that are less discussed in the literature. On the
one hand, parental migration can affect children’s development outcomes by affecting
children’s own time allocation. In the context of rural families, when the father is
away, a child may have to spend more time in housework or farm work instead of
interacting with friends. Empirical evidence in child development literature suggests
that how children spend time on their own becomes important as children grow into
adolescence (see Del Boca et al. (2017); Fiorini and Keane (2014); Kooreman (2007)
for examples). In the meantime, the effect of parental time investments on child
development declines during adolescence (see Del Boca et al. (2017, 2014); Cunha
and Heckman (2008) for examples). This decline occurs because adolescents begin to
take responsibility for their own actions9 and their developmental outcomes begin to
depend on their own decisions. Although the role of children’s own time investment
has emerged in recent child development literature, this channel is seldom studied in
the migration literature.10
On the other hand, many left-behind children have only one parent who is mi-
9Lundberg et al. (2009) distinguishes children’s decisions taken on their own and those shared
with their parents, and find that the probability of children making independent decisions increases
sharply between the ages of 10 and 14.
10Antman (2011) is an exception that studies how the father’s U.S. migration affect children’s
study and work hours.
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grating, usually, the father. The father’s migration can increase his income, which
might increase his bargaining powers over the mother. Because mothers are more
likely to spend family resources on child development including education, nutrition,
and health-related commodities (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lépine and Strobl,
2013; Li and Wu, 2011), the father’s migration can affect not only the amount of
resources available to their children but also the amount of resources that are actu-
ally allocated to their children. Differentiating between the two is important because
only the latter makes the real impact. While previous studies have emphasized the
importance of intra-household bargaining in determining child outcomes, empirical
studies are limited on how migration affects household bargaining and whether it is
an important channel through which parental migration affects children outcomes.
In addition, we also explore parenting style (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017; Dooley
and Stewart, 2007; Fiorini and Keane, 2014) and parental mental health (Antman,
2010; Barrett and Mosca, 2013) as additional mechanisms. Both of these mechanisms
have been regarded as important for child development. On the one hand, father’s
absence may lead to harsher (maternal) parenting style due to the lack of paternal
involvement. On the other hand, father’s absence could also has negative effect on
maternal mental health.
To assess different mechanisms behind the effect of parental migration, we consider
four different sets of outcome variables.11 First, we consider household income and
11This paper does not tend to estimate a production function of children’s skill formation (such
as Cunha and Heckman (2008) mainly because we only have two waves of data and two measures
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child-related spending. Thus, we investigate not only the available financial resources,
but also how they are allocated to children. Second, we investigate the mechanism
of parental time input by studying the effect of the father’s migration on how many
hours the father and mother spend on helping children with homework and on playing
and talking with children every week. The latter could be particularly salient in the
context of non-cognitive development. Third, we estimate how parental migration
affects children’s own time allocation among different activities. Fourth, we consider
variables measuring father’s decision power regarding a wide range of family decisions.
These variables help us understand whether changes in intra-household bargaining is
an important mechanism through which parental migration affects the allocation of
financial resources to children. Finally, we also consider a proxy variable for parenting
style as well as parental health as additional channels. The results shed some light on
the relative importance of different mechanisms that drive the relationship between
parental migration and children development.
Another important contribution of our paper is that we are able to distinguish be-
tween intra- and inter-provincial migration by looking at the information on parental
migration destination. This distinction is important because it may have different im-
pacts on left-behind children. On the one hand, the expected wage gain from inter-
provincial migration is larger than intra-provincial migration. On the other hand,
the loss of parental supervision and interaction might be much more detrimental for
for non-cognitive skills.
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inter-provincial migration with long-distance travel and infrequent returns, than for
short-distance intra-provincial migrations.12 As we show later, intra-provincial mi-
gration generally has no significant effect on children’s outcomes, while the effect of
inter-provincial migration is usually significant. This is probably because the fact
that intra-provincial migrants could easily travel back and forth between the work-
place and home, so they are not fully absent from their children as parents who have
migrated to different provinces. Existing studies on migration in China and in other
countries usually do not distinguish the two types of migration.13 By exploring this
new dimension of migration, our analysis improves the understanding of the impact
of parental migration on left behind children.
The main difficulty in estimating the causal effect of parental migration on chil-
dren left behind is the endogeneity problem associated with migration. To be more
specific, migration is not randomly assigned, and one has to worry about unobserved
characteristics that are related to migration can also influence the outcome of left-
behind children. For example, an unobserved negative financial shock may have a
negative impact on children’s development and influence household migration deci-
sion. On the one hand, since the shock makes the sending household poorer, it may
encourage the father to migrate. On the other hand, if migration is costly, such
12With one of the few papers on this subject, Su et al. (2018) noticed that migrants who have
come from other provinces differ significantly from migrants who come from the same province as
the destination city in a variety of individual characteristics. In general, the migrants from other
provinces tend to be younger, more likely to be male, usually in better physical condition, but have
fewer years of formal education.
13Antman (2012) is one exception, showing the different impacts of parental domestic and inter-
national migration on children left behind in Mexico.
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financial shock may prevent the father from migrating because it is unaffordable.
Thus, the direction of such bias is theoretically uncertain. In addition, endogeneity
may result from reverse causation, in which children’s outcome is actually causing
the father’s migration rather than the other way around. For example, economic
models of optimizing behavior suggest that the father’s migration decision is likely
to be responsive to their perception of children’s behaviors. Thus, fathers are more
likely to stay at home if their children face behavioral challenges. In these scenarios,
a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation may underestimate the impact that
a migrant father has on children’s non-cognitive development.
The main approach taken by existing studies to address the endogeneity problem
has been the use of instrumental variables (IV) for migration. In particular, a large
number of studies have used variation in historical migration rates at the local level to
identify the effect of migration (Hanson andWoodruff, 2003; Mansuri, 2006; McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2011). One concern with historical migration rate as instrument is
that this variable is likely to reflect the level of economic development at the local
area that would affect children of migrants directly. More recent studies have adopted
economic conditions in destination areas as instruments (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo,
2010; Antman, 2011; Cortes, 2015; Yang, 2008). Such variables are arguably more
valid since they are less likely to be correlated with local area unobservables. Section
3.2 provides a more detailed summary of the estimation methods that are adopted in
the literature.
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In this study, we address the endogeneity problem of parental migration by ex-
ploring the longitudinal data structure and by using instrumental variables. First,
the longitudinal data structure makes it possible to use a child-level individual fixed
effects model (FE) to address the possibility that some time-invariant characteristics
may affect both the probability of parental migration and children’s development.
Second, following the literature cited above, we use labor market conditions in the
destination provinces as instrumental variables.14 Though many papers have stud-
ied the impact of migration on children left behind in the context of rural-urban
migration in China, few papers have used economic condition in destination areas
as instruments. This probably happens because the commonly used datasets lack
information on migration destination.
We construct two scores to measure children’s non-cognitive skills based on a seri-
ous of questions provided in the GSCF regarding their internalizing and externalizing
behavioral challenges. The two scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. Our estimates show significant adverse effects of the father’s
inter-provincial migration 15 on the non-cognitive skills of left-behind children, which
reduces the scores by 0.03 and 0.06 points in regards to internalizing and external-
izing behaviors, respectively. However, we find that the effects of intra-provincial
14Rural migrants tend to work in the manufacturing and construction sector so that changes
in wage and employment levels in those sectors are more likely to affect migration behavior but
are unlikely to affect children’s development directly. As a robustness check, we use wage and
employment in these sectors as instruments.
15We focus on fathers’ inter-provincial migration because in our sample fathers are much more
likely to migrate than mothers and intra-provincial migration has not been found to significantly
affect child outcomes.
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migration, though still negative, are much smaller and insignificant. Effects are also
stronger for boys than girls. These results are robust with different specifications for
our regression model, alternative instruments, and an alternative value-added model.
Our results suggest that the inter-provincial migrations, which are quite common in
China, is a much more serious problem in shaping the emotional well-being of chil-
dren left behind, and therefore deserves greater policy attention. Further discussion
on mechanisms shows that fathers’ migration is associated with an increase in fam-
ily income, but not child-related spending probably due to the increasing bargaining
power among fathers. More important, fathers’ migration reduces the time parents
spend talking and playing with their children. These two mechanisms might be the
major driving forces behind the negative effect of the father’s migration on left-behind
children.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section provides
background information. Section 3.3 presents the empirical method. Section 3.4
introduces the data and provides summary statistics. Section 3.5 reports estimation
results and robustness checks. Section 3.6 provides a comprehensive discussion of the
potential mechanisms. Section 3.7 discusses sub-sample results. We conclude with
Section 3.8.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Parental Migration and Development of Chil-
dren Left Behind
There are almost 1 billion migrants worldwide, with 214 million international mi-
grants and another 740 million internal migrants moving within countries (United
Nations, 2013). The impact of migration on the school attainment of children left be-
hind is one of the most intensively studied dimensions of the consequences of parental
migration. The literature so far yields ambiguous predictions. On the one hand,
a number of papers find that migration increases education attendance or enroll-
ment (Acosta, 2011; Antman, 2012; Binci and Giannelli, 2018; Cox-Edwards and
Ureta, 2003; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Mansuri,
2006; Yang, 2008). On the other hand, a substantial number of studies find that mi-
gration negatively impacts school attendance or enrollment (Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo, 2010; Cortes, 2015; Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010; Kroeger and Anderson,
2014; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). Empirical evidence on the effect of migration
on children’s cognitive skills measured by test scores is relatively limited and is far
from conclusive. For example, Macours and Vakis (2010) find that parental migra-
tion increases children’s academic performance in Nicaragua, while Powers (2011) find
parental migration decreases children’s test scores in Mexico.
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More important, to the best of our knowledge, no paper so far has employed
a rigorous estimation method to study the impact of parental migration on non-
cognitive skills of children left behind, although a small number of papers have found
correlations between parental migration and psychological well-being of children left
behind. For example, in Romania, Botezat and Pfeiffer (2014) find that children’s
psychological well-being measured by whether they were bullied or were involved in
conflicts is negatively associated with parental migration.16
The endogeneity of migration is one of the most important reasons that exist-
ing studies report mixed results regarding the impact of migration on children left
behind. Researchers have applied various methods to address this problem. The
main approach has been the use of instrumental variables for migration. The most
commonly used instrumental variables can be categorized into two groups. The first
group consists of a large number of studies that have used variation in historical mi-
gration rates at a local level to identify the effect of migration.17 The second group of
more recent studies has used economic conditions in destination countries or regions
as instruments, to better satisfy the validation condition. For example, Yang (2008)
uses variation in exchange rate appreciation in migrants’ destinations to show that re-
mittances result in an increase in child schooling. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010)
make use of unemployment and wages in U.S. destination states to identify the effects
16Instead of looking at left-behind children, a few papers have studied the impact of migration
on mental health or psychological well-being of elderly parents left behind (Antman, 2010) and of
migrants themselves (Atella et al., 2019; Barrett and Mosca, 2013; Stillman et al., 2015).
17For examples, see Hanson andWoodruff (2003); Mansuri (2006); McKenzie and Rapoport (2011).
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of remittances on expenditure patterns in Mexico. Antman (2011) uses employment
condition in U.S. cities the potential migrant could select as a destination as instru-
ments and studied the effect of the father’s migration status on children’s school and
work outcomes in Mexico. Gibson and McKenzie (2014) use the demand shocks in
destination countries to study the effect of the mother’s migration on children left
behind in the Philippines.
Recently, a small number of papers have used randomized trials to study the
impact of migration on the household members who are left behind. Gibson et al.
(2011a) study a migration lottery program in New Zealand that allows them to com-
pare families of successful applicants who were authorized to migrate with families of
applicants that were not allowed to migrate. Mergo (2016) uses the Diversity Visa
lottery program to evaluate the effects of international migration on families left be-
hind in Ethiopia. Although the experimental approach leads the way to promising
solutions for the endogeneity problem, it is usually very costly and, thus, not easily
applied to alternative contexts.18
Besides the endogeneity problem of migration, another major challenge of the ex-
isting literature is to identify the different mechanisms that drive the effect of parental
migration. So far, the empirical evidence on the mechanisms of how parental migra-
tion affects child development is limited mainly because most socioeconomic surveys
18A few studies have applied the matching methods, which is not usually preferred because the
method has to assume that selection into migration depends on observable characteristics only
and match migrants with comparable non-migrants based on those observable characteristics. For
example, see Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2007).
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lack precise measures of parental investments and other factors that are important in
the production of children’s skills. Nevertheless, the existing literature has provided
some discussions on how parental migration affects material inputs and children’s
own time allocation.
First, many studies have used household income or remittance as a proxy mea-
sure for material inputs in understanding the impact of parental migration on child
development. A consensus in this strand of literature is that migration increases
remittances and household income (Alcaraz et al., 2012; Cox-Edwards and Ureta,
2003; Gibson and McKenzie, 2014; Yang, 2008). The remittances can ease household
budget constraint and, thereby, can potentially increase household spending on chil-
dren. Thus, parental migration can have a positive impact on children’s development.
However, increased household income may not always lead to an increased spending
on children. For example, if the father’s migration increase his bargaining power and
he chooses to spend less on children, then the father’s migration can reduce financial
resources allocated to the children. The richness of our data allows us to not only
look at the overall income but also child-specific expenditure on different categories.
Moreover, in the literature of child development, parental time inputs are consid-
ered as one of the most important determinants of child outcomes, however, we know
relatively little about how migration affects the time allocation of parents. Though
it is reasonable to assume that a parent who migrates will spend less time with his
or her children, it is possible that the other parent who is left behind with the chil-
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dren will sacrifice leisure time to compensate for the reduced time inputs. The effect
of migration on parental time inputs is seldom studied in the literature. Zhang et
al. (2014) is one exception, providing summary statistics showing that families with
migrant parents in China are less likely to tutor their children. 19 Our paper goes
beyond the current literature by providing causal evidence of parental migration on
parental time inputs.
In the meanwhile, a few papers have studied how parental migration affects chil-
dren’s own time allocation. For example, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) provides
summary statistics showing that children with migrant parents are more likely to
devote time in housework and family business. Antman (2011) studies how parental
U.S. migration affects the number of hours per week that a child devotes to studying
and working and finds that parental migration reduces study hours and increases work
hours. Chen (2013) examines the time allocation of left-behind children in China and
finds that children spend more time in household work. Migration costs can also di-
rectly affect children’s school decision as shown in de Brauw and Giles (2017). They
find a negative relationship between migrant opportunity and high school enrollment.
With rich information on household spending, intra-household bargaining, and parent
and child time allocation, our paper contributes to the literature by looking at the
mechanisms behind the link of parental migration and child non-cognitive skills in a
more comprehensive and coherent way.
19Zhang et al. (2014) also shows that families with migrant parents less likely to have a satisfying
relationship between children and parents or other adults in the family.
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3.2.2 Labor Migration and Children Left Behind
in Rural China
Beginning in 1958, China started the household registration system (hukou) which
categorized citizens into rural or urban residents and imposed strict restrictions on
rural residents migrating to urban areas.20 These restrictions were only gradually
relaxed by the government in the late 1980s when China’s open-door economic reform
led to the rising demand of labor in urban areas, while, concurrently, privatization
of farming let to a surplus of labor in rural areas. Since then, hundreds of millions
of rural migrant workers have travelled to cities to find jobs. According to a survey
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the total number of rural migrant
workers has grown from 104 million in 2002 to 168 million in 2015. Such a huge wave
of rural-to-urban migration is unprecedented and has been described as the largest
peacetime migration in human history (Du et al., 2005; Zhao, 1999).
Rural migrants are allowed to work and live in urban areas as temporary residents.
However, they are not able to access the urban welfare system, including education
health, and the social safety net, mainly because of the current hukou system. The
majority of these migrant workers perform low-paying jobs and live in crowded con-
ditions (World Bank, 2009). As a result, a considerable number of migrant parents
(often migrant father) choose to leave their children and spouses behind in their rural
20See Song (2014) for a detailed introduction of the origins and changes of the hukou system in
China.
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communities.21 Recent estimates based on the 2010 population census suggest that
there are more than 61 million children aged 17 years or below that have been left
behind by their parents in rural areas, which account for 37.7 percent of rural children
and 21.9 percent of all children in China (Zhang et al., 2014).
This left-behind children phenomenon has attracted increasing attention from
both policymakers and academic researchers. So far, despite the empirical evidence
from other countries that produces very mixed results, a majority of studies in China
find negative impacts of parental migration on educational outcomes of children left
behind. To be more specific, these studies find that parental migration reduces school
attendance (Hu, 2012; Meyerhoefer and Chen, 2011; Wang, 2014) and decreases test
scores (Meng and Yamauchi, 2017; Zhang et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2014). In contrast,
Bai et al. (2017) finds that parental migration has a positive impact on children’s
academic performance.
More relevantly, some work has studied the effect of parental migration on chil-
dren’s emotional or psychological well-being, and the evidence on this topic is far
less conclusive and remains mainly descriptive. Some studies suggest that left behind
children are more likely to have symptoms of anxiety and depression (Liu et al., 2009)
and are more likely to feel sad and think of suicide or leave home (Gao et al., 2010).
Other studies find that these impacts are insignificant (Ren and Treiman, 2016; Xu
and Xie, 2015).
21Despite an increasing number of rural children accompanying their parents and entering the
migration process, single person migration remains the dominant pattern in the internal migratory
flow in China (World Bank, 2009).
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Thus, this paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, it expands
the scope of the current literature by studying the impact of parental migration
on left-behind children in terms of non-cognitive skills, which is seldom studied in
the literature in either China or other developing countries. More important, this
paper improves the identification of the causal effect of parental migration in China
by adopting economic conditions in destination areas as instrumental variables. As
described section 3.2, these variables are commonly employed in the literature and
have been proven to be valid instruments (?). However, to the best of our knowledge,
not many papers on left-behind children in China have explored these variables.
The most similar paper to ours is (Lee and Park, 2010) which also uses the GSCF
to study the effect of parental migration on a variety of measures of child development,
including school enrollment, years held back, achievement scores, and psychological
well-being. In particular, they find no impact of parental migration on children’s
internalizing behavior while some suggestive evidence on the negative impact on chil-
dren’s externalizing behavior. Our work differs in several important ways. First
and foremost, we emphasize the underlying mechanisms through which parental mi-
gration affects child development, which are not analyzed in Lee and Park (2010).
Understanding the mechanisms are particularly important in the context of parental
migration, because the directions of various channels mentioned above are different.
Having a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms is particularly impor-
tant for policy recommendation. Second, we define a father’s migration status by his
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workplace location which allows us to differentiate between inter- and intra-provincial
migration. This differentiation is important because different types of migration lead
to different impacts. Lee and Park (2010) defines a father as migrant if he is away
from home for more than 3 months in the past year. Although this definition cap-
tures the fact that a migrant father may be away from home for a longer time, it
is not clear whether the father is away consecutively or if the father travels back
for the weekend.22 Thus, that definition of migrant might be ambiguous if we can
not differentiate between consecutively away and only away during weekdays. More-
over, our identification strategy is improved and has stronger identification power.23
Finally, we also refine the measurement of children’s non-cognitive skills using item
response theory. Thus, our results could complement findings in Lee and Park (2010)
by improving our understanding of how parental migration affects child development.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
Since our primary goal is to estimate the effect of the father’s current migration on
his children’s non-cognitive development, the simplest econometric framework might
22In both cases, fathers are defined as migrants, but the impact on their children might be quite
different. In the latter case, fathers would still be able to communicate with their children on a
regular base, while in the former case, communication is less likely to happen.
23Lee and Park (2010) has weak instrumental variable restrictions.
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begin by estimating the following equation:
Yit = β0 + β1fmit + β2Xit + ǫit,
24 (3.1)
where Y is the non-cognitive scores for child i at time t, which are measured for
internalizing as well as externalizing behaviors. The effect of interest is captured by
the coefficient on the fm variable, which is an indicator that equals 1 if the father
migrates out of Gansu province and 0 otherwise. This means that the reference group
in the analysis includes children with non-migrant fathers and children whose father
migrates within the province. Moreover, the binary definition of migration status also
makes it possible to adopt destination shocks as instrument variables, which could
help us better deal with the endogeneity problem of migration, while including intra-
provincial migration may require additional instruments that are not available.25
The vector of covariates Xit, includes a rich set of control variables. At the child
level, we control for a child’s age and gender. At the parental level, we control for a
father’s and mother’s age and education level. We include both parents’ education
levels instead of just that of the household head to better capture children’s inheritable
ability. More important, previous research has shown that a mother’s education has
a stronger impact than a father’s education on a child’s developmental outcomes
(Dickson et al., 2016). At the household level, we control for the number of siblings
24The linear regression is applied because the non-linear models cannot accommodate the com-
bined instrument variable and fixed effects estimation (Antman, 2011),
25Many papers on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive development have used a production
approach using a value-added model (Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007). Nevertheless, we adopt a
value-added model as a robustness check. Our main results do not vary much with different model
specification.
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and whether the family lives together with at least one of the grandparents. The
variables are important factors determining the available time and financial resources
and how these resources allocated within a household. In addition, we include county
fixed effects to avoid bias from omitted local-level factors.
As discussed, one concern with estimating equation (1) is that the OLS estimation
method will yield biased estimates of β1 since the fmit variable is endogenous. First,
fathers and children may share some personality traits that are persistent over time,
and those traits may affect a father’s migration decisions and children’s behaviors
simultaneously. The panel nature of the data allows a simple solution to correct for
this type of endogeneity by adding child fixed effects. Thus, the regression model can
be expressed as following:
Yit = β0 + β1fmit + β2Xit + ηi + ǫit, (3.2)
where ηi captures time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the in-
dividual child level. However, there could still be some sources of endogeneity that
vary over time. For example, a negative shock to the family’s income may affect
children’s psychosocial development, while at the same time, this shock could force
the father to migrate for higher income or prevent the father from migrating by mak-
ing migration unaffordable. In this case, the direction of such bias is theoretically
uncertain. Moreover, parents may respond to realized poor behaviors by staying at
home to accompany their children. The OLS estimate will be biased upward if we
fail to control this bias.
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To address this concern, we propose a set of instrumental variables that will only
influence the child’s outcomes through their effects on the father’s migration status.
The proposed instruments are based on labor market conditions in the destination
provinces where the father was most likely to migrate to.26 Economic conditions in
the recent past in the destination provinces can affect the father’s migration decision
without influencing the children left behind directly.
The main empirical strategy then amounts to the estimation of equation (2) above
by instrumental variables, where migration status is estimated through the following
first stage regression:
fmit = α0 + α1Zit + α2Xit + µi + ǫit, (3.3)
where Zit is a vector of instrumental variables excluded from equation (2). The set
of variables Zit comprise of the employment and wage in the destination provinces
to which the father was likely to migrate. Since the child fixed effects model with
instrumental variable (FEIV) approach involves using repeated observations of chil-
dren from the same family in different time periods, we cluster the standard errors
at the level of the individual to allow for arbitrary correlation within the individual
and across time.
26A growing number of papers have used economic conditions in the destination areas as instru-
ments to estimate the effect of migration. For example, see Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010);
Antman (2011); Yang (2008),and Cortes (2015).
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3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
This study analyzes data from the GSCF, a longitudinal study of 2,000 children
who were 9-12 years old in the year 2000 and living in 100 rural villages in Gansu.
The data is designed so that such 2,000 children constitute a random sample of all
children in this region. Gansu is located in the northwest of China (see Figure 3.1)
and is one of the poorest provinces in the country. According to the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS), in 2001 and 2005, rural per capita income in Gansu ranked 30th
out of 31 provinces.
This study uses data from the first two waves of the GSCF, which were conducted
in 2000 and 2004.27 The GSCF has a low sample attrition because 1,872 (93.6 per-
cent) children of the original 2,000 children were re-interviewed in wave 2 (2004).
In each wave, the GSCF collected detailed information for the target children on
their developmental outcomes including cognitive and non-cognitive skills, as well as
parental, household, and environmental factors that may affect these developmen-
tal outcomes. In particular, it also contains information that helps define father’s
migration (discussed below) as well as various mechanisms mentioned above. Specifi-
cally, the data contains different sources of income including remittances, information
about parental and children’s own time allocation, as well as measures of household
27Wave 3 of the GSCF was conducted in 2007-2009 when sample children were 17-21 years old.
Since the impact of parental input becomes less important in shaping their non-cognitive skills
(Cunha et al., 2010) at those ages, we choose to use only waves 1 and 2. Moreover, wave 3 covers
a highly selective sample because its data collection process is different from previous waves. See
Glewwe et al. (2017) for a more detailed explanation on this issue.
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bargaining power.28
We impose a set of sample restrictions. First, given that the mother’s migration
is rare in our sample,29 we focus on the impact of the migrant father and restrict
our sample to children whose mother stayed at home. Second, we exclude children
whose parents are divorced or deceased to eliminate the confounding factors associated
with the family structure.30 In addition, to use a child fixed effects model, we exclude
children that appear only in wave 1. We further drop observations with missing values
of main variables. Our final data consists of 1,779 children with 3,558 observations.
The GSCF provides a unique data source that enables us to study the development
of children’s non-cognitive skills in the context of a developing country.31 It asks the
respondent child a series of questions regarding their internalizing and externalizing
behavioral challenges. The former captures intra-personal problems such as with-
drawal, depression, and anxiety, and the latter captures inter-personal problems such
as destructive behavior, aggression, and hyperactivity. We construct two variables
measuring children’s non-cognitive skills that capture internalizing and externalizing
behaviors separately. Each measurement is constructed by applying item response
28Because of its richness on child development, the GSCF has been widely used to analyze how
parental and school inputs affect children’s educational achievements, health outcomes, and non-
cognitive behaviors. See Glewwe et al. (2016, 2017); Hannum and Zhang (2012); Leight (2017);
Leight and Liu (2016) for examples.
29In the GSCF, less than 3 percent of children have a migrant mother. Using the same data, Lee
and Park (2010) reports the same migration rate for mothers.
30Compared with the United States, divorce is relatively uncommon in China. In 2000, the U.S.
divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000 population) was 4 according to the census, while China’s
divorce rate was only around 1 according to the China Statistical Yearbook.
31See Almlund et al. (2011); Borghans et al. (2008); Humphries and Kosse (2017); Thiel and Thom-
sen (2013) for measurements and interpretations of non-cognitive skills across different disciplines.
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theory (IRT) to generate a single index based on a list of 17 questions (Andrich,
1978). We use the IRT approach to measure children’s non-cognitive skills.32 An
example of a question used for the internalizing index is whether you fully agreed,
agreed, disagreed, or totally disagreed with the following statement: “I easily get
anxious.” An example of a question used for the externalizing index is whether you
fully agreed, agreed, disagreed, or totally disagreed with the following statement: “I
often lose my temper with others.” A full list of questions is summarized in Appendix
3.14. The two scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
1. A higher score means fewer behavioral problems and higher non-cognitive skills.33
Throughout this paper, we define a father’s migration status by the location of his
workplace. In particular, we define a father to be a non-migrant if his workplace is
located in the village, an intra-provincial migrant if his workplace is located outside of
the village but within Gansu province and an inter-provincial migrant if his workplace
is located in another province outside of Gansu.34 As we plan to adopt the child
32IRT is a well-established method that the literature use to aggregate information from different
measurements. It has several advantages than simply summarizing answers to different questions.
Each question provides different information about the underlying non-cognitive skills that are being
measured. There is no reason to believe that a score of 4 in one of the measure implies the same
level of non-cognitive development as a score of 4 in another measure. For example, fully agreeing
that “I steal things from others” might indicate something different than fully agreeing that “I often
make fun of others.” Summing up the scores ignores this issue. If we think that each question
is measured with some noise and that the variance in the noise is different across questions, then
summing up the scores on each question will provide a very unreliable and noisy measure of the
underlying non-cognitive skills.
33Glewwe et al. (2017) and Leight and Liu (2016) constructed measures of non-cognitive skills the
same way.
34Previous papers usually define a migrant parent if he or she is away from home for certain period
of time during the year. See Lee and Park (2010) and Zhang et al. (2014) for more information.
As illustrated in Table A2, our definition is consistent with that in the literature as parents with a
workplace outside of the village experienced much longer periods of time away from home.
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fixed effects model, it is important to have enough over-time variation in the father’s
migration. We observe this variation in panel A of Table 3.1, which categorizes our
sample children by their father’s migration status in 2000 and 2004. In 2000, 62.9
percent of fathers stayed in the home village, 30.8 percent had previously migrated
within the province, and 6.3 percent had previously migrated out of the province. In
2004, 65.1 percent of fathers stayed in the home village, 26.5 percent had previously
migrated within the province, and 8.4 percent had previously migrated out of the
province. This trend is consistent with the growing migration rate at the national
level (Su et al., 2018).35
A further look at the longitudinal structure of our data shows a large variation of
the father’s migration over time within a family (panel B of Table 3.1). The majority
of fathers never migrated out of the province (88.5 percent). There are 2.6 percent
of fathers migrated out of the province in both 2000 and 2004, 3.7 percent migrated
out of the province only in 2000, and 5.2 percent migrated out of the province only
in 2004.
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for children in our final sample, as well
as three subsamples defined by the father’s migration status.36 A clear relationship
35In Table 3.15, we report the amount of months the father has been away from home in each
category by years, showing that inter-provincial migrants have been away from home for a much
longer time than intra-provincial immigrants (6 months versus 3 months) in 2000. In wave 2, the
GSCF asked two different questions on how many months the father has been away. The first
question asked how many months the father has been away consecutively, and the second question
asked how many months the father has been away only during weekdays. As shown in Table 3.15,
inter-provincial migrants are away for more months both consecutively and during weekdays than
intra-provincial migrants (4.5 and 0.9 months versus 2.0 and 0.7 months).
36In Table 3.16 and Table 3.17, we present descriptive analysis for children in 2000 and 2004
separately.
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emerges between the father’s migration status and non-cognitive skills. Children with
non-migrant fathers perform better in both internalizing and externalizing behaviors
(higher scores for better non-cognitive skills) compared with children with migrant
fathers. Among children with migrant fathers, those with fathers who migrated out
of the province have the lowest non-cognitive scores. To be more specific, average
non-cognitive scores (with mean 0 and s.d. 1) of children with non-migrant fathers
range from 0.019 to 0.003. Such scores on average range from -0.014 to 0.013 for
children with an intra-provincial migrant father, and on average range from -0.115 to
-0.078 for children with an interprovincial migrant father. That is, the farther away
the father was from home, the lower scores the children had.
In terms of control variables, a first look at the statistics for all children (column
(1) of Table 3.2) reveals that the average age of sample children is 13 years old and
47 percent of them are female. On average, fathers and mothers in our sample are
39 and 37 years old, respectively. Fathers had 6.7 years of education, while mothers
had about 3.7 years, which suggests that most fathers do not finish junior middle
school and most mothers barely finish elementary school. Families in our sample on
average have 2.3 children, which suggests that the one-child policy was not strictly
enforced in the rural area of Gansu. About 20 percent of families have at least one
grandparent living with them. Regarding village level characteristics, the average
village population in our sample is 1712, and the average arable land per capita is 2.2
mu (about 8.1 square meters). About 32.9 percent of villages are in plain terrain, 9.8
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percent in hills terrain, 33.9 percent in mountain terrain, and 23.4 percent in other
terrains. A majority of villages have their own elementary schools (83 percent), while
a relatively smaller number of villages have their own middle schools (10 percent).
Columns (2)-(4) of Table 3.2 report the summary statistics across the three sub-
samples according to the father’s migration status, showing that most demographic
characteristics across the three groups do not vary much. However, we do find some in-
teresting differences, especially between the samples with an inter-provincial migrant
father and other groups. For instance, fathers and mothers in the inter-provincial
group have, on average, 5.9 and 2.4 years of education, which are the lowest among
the three sub-samples. They also have more children and are more likely to have at
least one grandparent at home. These characteristics are consistent with what has
been found in Su et al. (2018).
Our instrumental variables are economic conditions in the recent past of destina-
tion provinces where the father is most likely to migrate. We identify the provinces
to which fathers in our sample are most likely to migrate based on the village module
of GSCF. The village module of GSCF asks the top migration destination province of
the village, and is answered by the village leader. One of the main reasons for us to
use this village level information is due to the fact we only know whether a father mi-
grates or not, we do not know which geographic area, e.g. which province, the father
has moved to at the individual household level. Hence, our instrument is at the vil-
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lage level.37 As reported in Table 3.3, the top migration destinations for each village
appeared to be relatively stable and are concentrated in certain provinces during our
sample period. The most popular destination is Xinjiang province, which accounted
for about 37 percent of the top migration destination in 2000 and 39 percent in 2004.
Xinjiang is to the northwest of Gansu, but unlike Gansu, Xinjiang’s economy has been
performing close to the national average ever since the mid-1990s, owing perhaps to
the western development policies launched by China’s central government. One of
the important goals of these policies is to enhance national unity and social stability
by facilitating economic and social development in the west Goodman (2004).38 In
2000, the average annual wage was 7,605 RMB in Xinjiang and 7,277 RMB in Gansu.
The economic differences between Gansu and Xinjiang explain why there is a mass
migration from one province to the other. This migration trend is consistent with
what has been observed in studies on inter-migration in China (Su et al., 2018). Other
common destinations include provinces near Gansu (Ningxia, Qinghai, and Shaanxi)
or provinces in booming coastal regions (Guangdong and Beijing).39
Once we have identified the destination provinces to which migrant fathers are
most likely to move, we link the child observations with employment and wage data
37Such migration destination provinces are likely to be formed as a result of historical and geo-
graphical factors.
38Xinjiang has received particular attention from the central authorities because it borders Central
Asia and has experienced a growth of separatist movements. To contain separatism, China’s central
government has stepped up its efforts to improve living standards in Xinjiang and to crack down
on separatism. Fiscal transfers from the central government to Xinjiang have increased from 5.91
billion RMB in 1996 to 18.4 billion RMB in 2001 (Information Office of the State Council 2003).
39The GSCF also asked the migrant father which province his workplace was located in if his
workplace was outside of Gansu. However, only about half of our observations have valid answers
to this question.
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in the most likely destination province. The province-level employment and wage
data are available from the China Labor Statistical Yearbook for 1999 and 2003. It
is expected that these variables will act to stimulate migration. That is, potential
migrants will be more likely to make the trip when employment and wage are high
indicating a boom in those industries. As a robustness check, we also construct
the instrumental variable using employment and wages in the manufacturing and
construction sectors, separately.40 Finally, given the child fixed effect, change of values
in our instrumental variable across two waves is also needed to achieve identification.
To investigate the potential mechanisms of how the father’s migration affects
children’s outcomes, we explore variables that measure household financial inputs,
household bargaining power, and parental and children’s time inputs. In particular,
we measure household financial inputs by household income, household expenditure,
and household item purchase. Table 3.4 panel 1 reports household income across
different groups of households and shows that the average total household income
(including remittances) is 10,121 RMB, which consists of about 62 percent (6,311
RMB) agriculture income and about 27 percent (2,721 RMB) labor income. Overall,
the three groups of households have a similar level of household total income, but
with quite different components. As expected, households with a migrant father have
a much higher labor income (5,815 RMB, 4,854 RMB, and 1,412 RMB), but a much
lower agriculture income (3781 RMB, 5387 RMB, and 7015 RMB) than households
40Manufacturing and construction sectors employ a large number of migrant workers, but the
employment and wage variables in those sectors are highly correlated with those at the aggregate
level, so we construct our instrument based on aggregate variables.
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in which the father stays at home. Table 3.4 panel 2 reports, the annual expenditure
on children’s clothes, school supplies, and children’s allowances are 234 RMB, 35
RMB, and 93 RMB, respectively. When we look at these expenditures by migration
status of fathers, a clear trend emerges: households with a migrant father, especially
an inter-provincial migrant father, have much lower spending on children. Table 3.4
panel 3 describes a similar story as in panel 2, showing that households with an inter-
provincial migrant father are less likely to purchase reading materials, a dictionary,
and desks for their children. Considering that different groups of households receive
similar total household income (Table 3.2), financial constraints do not seem to be
the main explanation of why households with migrant fathers spend less on their
children.
Table 3.5 reports parental time inputs which are measured by weekly hours the
father spends with his children. For a father who is absent from home, those variables
reflect weekly hours he spends on those activities when he stays at home. We consider
two variables: weekly hours helping children with their homework and weekly hours
of playing or talking with children. Table 3.5 shows that even when they come back
home, fathers with inter-provincial migration experience spend much less time playing
and talking with their children (2.5 hours) compared with fathers who stay home (2.9
hours) and fathers who migrate within Gansu (2.8 hours). This might occur because
when migrant fathers come home from other provinces, they have to take in charge of
certain home production activities, such as house repairs, that are usually conducted
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by male members of the households. We indeed observe that inter-provincial migrant
fathers spend about 12 hours on home production, while nonmigrant fathers and
fathers migrant within Gansu only spend about 10 or 7 hours, respectively. This
further implies, when fathers are away, mothers may have to undertake some of the
home production that the faters were doing, which is also confirmed below.41
A father’s migration can also affect a mother’s time inputs. Table 3.5 shows that
on average mothers in our sample spend 30 hours on home production, 1.3 hours
helping their children with homework and 3.7 hours playing and talking with their
children every week. If the father migrated out of Gansu province, the mother will
spend 4 more hours on home production comparing with the mother whose spouse
stays at home. In the meantime, mothers will spend fewer hours with their children,
especially helping their children with homework. Overall, summary statistics in Table
3.5 suggest that a father’s migration status largely reduces the number of hours a
father and mother can spend with their children, which is likely to be the major
mechanism through which a father’s migrant status affects children’s development.
In the bottom panel of Table 3.5, we report children’s time allocation measured by
their weekly hours spent on home production, taking care of others, doing homework,
and watching TV. Overall, we find that children with a migrant father are more likely
to participate in home production and caring for others, while the difference in doing
homework and watching TV is not evident.
41Although we can not observe how many hours migrant fathers spend with their children when
they are away from their residents, we reasonably assume that the time they spend with their
children is quite limited because of their absence.
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Table 3.6 reports the father’s decision power relative to the mother, which is
measured by the questions regarding whether the father is the decision-maker behind
a wide range of family decisions. These decisions include the children’s schooling, how
to treat the child, purchase of durable goods, management of family finances, planting
of crops, and livestock transaction. Those questions are answered by the mother. If
the father makes those decisions, the variables are coded as 1; if the mother makes
the decision or if the parents make the decision together, the variables are coded as
0. Thus, the variables reflect the bargaining power of the father. Overall, the father
is not the major decision maker in the household. On the management of the family
finances, fathers have about a 42 percent probability of being the decision maker,
which is the highest among all decisions asked in the survey. Meanwhile, the father’s
migration status does not seem to cause large differences according to the summary
statistics presented here.
3.5 Father’s Migration and Children’s Non-
cognitive Skills
3.5.1 Main Results
Table 3.7 presents our main estimation results. In columns (1) and (5), we start
with the simple OLS estimation, which assumes the father’s migration status is exoge-
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nous. The coefficient estimates on the dummy indicator for having an inter-provincial
migrant father are negative and significant for both non-cognitive scores. In partic-
ular, having a father who migrates out of the province is associated with a 0.046
and 0.084 declines for internalizing and externalizing scores, respectively, compared
to having a father who stays at home or migrate within the province.
The simple regression coefficients presented in columns (1) and (5) are subject to
the potential endogeneity problem. As a first attempt to address this issue, we employ
a child fixed effects model to deals with the time-invariant source of endogeneity.
Columns (3) and (7) report the estimation results of the fixed effects model. The
estimates of the coefficient on inter-provincial migration remain significant and are
consistently smaller in magnitude than in the linear regression estimates reported in
columns (1) and (5) (-0.025 for internalizing behaviors and -0.054 for externalizing
behaviors), which suggest that the inter-provincial migration is positively correlated
with the omitted time-invariant determinants of a child’s non-cognitive skills. This
is consistent with the notion that migration households tend to pay less attention to
children’s development or are more financially distressed.
A fixed effect model helps to deal with the time-invariant omitted variable prob-
lem; however, the above results may still be contaminated by time-varying confound-
ing factors and reverse causality problem. We deal with these problems with the
instrumental variable method. Table 3.7 columns (2) and (6) report the estimation
results for two-stage least square estimation and columns (4) and (8) report estima-
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tion results for the fixed effects model with instrumental variables. Consistent with
the OLS and fixed effects model, the estimation coefficients for inter-provincial migra-
tion are significantly negative, -0.058 and -0.029 for the internalizing score and -0.088
and -0.058 for the externalizing score. More important, the estimated coefficients for
father migration become larger after adopting instrumental variables in both models,
which suggests that time-varying unobservables, such as negative income shocks, tend
to prevent migration and bias down the estimation. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that the instrumental variable has a much smaller impact on father’s migration co-
efficient than the child fixed effect does. The overall effects of a father’s migration
appear to have negative impacts on children’s non-cognitive development. In terms of
the mechanism behind this negative effect, we test the financial inputs, time inputs,
and other related channels in later sections.
The first stage regression results are presented in Table 3.8 using both OLS and
fixed effects models. Employment and wage levels in the top destination provinces are
included together as instrumental variables. Both employment and wage levels are
one year ahead of the survey year. As observed, both instruments are good predictors
of the likelihood that the father’s migration out of province. The point estimates in
column (2), where we adopt the fixed effects model, indicate that an increase in
employment by 1,000 would correspond to an increase in the probability of a father
migrating by 0.02 percent and an increase in wage by 1,000 RMB would increase the
probability of paternal migration by 1.4 percent. The coefficient is more significant
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for destination wage, which is at 1 percent level. As indicated at the bottom of
Table 3.7, the F statistics on the weak instrument test ranges from 17 to 35 across
different specifications, which are well above the critical values for weak instruments
as reported by Stock et al. (2002a). In addition, since there are two instrumental
variables, an overidentification test is also possible, although it can be argued that if
both instrumental variables are measuring the same economic forces, the test provides
limited information (Murray, 2006; Sargan, 1988). Nevertheless, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of valid instruments according to the overidentification test.
In Table 3.9, we consider two alternative sets of instrumental variables by explor-
ing employment and wage in the manufacturing and construction sectors which are
most likely to hire migrant workers. The estimation results are quite similar to our
main results, with F statistics on the weak instrument test ranging from 15 to 34
across different specifications. Table 3.8 columns (3)-(6) report the first-stage estima-
tions using employment and wage in the manufacturing and construction sectors as
instrumental variables for the father’s migration. Estimates are qualitatively similar
to our baseline case in columns (1) and (2).
3.5.2 Robustness Check
Here we discuss the robustness of our results considering several possible alter-
native model specifications. First, one concern to our identification strategy lies in
the exclusion restriction necessary for the instrumental variables estimation. It is
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possible that destination economic conditions affect child outcomes directly, perhaps
because the national-level business cycle will affect both the destination province and
the local economics, which will certainly affect the child outcomes. Another possible
threat to the validity of our instruments could come from the fact that migrants from
different regions may traditionally send migrants to specific provinces. In that case,
the instruments could be simply capturing differences across regions, such as differ-
ences in overall economic development. To address these concerns, we include the
county and the year interaction term in Table 3.18 columns (1) and (6). Our baseline
results are robust to the inclusion of those variables.
In addition, the following sets of variables have been found to be relevant to ex-
plain children’s non-cognitive development in previous papers: (1) children’s cognitive
skill and health status, (2) school inputs, and (3) parent health status. In Table 3.18
columns (2)-(4) and (7)-(9), we begin by considering the subsample of children for
whom we can observe health status and cognitive skills. Health status is self-reported
and range from 1 to 4, with the higher scores indicating better health. The cognitive
skills are measured by math and language scores based on standardized tests devel-
oped for the survey by test experts in the Gansu Educational Bureau. The test scores
are normalized by standard deviations from the mean score of children in the same
grade level. We do not observe children’s cognitive skills for the full sample because
only half the students were given language tests and the other half were given math
tests in 2000. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the migration coefficients is very similar
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to that observed in our main estimation (columns (4) and (8) in Table 3.7), despite
the increased standard errors caused by the smaller sample size.
In columns (3) and (8) of Table 3.18, we test for the omission of school inputs, us-
ing information about schools that are self-reported by the sample children.42 These
variables describe whether the sample children observe disruptive behaviors in the
school, such as violent discipline, disruptive classes, absentee teachers, and school
closing for no legitimate reasons. Again, we do not observe any change in our coeffi-
cients of interest. In columns (4) and (9), we check for a potential bias caused by the
omission of parent’s health shocks by including two variables that measure parent’s
health status. The two variables are self-reported and range from 1 to 4, with higher
scores indicating better health. Estimation results show that our main results are
robust to the inclusion of these measures of parents’ health conditions. Overall, we
conclude from our sensitivity analysis that our results are relatively invariant with
respect to these changes in the model specification.
In addition, household inputs such as purchased goods and services as well as time
inputs may also affect children’s non-cognitive development. As mentioned by Todd
and Wolpin (2007), one way to account for missing variables on such inputs is to
approximate family income and parent allocation of time. However, their inclusion is
problematic because they will be affected by the father’s migration, making it hard to
42The GSFS has a separate questionnaire which covers more detailed information on schools that
were answered by the school principal. However, since a large proportion of observations (about 70
percent) in the household survey are missing school ID, merging variables from this questionnaire to
our sample will dramatically reduce the sample size. Thus, we chose not to use this questionnaire.
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interpret our estimation results (Bono et al., 2016; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2013).
Nevertheless, in addition to the variables used in the benchmark specifications, we
include a log of family annual income and the father’s and mother’s weekly hours
spent with the children as control variables in columns (5) and (10) of Table 3.18.
Regardless of the outcome, the estimates from the specification with added controls
are remarkably similar to our baseline results. This provides strong evidence that the
estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of other predictors of child outcomes.
Finally, regarding children’s cognitive and non-cognitive development, many stud-
ies have used valued-added model to deal with the potential omitted variable problem
(Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007). This model includes the lagged outcome variables
together with other control variables, assuming the lagged outcome variable are a
sufficient statistic for all historical inputs and unobserved family and child character-
istics that may affect children’s outcome.43 However, since a value-added model with
the individual fixed effect would require observing the sample children for more than
two periods, it is not applicable to our main estimation. Nevertheless, we estimated
the value-added model without child fixed effect as a robustness check. We use the
2004 wave as our baseline sample, incorporating non-cognitive scores in wave 1 as
commonly specified in the value-added model. Table 3.19 reports the estimates for a
value-added model with and without instrumental variables. Our baseline results are
robust to this alternative model specification.
43This method has been applied by Bono et al. (2016) and Fiorini and Keane (2014).
219
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
3.6 Mechanisms
Our results so far suggest a negative impact of the father’s migration on child
non-cognitive skill. It is then natural to ask how migration might have affected chil-
dren’s development. We test several different channels that are found to be salient
for children’s development broadly, including parental financial inputs, father’s bar-
gaining power, parental time inputs, child time inputs, parenting style, and parent
health conditions. All the results are based on our instrumental variable model with
child fixed effects.44
3.6.1 Parental Financial Inputs
As suggested in Hao and Yeung (2015) and Meyer and Sullivan (2008), household
income is different from household consumption expenditure. The former measures
the available financial resources and the latter measures the resource allocation. Dis-
tinguishing between the two will help clarify the mechanisms behind the effect of
the father’s migration. Thus, we explore not only how the father’s migration affects
household income but also how it affects children-specific spending.
In Table 3.10 panel A, we estimate a fixed effects instrumental variable model
considering three outcome variables related to household income: total income, agri-
culture income, and labor income. As expected, households with a migrant father
have significant lower agriculture income, but much higher labor income. Overall, the
44Results from alternative model specifications are available upon request.
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migrant father significantly increased household income by 76 percent.
In panel B, we explore the effect of the father’s migration on children-specific
spending, which includes annual expenditure on children’s clothes, school supplies,
and children’s allowance. Surprisingly, our results show that the father’s migration
significantly reduces household expenditure on children’s clothes (67 percent) and
has no significant impact on the expenditure of school supplies or allowance. These
results imply that increased household income does not seem to be spent on improving
children’s living condition. One may argue that households with a migrant father have
spent the increased income on education materials which is not covered in panel B.
We are not able to pin down the exact amount of expenditure on studying materials
because the GSCF provides no such information; however, we are able to test whether
the father’s migration has increased household expenditure on studying materials by
exploring whether households have purchased certain study-related items for their
children. In panel C, we investigate whether the household has purchased any reading
material, a desk, or a dictionary for the children. Consistent with results in panel B,
we observe that the father’s migration is associated with a lower probability of the
child having reading materials other than a test book or dictionary.45
Overall, results in Table 3.10 suggest that the father’s migration increased house-
hold income, but it does not necessarily increase and actually decreases household
material inputs for children development. Considering that material inputs are im-
45In contrast, we find that household with a migrating father spend more on transportation and
adult clothing. These results are available upon request.
221
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
portant for children’s non-cognitive development (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Cunha
et al., 2010), the fact that the father’s migration reduces the material inputs is a
potential mechanism behind its negative impact on children’s non-cognitive skills. 46
3.6.2 Parental Time Inputs
The father’s migration can affect the father and mother’s time allocation, which
in turn would affect their time inputs on their children. On the one hand, the migrant
father is absent for a substantial period of time, which reduces the time he can spend
with his children. On the other hand, the mother who is left behind with the children
may need to devote more time to other household matters, such as home production
and farm work, when her spouse is away. It is intuitive that the father’s migration
likely reduces parental time inputs on children. However, we are reluctant to jump to
the conclusion that the mother will reduce her time inputs on children because she
might sacrifice her leisure time to compensate for the time lost caused by the father’s
migration.
To take a close look at this time input mechanism, we consider three variables
that measure the father’s and mother’s time allocation, which include weekly hours
of home production, weekly hours helping children with their homework, and playing
or talking with children. For the migrant father, these variables reflect weekly hours
46It is worth noting that the father’s migration significantly increased household spending on adult
clothing and transportation, which explains where the additional income has been spent among
families with a migrant father.
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he spends on those activities when he stays at home. Thus, the estimates largely
underestimated the negative impact of the father’s migration on the father’s time
inputs on children. Nevertheless, as presented in panel A of Table 3.11, we find
that the migrant father spends less time helping his children with their homework
and less time playing and talking with his children even when the father is at home.
Though the estimate on homework time is insignificant at -0.153, the effect on play
and talk is significant at -0.500, which shows that they spend about 50 percent less
time playing and talking with their children than fathers who stay home. Why do
migrant fathers spend less time with their children when they come back? Shouldn’t
they spend more time to make up for the lost time when they are away? There are two
potential explanations. First, a long-term absence makes it harder for the father to
bond with his children and creates a communication barrier between the two. Second,
the migrant father may have to devote substantial time to deal with family matters,
such as repairing the house or socializing with other village members.47
In panel B of Table 3.11, we present how the father’s migration affects the mother’s
time allocation considering the same set of activities, including home production,
helping children with homework, and playing or talking with children. As expected,
column (1) shows that a mother with a migrant spouse is much more likely to en-
gage in home production activities, which more or less explains why she spends less
47There is also descriptive evidence suggesting that the longer a father migrates out, the less time
input he spends with his children. However, migration duration itself is an endogenous choice, and
is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Another data restriction is the variables measuring
father’s migration duration in 2000 and 2004 have different definitions.
223
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
time communicating with her children as shown in column (3). Considering that the
literature suggests investment in time plays an important role in determining chil-
dren’s non-cognitive development,48 these results suggest that the lack of time inputs
seems to be the main driving force behind the adverse effects of father’s migration on
children’s non-cognitive skills.
3.6.3 Child Time Allocations
We also analyze the impact of the father’s migration on time allocation made
by children themselves. The GSCF asks the target child about his or her weekly
hours spent on participating in home production, taking care of sick or elderly family
members, doing homework, and watching TV. The estimation results are reported in
the third panel of Table 3.11. Columns (1) and (2) show that the father’s migration
significantly increases the time a child spends on home production and caring for
others by 67 and 71 percent, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show that the father’s
migration has no significant effect on the time the child spends on doing homework or
watching TV. These results are consistent with Chen (2013), which exams the time
allocation of left-behind children in China and finds that they spend more time in
household work. Antman (2011) also studies children’s time allocation and finds that
48Since most socioeconomic surveys lack appropriate measures of parental time, most studies have
used mother’s employment to proxy it. Only until recently have a few papers started to use time-use
diaries to measure parent time investments. See Del Boca et al. (2017, 2014); Fiorini and Keane
(2014) for examples of papers that have used time-use diaries to study the effects of parental time
inputs on child outcomes in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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children reduce study hours and increase work hours outside the home in response to a
father’s U.S. migration. The explanation of their results is that a father’s migration is
followed by a period of financial hardship for families in Mexico who may be financing
the father’s trip and also waiting for him to find a job in the United State. During this
time period, children have to take financial responsibility for the household. Thus,
they have to shift focus from schooling toward work outside of home. Our results
are partially consistent with their findings, in the sense that we both find that left-
behind children work more than other children. Our results are different from theirs
in the sense that we find no significant impact on weekly hours doing homework.
There are two reasons our results are different. First, their data measure total study
hours, whereas we can only observe weekly hours of doing homework, which may be
a major proportion of study hours. But it is possible that the father’s migration
decreases the total study hours by decreasing the time the child spends on reading or
other studying activities. Second, it is possible that Chinese parents commonly have
a high expectation about their children’s education so they would make sure that
their children spend enough time on studying before letting them engage in work-
related activities. This explains why we observe nonsignificant effects of the father’s
migration on children’s weekly hours of doing homework.
Spending more time on home production and caring for others may not have a
direct negative impact on child development, but it implies that the child may have
less time for other social activities that might be beneficial to their emotional and
225
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
social well-being. The GSCF does not have questions regarding weekly hours of other
major activities besides what we listed here. Thus, our results only provide indirect
evidence that the father’s migration affects children’s own time allocation. Moreover,
the limited information from the GSCF makes it impossible to distinguish between
the time the child spends on his or her own and the time actively supervised by a
parent. Thus, the purpose of the above estimation is not to compare the importance
of parental time and child time investment, but to provide insights on the possible
mechanisms behind the negative effect of the father’s migration. Future work testing
this channel requires a time diary of the targeted children. such as such as the one
in Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
(PSID) ,that can be used to estimate the effect of parental migration on the time
allocation of children more comprehensively.
3.6.4 Father’s Bargaining Power
The father’s migration can affect not only how many financial resources are avail-
able to children by affecting household income but also how parents allocate these
resources. Table 3.12 shows how the father’s migration affects the decision power of
the father relative to the mother regarding a wide range of family decisions. Columns
(1)-(3) show that the father’s migration increases the probability that he makes deci-
sions on the children’s schooling, on how to treat children, and on how to manage the
family finances. Columns (4)-(6) show that the father’s migration is positively related
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with his decision power regarding the purchase of durable goods, planting crops, and
transaction of livestock, though the estimated coefficients are not significant. These
results are consistent with the literature, which finds that greater economic resources
lead to greater bargaining power (Antman, 2014).
Overall, results in Table 3.12 suggest that the father’s migration increases his
bargaining power, especially related to children’s education and financial inputs. The
existing studies show that fathers, compared with mothers, are less likely to spend
family resources on their children (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lépine and Strobl,
2013; Li and Wu, 2011). Our results suggest that fathers’ migration may reduce
the amount of resources actually allocated to their children, which to some extent,
explains why households with migrant fathers spend less on children’s clothes and are
less likely to purchase study materials given that their household income has been
increased (Table 3.10).
3.6.5 Parenting Style and Parental Health
In addition to the mechanisms we have tested so far, the literature has emphasized
other important determinants of child development. One is parenting style (Doepke
and Zilibotti, 2017; Dooley and Stewart, 2007; Fiorini and Keane, 2014). Although
there are no consistent measurements of parental style so far, the few papers that
considered these kinds of variables commonly find that parenting style has an impact
on child developmental outcomes. For example, Dooley and Stewart (2007) find that
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different aspects of parenting (positiveness, hostility, consistency, and punitiveness)
are more important than family income in terms of determining children’s behavior
and emotional outcomes. Fiorini and Keane (2014) find that parental warmth and
effective discipline lead to better non-cognitive outcomes for children. More recently,
Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) develops a theory to explain how parenting style plays
an important role in determining children’s welfare and economic success. Parenting
style can be an important channel through which parental migration affects child de-
velopment. The GSCS provides limited information on parenting style. Nevertheless,
we define harsh parenting style by the mother’s and child’s answer to the question
“whether you beat your child/you are beaten when misbehaved.” Using the base-
line fixed effects model with instrumental variables, our results in Appendix Table
3.20 show that the effect of the father’s migration on parenting style is insignificant.
These results, however, do not imply that parenting style is not important in terms
of explaining the link between a father’s migration and his children’s development
outcomes. Future work needs to measure parenting styles in a more comprehensive
way to better test this mechanism.
The other determinant that was mentioned in the literature is parent’s health
condition, which may have an impact on the quality of time parents spend with their
children. For example, Ronda (2016) and Herbst (2017) find that maternal psycho-
logical distress and depression may have a negative impact on children’s outcomes.
In the meantime, the migration literature has provided some evidence that migra-
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tion increases the probability of being in poor physical and mental health (Antman,
2010; Barrett and Mosca, 2013). To test this mechanism, we investigate whether the
father’s migration has an impact on the self-assessed health status of the father and
mother.49 Appendix Table 3.20 provides the estimation results, showing that the fa-
ther’s migration does not increase the probability of parents in poor health condition.
However, we are reluctant to conclude that parent health status is not an important
mechanism behind the link between parental migration and a child’s development,
considering that our measure of health status is self-reported and does not differen-
tiate between mental health and physical health. This is a mechanism worth testing
in the future. 50
3.7 Discussion of Sub-sample Results
Table 3.13 reports the sub-sample estimation results and highlights some interest-
ing patterns.51 First, columns (1) and (2) show that the effects of father’s migration
are larger among boys (-0.057 and -0.065) than those for girls (-0.028 and -0.047).
We hypothesize that there are several explanations for this gender difference. First,
49The assessment of the father’s and mother’s health condition is classified into five categories:
very poor, poor, average, good, and very good. We group the first two and generate a dummy
variable to indicate whether the father or mother has poor health.
50Parents make decisions taking as given the production function of human capital. It is possible
that parental migration will change parents view on the production function regarding the expec-
tation of the economic return of their investment. However, without valid measurements on these
variables, it is difficult to test these hypotheses empirically using our data.
51As is often the case, however, the instruments are much weaker by subgroup, and the F statistic
on the excluded instruments is only above 10 for the children whose father did not graduate from
elementary school. The results should thus be interpreted with caution.
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the left-behind mother communicates better with girls while having difficulty dealing
with teen boys. Second, lacking a positive male role model has a negative impact on
a boy’s development. Thus, maternal input could be a poorer substitute for the lack
of paternal inputs when it comes to raising a boy. Third, as proposed in Bertrand
and Pan (2013), the non-cognitive development of boys, unlike that of girls, appears
extremely responsive to the quality of parental inputs, which is negatively associated
with parental migration.52 Nonetheless, we are not intending to decompose these
different channels, and we leave it for future studies. This kind of gender difference
has also been documented in recent child development literature, which finds that
father absence, usually caused by divorce, has a greater influence on boys than girls.
For example, Bertrand and Pan (2013) find that boys do especially poorly and are
much more likely to develop behavior problems in broken families, which are usually
associated with worse parental inputs. Figlio et al. (2019) find that family disadvan-
tage disproportionately impedes the development of boys by using birth certificates
matched to schooling records in Florida.
Columns (3)-(6) divide the sample children by their parents’ education levels. We
find that the negative effect of the father’s migration is more evident if parents, espe-
cially mothers, are less educated. For example, if the mother has not graduated from
elementary school, then the father’s migration reduces internalizing and externalizing
scores by 0.036 and 0.071 points. But if the mother has graduated from elementary
52Antman (2012) finds that a left-behind mother allocate more resources on girls relative to boys
while the father migrates to the United States. However, this explanation may not apply in the
context of rural China, considering the preference of boys over girls.
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school, the two coefficients are reduced to 0.025 and 0.05. These results suggest that
mothers with better education are more likely to engage in high-quality parenting
and can better mitigate the adverse effect caused by the father’s absence (Carneiro
et al., 2013).
Moreover, as previously discussed, lack of time inputs seems to be the major
mechanism through which the father’s migration affects his children’s development.
In that sense, it is possible that better infrastructure, such as having access to a
telephone service, may help left-behind children connect and communicate with their
fathers. In columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.13, we divide our sample children by
whether their resident village has telephone services, but the negative effect of father’s
migration does not vary much across the two groups. This may be because telephone
communication is not a good substitute for face-to-face communication in terms of
parenting or because the telephone is not widely used among migrant families to
maintain effective communication between the migrant father and his children left
behind.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper sets out to identify the effects of a father’s migration on his children’s
non-cognitive development. By exploiting a longitudinal data set and using instru-
mental variables based on the destination provinces, we identify a negative effect of
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a father’s migration and effects are stronger for boys than girls. We explore several
possible mechanisms behind this negative effect. First, we find that a fathers’ migra-
tion is associated with an increase in family income, which, however, does not lead
to an increase in child-related spending. In the meanwhile, our results show that
a father’s migration increases his decision power on financial allocation within the
family, which provides a potential explanation of the observed divergence in family
income and spending. More important, a father’s migration reduces the time both
parents spend talking and playing with their children. Overall, the father’s migration
reduces both parent financial and time inputs, which might be the two major driving
forces behind the negative effect of a father’s migration on left-behind children.
These results expand the scope of current literature by uncovering negative conse-
quences of parental migration that is rarely studied in the literature. More important,
our discussion on potential mechanisms suggest that relevant policies are urgently
needed to help migrant parents improve their financial and time inputs on children.
Considering that non-cognitive skill is a vital dimension of human capital, these poli-
cies would have an important impact on increasing inter-generational mobility and
on reducing rural-urban inequality.
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3.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: A Map of Gansu Province in China
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Table 3.1: Father’s Migration Status by Year
Panel A 2000 2004 Total
No. % No. % No. %
Father Non-Migrant 1,119 62.9% 1,159 65.1% 2,278 64.0%
Intra-provincial Migrant 548 30.8% 471 26.5% 1,019 28.6%
Inter-provincial Migrant 112 6.3% 149 8.4% 261 7.3%
Total 1,779 100.0% 1,779 100.0% 3,558 100.0%
Panel B
Inter-provincial Migrant No. %
only in 2000 66 3.7%
only in 2004 93 5.2%
in both years 46 2.6%
in neither year 1574 88.5%
Total 1,779 100.0%
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves.
Note: A father’s migration status is defined by his workplace location. In particular, we define a
father to be a non-migrant if his workplace is located in the village, an intra-provincial migrant if
his workplace is located outside of the village but within Gansu province and an inter-provincial
migrant if his workplace is located in another province outside of Gansu.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics by Father’s Migration Status
Total Father Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Internalizing Score 0.000 0.019 -0.014 -0.115
(1.000) (0.979) (1.027) (1.063)
Externalizing Score 0.000 0.003 0.013 -0.078
(1.000) (0.986) (1.036) (0.984)
Child Female 0.469 0.464 0.485 0.441
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.497)
Child’s Age 12.999 13.019 12.892 13.240
(2.281) (2.286) (2.262) (2.286)
Father’s Age 39.493 39.865 38.919 38.485
(5.512) (5.821) (4.732) (5.261)
Mother’s Age 37.113 37.426 36.636 36.240
(4.958) (5.221) (4.200) (5.091)
Father’s Years of Eduction 6.757 6.648 7.213 5.931
(4.154) (4.164) (4.050) (4.283)
Mother’s Years of Eduction 3.749 3.761 4.066 2.402
(4.014) (4.005) (4.089) (3.499)
Number of Siblings 1.329 1.338 1.289 1.406
(0.719) (0.733) (0.690) (0.699)
Grandparent at Home 0.206 0.206 0.204 0.218
(0.405) (0.404) (0.403) (0.414)
Village Population (1000) 1.712 1.677 1.872 1.384
(1.809) (1.549) (2.431) (0.653)
Village has Primary School 0.830 0.806 0.871 0.881
(0.375) (0.396) (0.335) (0.324)
Village has Middle School 0.101 0.104 0.099 0.077
(0.301) (0.306) (0.299) (0.267)
Dest. Wage 12095.361 12159.194 11818.068 12620.841
(4720.891) (4820.492) (4526.407) (4534.633)
Dest. Employment (1000) 13331.346 13620.136 13307.845 10902.550
(12220.901) (12167.200) (12332.639) (12023.828)
Dest. Wage in Manuf. 10637.723 10685.031 10423.401 11061.584
(3554.708) (3608.145) (3414.807) (3580.332)
Dest. Employment in Manuf. (1000) 774.203 787.806 765.992 687.539
(845.585) (841.017) (860.453) (824.165)
Dest. Wage in Constr. 15332.017 15360.850 15163.207 15739.431
(4413.732) (4485.089) (4315.598) (4139.841)
Dest. Employment in Constr. (1000) 234.966 237.391 232.944 221.700
(183.421) (180.854) (185.469) (197.204)
Observations 3558 2278 1019 261
% of Total Sample 100% 64.0% 28.6% 7.4%
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves. Note: The sample includes
children who appear in both 2000 and 2004 waves. Internalizing and externalizing scores have been standardized to
have means equal to 0 and standard deviations equal to 1. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher
non-cognitive skills. Monetary value in 2004 real RMB.
235
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
Table 3.3: Migration Destination Provinces
2000 2004 Total
No. % No. % No. %
Xinjiang 670 37.7% 693 39.0% 1,363 38.3%
Guangdong 225 12.6% 262 14.7% 487 13.7%
Ningxia 147 8.3% 147 8.3% 294 8.3%
Beijing 92 5.2% 110 6.2% 202 5.7%
Qinghai 89 5.0% 108 6.1% 197 5.5%
Shannxi 72 4.0% 55 3.1% 127 3.6%
Inner Mongolia 37 2.1% 53 3.0% 90 2.5%
Zhejiang 19 1.1% 50 2.8% 69 1.9%
Shanxi 45 2.5% 15 0.8% 60 1.7%
Tibet 18 1.0% 36 2.0% 54 1.5%
Fujian 18 1.0% 18 1.0% 36 1.0%
Tianjing 0 0.0% 33 1.9% 33 0.9%
Shanghai 0 0.0% 18 1.0% 18 0.5%
Gansu 347 19.5% 181 10.2% 528 14.8%
Total 1,779 100.0% 1,779 100.0% 3,558 100.0%
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves.
Note: Migration destination is a village-level variable. For example, in 2000, 670 ob-
servations in our sample live in villages where Xinjiang is reported as the most popu-
lar destination other than Gansu; 347 observations live in villages where no provinces
other than Gansu are reported as migration destination.
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Table 3.4: Parental Financial inputs by Father’s Migration Status
Total Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Annual Income (RMB)
Agriculture 6311.93 7015.41 5387.53 3781.05
(6231.03) (6705.68) (5371.45) (3206.67)
Labor 2721.10 1412.29 4854.39 5815.44
(3655.96) (2920.97) (3518.95) (4146.84)
Total 10121.1 10186.3 10040.4 9867.8
(10048.1) (11005.4) (7813.8) (9021.3)
Annual Expenditure (RMB)
Children Clothes 234.8 244.1 228.6 178.3
(178.7) (184.2) (171.2) (143.9)
School Supplies 35.4 36.8 33.8 29.8
(40.4) (42.3) (37.3) (34.1)
Children’s Allowance 93.4 98.1 85.9 82.3
(144.2) (149.8) (134.3) (129.8)
Item (Dummy)
Reading Materials 0.604 0.623 0.612 0.413
(0.489) (0.485) (0.488) (0.493)
Dictionary 0.956 0.952 0.968 0.945
(0.204) (0.213) (0.175) (0.229)
Desk or Bookshelf 0.626 0.630 0.645 0.520
(0.484) (0.483) (0.479) (0.501)
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves.
Note: Total income includes agriculture and labor income. All monetary variables were converted to real terms
(the year 2000 RMB value) using the national Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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Table 3.5: Parental and Children’s Own Time Inputs by Father’s Migration
Status
Total Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Father Weekly Hours
Home Production 9.368 9.795 7.727 12.178
(11.559) (11.500) (10.266) (16.166)
Help Children with Homework 1.769 1.892 1.592 1.185
(3.062) (3.165) (2.943) (2.183)
Play or Talk with Children 2.883 2.958 2.790 2.454
(3.741) (3.826) (3.613) (3.290)
Mother Weekly Hours
Home Production 30.172 29.125 31.539 34.096
(18.936) (14.042) (26.970) (17.158)
Help Children with Homework 1.319 1.264 1.557 0.843
(2.688) (2.607) (2.982) (1.964)
Play or Talk with Children 3.773 3.668 4.038 3.650
(4.928) (4.988) (4.975) (4.099)
Child Weekly Hours
Home Production 3.20 2.95 3.44 4.46
(5.44) (5.17) (5.71) (6.36)
Take Care Others 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.89
(1.91) (1.87) (1.86) (2.33)
Do Homework 10.05 9.78 10.50 10.63
(6.51) (6.38) (6.56) (7.34)
Watch TV 6.32 6.26 6.42 6.35
(5.05) (5.01) (4.99) (5.59)
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves.
Note: For the migrant father, weekly hours variables reflect the time he spends when he stays at home.
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Table 3.6: Father’s Bargaining Power by Father’s Migration Status
Total Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Decision on Child’s School 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.19
(0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.39)
Decision on How to Treat the Child 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.24
(0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43)
Decision on Purchase of New Durable Goods 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.22
(0.42) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42)
Decision on Management of Family Finance 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.41
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Decision on Planting of Crops 0.30 0.33 0.27 0.24
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.43)
Decision on Livestock Transaction 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.30
(0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 and 2004 waves. Note: Questions regarding the power
of decision-making in the family are reported by the mother. If the father makes decisions, the variables are coded as 1; if the

































































































Table 3.7: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-cognitive Skills: Main Results
Internalizing Score Externalizing Score
OLS 2SLS FE FE+IV OLS 2SLS FE FE+IV
Father Migration -0.046*** -0.058** -0.025*** -0.029* -0.084*** -0.088*** -0.054*** -0.058***
(0.019) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016)
F test 17.24 35.82 17.24 35.82
Over-identification test 0.11 0.79 0.11 0.79
Observations 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558
R2 0.205 0.202 0.013 0.008 0.029 0.028 0.014 0.009
Note: Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The dependent variables are the
internalizing and externalizing scores. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. The instrumental vari-
ables include the employment and wage in the top destination provinces provided in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook. For OLS and 2SLS
specifications, control variables include child’s age and gender, parental age and education, number of siblings, whether any grandparent resides
at home or not, village level population, whether has elementary school, and whether has middle school, as well as county and year fixed effects.
For FE and FE with IV specifications, time-invariant variables such as child’s gender, parental education, number of siblings, county fixed effect
































































































ATable 3.8: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-cognitive Skills: First-Stage
Regressions
Total IV Manufacturing IV Construction IV
2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE
Dest. Employment (1000) 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Dest. Wage (1000) 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.002)
Dest. Employment in Manuf. (1000) 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Dest. Wage in Manuf. (1000) 0.021*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.003)
Dest. Employment in Constr. (1000) 0.003*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Dest. Wage in Constr. (1000) 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558
R2 0.125 0.040 0.137 0.045 0.143 0.049
Note: Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The dependent
variables are the internalizing and externalizing scores. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive
skills. The instrumental variables include the employment and wage in the top destination provinces provided in the China La-
bor Statistical Yearbook. For 2SLS specifications, control variables include child’s age and gender, parental age and education,
number of siblings, whether any grandparent resides at home or not, village level population, whether has elementary school, and
whether has middle school, as well as county and year fixed effects. For FE with IV specifications, time-invariant variables such
as child’s gender, parental education, number of siblings, county fixed effect are excluded. Parental ages are also excluded from

































































































Table 3.9: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-cognitive Skills: Alternative In-
strumental Variables
Internalizing Score Externalizing Score
Manufacturing IV Construction IV Manufacturing IV Construction IV
2SLS FE+IV 2SLS FE+IV 2SLS FE+IV 2SLS FE+IV
Father Migration -0.054*** -0.034*** -0.044* -0.024 -0.084*** -0.056*** -0.087*** -0.068*
(0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.033) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032)
F test 19.28 37.87 15.31 34.64 19.28 37.87 15.31 34.64
Over-identification test 0.09 0.11 0.91 0.77 0.09 0.11 0.91 0.77
Observations 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558 3558
R2 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.020 0.020 0.006 0.005
Note: Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The dependent variables are
the internalizing and externalizing scores. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. The instrumental
variables include the employment and wage in the top destination provinces provided in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook. For 2SLS
specifications, control variables include child’s age and gender, parental age and education, number of siblings, whether any grandparent
resides at home or not, village level population, whether has elementary school, and whether has middle school, as well as county and year
fixed effects. For FE with IV specifications, time-invariant variables such as child’s gender, parental education, number of siblings, county
fixed effect are excluded. Parental ages are also excluded from FE and FE with IV specifications, due to co-linearity with the variation of
child’s age.
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Table 3.10: Mechanisms 1: Parental Financial Inputs
Panel A log(Income)
Total Agriculture Labor
Father Migration 0.761*** -0.929*** 11.944***
(0.215) (0.243) (1.110)
F test 35.82 35.82 35.82
Over-identification test 1.85 2.97 1.16
Observations 3558 3558 3558




Father Migration -0.671*** -0.291 0.055
(0.249) (0.273) (0.249)
F test 35.82 35.82 35.82
Over-identification test 2.01 0.06 1.84
Observations 3558 3558 3558
RMSE 0.770 0.997 0.892
Panel C Items (dummy)
Reading Materials Desk Dictionary
Father Migration -0.378*** 0.008 -0.254*
(0.130) (0.055) (0.130)
F test 36.12 36.25 36.25
Over-identification test 3.99 0.30 0.53
Observations 3464 3494 3494
RMSE 0.422 0.192 0.421
Note: Total income includes farming, livestock, and labor income. All monetary variables
were converted to real terms (the year 2000 RMB value) using CPI. Standard errors in brack-
ets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The results
are based on FE with IV specification used in column (4) and (8) in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.11: Mechanisms 3: Parental and Children’ Own
Time Inputs
Panel A Father Time Allocation
Home Time Help Play
Production with Children Homework and Talk
Father Migration 0.408 -0.540** -0.153 -0.500**
(0.320) (0.246) (0.215) (0.230)
F test 51.01 51.01 51.05 51.07
Over-identification test 2.46 1.68 5.63 8.66
Observations 3224 3224 3226 3228
RMSE 1.021 0.864 0.740 0.830
Panel B Mother Time Allocation
Home Time Help Play
Production with Children Homework and Talk
Father Migration 0.440*** -0.242 -0.022 -0.570**
(0.167) (0.246) (0.196) (0.240)
F test 36.13 36.10 36.10 36.19
Over-identification test 4.15 8.22 0.01 11.71
Observations 3490 3490 3490 3496
RMSE 0.565 0.865 0.672 0.851
Panel C Child Time Allocation
Home Take Care Do Watch
Production Others Homework TV
Father Migration 0.676*** 0.713** -0.078 0.208
(0.142) (0.338) (0.466) (0.464)
F test 35.84 35.84 35.84 35.84
Over-identification test 0.27 0.07 0.43 0.01
Observations 3558 3558 3558 3558
RMSE 0.900 0.560 0.773 0.769
Note: Time variables are measured as weekly hours in log. Standard errors in brackets are sig-
nificant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The results are based on
FE with IV specification used in column (4) and (8) in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.12: Mechanisms 2: Father’s Bargaining Power
Child Treat Family Purchase Plant Livestock
School Child Finance Durables Crops Transaction
Father Migration 0.536** 0.525** 0.597** 0.215 0.094 0.228
(0.255) (0.229) (0.251) (0.277) (0.257) (0.270)
F test 36.55 36.69 35.57 37.22 36.95 36.58
Over-identification test 0.88 1.29 1.16 2.27 0.92 2.26
Observations 3474 3474 3474 3474 3478 3460
RMSE 0.424 0.380 0.410 0.462 0.429 0.448
Note: Questions regarding the power of decision-making in the family are reported by the mother. If the father
makes decisions, the variables are coded as 1; if the mother makes the decision or the parents make decision
together, the variables are coded as 0. Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1%


































































































Table 3.13: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-cognitive Skills: Subsample Results
Child Gender Mother Education Father Education Village Phone Service
Boys Girls Low High Low High No Yes
Internalizing Score
Father Migration -0.057*** -0.028* -0.036* -0.025 -0.033* -0.028* -0.030 -0.029
(0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.030) (0.022)
F test 17.78 16.38 21.60 15.6 12.33 17.34 19.29 30.44
Over-identification test 0.08 0.00 0.31 0.03 0.49 0.27 0.91 0.08
Observations 1900 1658 1796 1762 806 2752 1502 2056
Externalizing Score
Father Migration -0.065*** -0.047*** -0.071*** -0.050*** -0.066*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.059***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.025)
F test 17.78 16.38 21.60 15.6 12.33 17.34 19.29 30.44
Over-identification test 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.91 1.21 1.29 0.063 0.26
Observations 1900 1658 1796 1762 806 2752 1502 2056
Note: Low-educated mothers and fathers are those who did not graduate from the elementary schools. Standard errors in brackets are significant at
*10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The results are based on FE with IV specification used in column (4) and (8) in Table 3.7.
246
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND




CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
Table 3.14: Survey Questions on Children’s Non-cognitive Skills in GSCF
2000 and 2004 waves
Externalization Behavioral Problems
⋄ I break things on purpose
⋄ I lose my temper with others
⋄ Even if wrong, I am reluctant to listen to others
⋄ I steal things from others or my home
⋄ I like to show off my strengths in front of others
⋄ I always want to be the center of attention
⋄ I often quarrel with others
⋄ I do not observe school discipline
⋄ I like to brag
⋄ It bothers me if others do things better than I do
⋄ I act impulsively
⋄ I often say obscenities
⋄ I often make fun of others
⋄ I sometimes tell lies
⋄ I am easily angered
⋄ I often disregard other people’s ideas
⋄ I sometimes menace and even hurt others
Internalization Behavioral Problems
⋄ I don’t want others to meddle in my own business
⋄ I can’t concentrate on what I am doing
⋄ I have many strange/weird ideas (often daydream)
⋄ I easily get flushed/frustrated/anxious
⋄ I can’t do things well when my parents are not present
⋄ I am very indifferent to others
⋄ I am very shy
⋄ I am often teased by classmates
⋄ I do not feel guilty, even if I have done something wrong
⋄ I feel inferior to others
⋄ I often am suspicious of others
⋄ I prefer to be alone
⋄ I often feel nervous
⋄ I am often bored
⋄ I stay quiet when I am with my classmates or friends
⋄ There is always something to worry about
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Table 3.15: Father’s Migration Duration: by Year
2000 2004
Months Away Months Away Months Away
Consecutively During Weekdays
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Father Non-Migrant 0.428 (1.691) 0.082 (0.784) 0.040 (0.540)
Intra-provincial Migrant 3.09 (3.845) 2.014 (3.183) 0.679 (2.121)
Inter-provincial Migrant 6.109 (3.347) 4.466 (3.446) 0.912 (2.199)
Total 1.877 (3.289) 0.960 (2.428) 0.282 (1.377)
Note: A father’s migration status is defined by his workplace location. In particular, we define a
father to be a non-migrant if his workplace is located in the village, an intra-provincial migrant if
his workplace is located outside of the village but within Gansu province and an inter-provincial
migrant if his workplace is located in another province outside of Gansu.
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Table 3.16: Summary Statistics by Father’s Migration Status (2000)
Total Father Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Internalizing Score -0.003 0.026 -0.037 -0.138
(1.001) (0.960) (1.050) (1.146)
Externalizing Score -0.003 0.010 -0.013 -0.078
(1.001) (0.968) (1.051) (1.079)
Child Female 0.469 0.467 0.487 0.393
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.491)
Child’s Age 10.999 10.975 11.058 10.953
(1.096) (1.089) (1.106) (1.114)
Father’s Years of Edu. 6.757 6.638 7.182 5.866
(4.154) (4.148) (4.074) (4.418)
Mother’s Years of Edu. 3.749 3.777 4.057 1.955
(4.014) (4.001) (4.103) (3.189)
Father’s Age 37.500 37.764 37.179 36.426
(5.139) (5.397) (4.486) (5.313)
Mother’s Age 35.119 35.373 34.838 33.963
(4.540) (4.854) (3.732) (4.672)
Number of Siblings 1.329 1.332 1.297 1.464
(0.717) (0.715) (0.714) (0.734)
Grandparent at Home 0.227 0.238 0.199 0.250
(0.419) (0.426) (0.400) (0.435)
Village Population 1.594 1.583 1.631 1.515
(0.819) (0.832) (0.808) (0.732)
Village has Elem. School 0.713 0.666 0.801 0.750
(0.453) (0.472) (0.400) (0.435)
Village has Mid. School 0.049 0.045 0.062 0.027
(0.216) (0.207) (0.241) (0.162)
Dest. Wage 8763.128 8713.006 8774.322 9209.121
(2248.299) (2221.963) (2187.512) (2726.506)
Dest. Employment (1000) 12769.524 12854.951 12846.605 11538.878
(10689.137) (10429.568) (11028.795) (11556.224)
Dest. Wage in Manuf. 8120.001 8083.147 8099.077 8590.593
(2047.102) (2003.453) (2022.871) (2508.707)
Dest. Employment in Manuf. (1000) 777.959 775.408 778.677 799.938
(773.425) (752.567) (804.270) (830.174)
Dest. Wage in Constr. 12218.446 12142.979 12292.206 12611.541
(2444.164) (2404.783) (2476.840) (2640.515)
Dest. Employment in Constr. (1000) 231.081 230.957 227.297 250.830
(173.496) (168.574) (177.901) (198.764)
Observations 1779 1159 471 149
% of Total Sample 100% 65.1% 26.5% 8.4%
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2000 waves. Note: The sample includes children who
appear in both 2000 waves. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. Monetary
value in 2004 real RMB.
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Table 3.17: Summary Statistics by Father’s Migration Status (2004)
Total Father Non-migrant Intra-provincial Inter-provincial
Migrant Migrant
Internalizing Score 0.003 0.012 0.013 -0.097
(0.999) (0.998) (1.001) (0.999)
Externalizing Score 0.003 -0.003 0.043 -0.077
(0.999) (1.003) (1.018) (0.910)
Child Female 0.468 0.462 0.482 0.477
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.501)
Child’s Age 14.999 14.993 15.026 14.960
(1.096) (1.094) (1.084) (1.146)
Father’s Years of Edu. 6.757 6.657 7.248 5.980
(4.154) (4.182) (4.026) (4.192)
Mother’s Years of Edu. 3.749 3.745 4.076 2.738
(4.014) (4.009) (4.078) (3.690)
Father’s Age 41.486 41.894 40.943 40.034
(5.140) (5.489) (4.177) (4.672)
Mother’s Age 39.106 39.408 38.729 37.951
(4.540) (4.781) (3.721) (4.721)
Number of Siblings 1.329 1.345 1.278 1.362
(0.722) (0.750) (0.663) (0.670)
Grandparent at Home 0.186 0.175 0.210 0.195
(0.389) (0.380) (0.408) (0.397)
Village Population 1.829 1.768 2.152 1.286
(2.419) (2.007) (3.449) (0.570)
Village has Elem. School 0.948 0.941 0.953 0.980
(0.223) (0.235) (0.211) (0.141)
Village has Mid. School 0.153 0.162 0.142 0.114
(0.360) (0.369) (0.350) (0.319)
Dest. Wage 15427.595 15486.445 15359.412 15185.356
(4160.679) (4285.874) (3929.130) (3888.306)
Dest. Employment (1000) 13893.168 14358.912 13844.490 10424.236
(13560.810) (13600.187) (13686.885) (12380.715)
Dest. Wage in Manuf. 13155.445 13197.117 13127.709 12918.973
(2898.862) (2977.575) (2620.444) (3115.359)
Dest. Employment in Manuf. (1000) 770.447 799.776 751.233 603.051
(912.259) (918.538) (922.172) (812.180)
Dest. Wage in Constr. 18445.588 18467.664 18503.565 18090.597
(3687.753) (3782.162) (3522.433) (3450.991)
Dest. Employment in Constr. (1000) 238.851 243.602 239.513 199.804
(192.807) (191.835) (193.886) (193.814)
Observations 1779 1119 548 112
% of Total Sample 100% 62.9% 30.8% 6.3%
Data source: Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) 2004 waves. Note: The sample includes children who
appear in 2004 waves. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. Monetary value

































































































Table 3.18: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-cognitive Skills: Additional Controls
Internalizing Score Externalizing Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Father Migration -0.027* -0.029* -0.021 -0.030* -0.024* -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Child Poor Health -0.049 -0.068
(0.093) (0.085)
Chinese Test Score 0.043 0.057
(0.039) (0.035)
Student Violate Discipline -0.082** -0.030
(0.041) (0.040)
Student Disrupt the Class -0.048 0.003
(0.043) (0.041)
Teacher Absent -0.223*** -0.146***
(0.047) (0.045)
School Close -0.264*** -0.324***
(0.044) (0.043)
Father Poor Health 0.075 -0.043
(0.072) (0.069)
Mother Poor Health -0.096 -0.009
(0.069) (0.066)
Log(Household Income) 0.007 0.020
(0.036) (0.035)
Father log (Hours with Children) 0.093** 0.062**
(0.041) (0.030)
Mother log (Hours with Children) 0.051 0.045
(0.041) (0.039)
Constant 2.753 1.830 1.959 -0.341 1.205 2.657 2.349 0.605 -1.975 -0.322
(4.516) (5.996) (4.205) (4.638) (4.643) (4.233) (5.473) (4.058) (4.438) (4.406)
County×Year dummies Yes No No No No Yes No No No No
F test 35.82 27.78 33.22 34.67 34.89 35.82 27.78 33.22 34.67 34.89
Over-identification test 0.72 0.89 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.89 0.79 0.77 0.77
Observations 3558 2547 3508 3529 3178 3558 2547 3508 3529 3178
R2 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.009
Note: Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The dependent variables are the internalizing and
externalizing scores. Higher internalizing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. The instrumental variables include the employment and wage
in the top destination provinces provided in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook. The results are based on FE with IV specification used in column (4) and (8) in
Table 3.7.
252
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
Table 3.19: Father’s Migration Status and Child Non-
cognitive Skills: Value-added Model
Internalizing Score 2004 Externalizing Score 2004
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Father Migration -0.060** -0.082*** -0.079** -0.080***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.028) (0.034)
Internalizing Score 2000 0.040 0.040
(0.029) (0.029)
Externalizing Score 2000 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.030) (0.029)
F test 15.78 15.78
Over-identification test 0.43 0.43
Observations 1779 1779 1779 1779
R2 0.052 0.034 0.067 0.049
Note: Standard errors in brackets are significant at *10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the
county level. The dependent variables are the internalizing and externalizing scores. Higher internal-
izing or externalizing scores indicate higher non-cognitive skills. The instrumental variables include
the employment and wage in the top destination provinces provided in the China Labor Statisti-
cal Yearbook. For OLS and 2SLS specifications, control variables include child’s age and gender,
parental age and education, number of siblings, whether any grandparent resides at home or not,
village level population, whether has elementary school, and whether has middle school, as well as
county and year fixed effects.
253
CHAPTER 3. PATERNAL MIGRATION, INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, AND
CHILDREN’S NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL
CHINA
Table 3.20: Mechanisms: Parenting Style
and Parent Health Condition (FE+IV)
Harsh Parenting Health Condition
Mother Child Father Mother
Father Migration -0.388 0.071 0.079 -0.200
(0.332) (0.370) (0.244) (0.257)
F test 69.22 69.71 68.68 69.65
Observations 3504 3556 3504 3542
RMSE 0.535 0.607 0.395 0.421
Note: Parenting style is measured as whether the parents beat the chil-
dren when children misbehave. Both the mother and the target child
have answered these questions. The father’s and mother’s health con-
ditions are self-reported. Standard errors in brackets are significant at
*10% **5%, and ***1% and clustered at the county level. The results
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